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ABSTRACT 
CHRISTINE E. BOYLE:  The changing nature of irrigation development in Northern 
China:  An examination of the impacts of fiscal structure on village-level irrigation 
provision 
(Under the direction of Dr. Yan Song) 
 
In recent decades, debate over how to promote water conservation in irrigation has 
increased as water has become scarcer and competition for water has increased – 
between neighboring locales, between farms and cities, and between people and their 
environment.  The irrigation debate is particularly salient as agricultural water use is 
directly tied to food production and rural livelihoods in many of the world‘s poorest 
communities.  Despite widespread reforms to promote irrigation efficiency and large 
influxes of infrastructure investment to improve water distribution, China‘s record for 
increasing irrigation-related water conservation and alleviating poverty, without 
disrupting agricultural production, remains poor.   
This dissertation examines local irrigation infrastructure provision processes to better 
understand how China‘s decentralized fiscal structure impacts regional irrigation 
development distribution and on-the-ground irrigation system performance.  This is 
accomplished by investigating the case of northern China where roughly 42% of the 
nation‘s population lives, 250 million small plot farms operate, yet where water 
availability is only 757 cubic meters per capita, about one-tenth of the world average.   
To unfold the relationship among investment, fiscal structure and irrigation 
performance, this dissertation uses descriptive and multivariate analysis of a panel 
iii 
data set for seventy villages in northern China to track irrigation investment patterns 
and outcomes over a ten-year period.  Analysis reveals that despite increasing 
amounts of investment overall, irrigation provision disparity between villages in 
northern China is growing.  Further, analysis of the determinants of village irrigation 
investment portfolios indicates that water shortages do influence farmer investment 
behavior and upper-level government targeting for investment funds.  Results further 
reveal a shift in the locus of decision making over village-level irrigation projects in 
recent years, from village level decision making, to irrigation districts and county-
level water resource bureau agencies‘ direct involvement in village irrigation 
development.  This re-concentration of fiscal decision making has many implications 
for regional irrigation coordination, poverty alleviation and northern China‘s 
precarious water resource future. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: How fiscal 
decentralization impacts irrigation development 
in northern China 
 
 
 
1.1. Background1 
1.1.1. Irrigation development in China struggles to achieve its goals 
In recent decades, debate over how to promote water conservation in irrigation 
has increased as water has become scarcer and competition for it has increased – 
between neighboring locales, between farms and cities, and between people and their 
environment.  The irrigation debate is particularly salient as agricultural water use is 
tied directly to food production and rural livelihoods in many of the world‘s poorest 
communities.  Despite widespread reforms to promote irrigation efficiency and large 
influxes of infrastructure to improve water distribution, China‘s record for increasing 
irrigation-related water conservation and alleviating poverty, without disrupting 
agricultural production, remains poor (Huang, Dawe et al. 2005).  
                                                 
1
 This dissertation has IRB approval (Study #: 08-2072). 
2 
Irrigation in China remains a relatively low technology and low efficiency 
operation (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007).  Households typically cultivate a few small 
plots of land and use traditional irrigation techniques such as flood irrigation and 
burrowing (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007).  In the past thirty years the government has 
worked to expand irrigated arable land in order to boost yields and rural incomes  
(Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006), yet several observers of China‘s agricultural 
development doubt the ability of the current system to service this increased irrigated 
area due to decreasing water availability (Zhu, Giordano et al. 2004) and others 
express doubt that the irrigated land expansion will contribute to increases in 
agricultural yields (Hu, Huang et al. 2000).   
1.1.2.  Shifts in fiscal policy impact irrigation 
Understanding recent irrigation policy in China requires looking at the 
increasingly decentralized structure of China‘s irrigation infrastructure provision.  In 
the early 1980s the Chinese central government began experimenting with 
decentralized fiscal policy by creating arrangements that changed the rules for how 
locally collected revenues were shared with the central government (Oksenberg and 
Tong 1991)
2
.  Under reform, local governments gained greater discretion and 
flexibility in deciding how to generate revenue and make expenditures (Oi 1992).  
The effects of these policy shifts on irrigation are observed in the form of increased 
                                                 
2
 A large literature on fiscal policy in China exists and categorizes the many different revenue sharing 
forms, and the impacts of such agreements in the post-reform era.  For much more detailed look at 
China‘s fiscal contracting, extra budgetary revenue structure, and other experimental fiscal policies see: 
Oksenberg and Tong (1991),Wong (1991),  Oi (1992),  West (1995), Jin et al (2005), Lin and Liu 
(2000), Tsui and Wang (2004), Whiting (2007).   
3 
local investment and irrigation infrastructure planning (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003; 
Fan, Zhang et al. 2004).  
Local responsibility over irrigation development, as opposed to centrally 
planned systems, changes how projects are planned, funded, built and maintained.  
First, local irrigation development goals are often different than upper-level 
government goals (Ostrom 1991; Uphoff 1991).  For example, local governments and 
farmers are interested in securing more water for crops and less interested in regional 
water cooperation and conservation.  Next, local governments have very limited 
funds available for public works projects such as irrigation development.  Particularly 
given the high upfront capital costs for canal construction, many local governments 
lack the revenue sources to cover such costs.  Next, given irrigation networks 
classification as common pool goods, when local governments are unable to provide 
irrigation works, systems often fall into disrepair
3
. On the other hand, when irrigation 
systems are locally funded and built, studies show increased feeling of ownership and 
responsibility over the infrastructure leads to better maintenance of the canals 
(Coward 1986).  For these reasons, impacts of decentralized fiscal policy go beyond 
the flow of funds and directly impact how irrigation systems are built and maintained.   
Overall in China, local and central government investment into irrigation in 
2000 exceeded 35 billion Yuan (USD $5.1 billion) (MWR 2000-2008), indicating a 
                                                 
3 An underlying explanation for the difficulty in developing well-managed local irrigation systems 
relates to the specific characteristics of irrigation systems as common pool resources Ostrom, E. (1991). 
Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action. New York Cambridge 
University Press.  The two primary problems associated with common-pool goods are:  (1) the overuse 
of the good where one person‘s use subtracts from benefits available to others; and (2) the free rider 
problem where excluding others from gaining the benefits of use of the good is costly and difficult to 
monitor.  These problems pose specific difficulties for irrigation planners and managers looking to 
develop fair and equitable irrigation systems.   
4 
strong commitment to improving irrigation systems.  However, despite massive 
influxes of irrigation investment, agricultural water use in China is inefficient by 
global standards.  A recent study found that due to the poor management of the 
nation‘s canal network, only 53 percent of water from primary canals is actually 
delivered to the field (Cai 2010).  Given the resolve of China‘s leadership to promote 
water conservation, it remains unclear how best to improve rural irrigation 
performance given the complex set of incentives faced by localities tasked with 
irrigation infrastructure development.  Unraveling the relationship between 
decentralized irrigation provision and irrigation outcomes will aid in crafting policies 
that work to achieve China‘s irrigation policy goals. 
1.2 Study Justification: How fiscal decentralization 
explains irrigation development outcomes 
This section makes explicit the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and irrigation development.  This is accomplished first by defining fiscal 
decentralization, then defining irrigation development and its policy outcomes, and 
finally by describing the overlap between an institutional structure (fiscal 
decentralization) and a function of decentralized water management policy (irrigation 
development).  Finally, this section presents how this dissertation will examine the 
crossroads of fiscal policy and irrigation development. 
1.2.1 Define fiscal decentralization 
This study draws on the public economics literature, based in the Wicksellian 
orientation of public finance and fiscal decentralization (Wicksell 1977).  Under this 
tradition, the state is not treated as an exogenous force that perfects the outcomes of 
5 
the market economy.  Instead fiscal analysis is based in the assumption that ―the 
actual fiscal conduct of the state emerges through complex interactions among fiscal 
and political participants, and the precise character of those interactions is constrained 
and shaped by a governing institution and constitutional framework‖ (page 10) 
(Backhaus and Wagner 2005).  Using this analytical framework, fiscal structure is 
defined as the composition of government expenditure and the structure of taxation 
and public revenue generation.  Fiscal decentralization is defined as the devolution by 
central (i.e. national) government of specific functions to local (i.e. province or 
municipal) governments that are independent of the center. 
Fiscal decentralization arose as a popular institution across the developing 
world in the 1980s and 1990 under the reasoning that decentralization can make 
government more responsive to the governed by ―tailoring levels of consumption to 
the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups‖ (Wallis and Oates 1988).  
Fiscal decentralization is theorized to promote economic vitality by providing sub-
national (province, county, township or village) governments‘ authority to make local 
public investment decisions based upon what is in need by that locality.  The 
academic literature on decentralized fiscal policy argues that greater flexibility on the 
part of the localities, given appropriate controls by the state, tends to be superior 
fiscal policy (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Faguet 2002); however China-specific 
literature contends that decentralization has resulted in increasing regional disparities  
and under-provision of public goods in rural areas (Zhang 2006).   
The previous two decades have seen shifts in China‘s fiscal structure.  
Important developments, to be discussed more in depth in later chapters,  include: 1) 
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alterations in the distribution of revenue sources (for example, shifts in revenue-
sharing agreements between province and center, and down the hierarchy); 2) vertical 
shifts in the locus of responsibility for certain functions from localities to counties 
and townships (as a consequence of the 2002 tax-for-fee reforms); and 3) horizontal 
changes in the structuring of local governance responsibilities (such as the creation of 
special purpose agencies for the delivery of local services in response to local 
government‘s lack of public funds).  The implications of these changes represent an 
important area of study in understanding irrigation governance at the regional and 
local level. With these policy shifts come changes in the responsiveness of 
government and in the distribution of services and benefits conferred to villages and 
farmers.  
1.2.2.  Define irrigation development 
In the past twenty years, irrigation development has increasingly been 
considered a social-technical sector, with organizational and technical factors 
considered equally important in improving system performance as the physical and 
engineering facets of irrigation systems (Uphoff 1991, Ostrom 1990).  While farmer 
participation continues to receive considerable attention by scholars and policy 
makers concerned with improving irrigation system outcomes (Uphoff 1986; Parlin 
and Lusk 1991; Ostrom 1992; Lin 2003; Ou, Zachernuk et al. 2004), how farmers, 
contractors, village collectives and government agencies‘ work together  to manage 
and invest into irrigated areas has not received much attention by researchers, apart 
from acknowledging that the relationship between farmers and upper-level agencies 
needs to be better understood (Agrawal 2002).   
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This study uses the term ‗irrigation development‘ to refer to both improving 
the performance of existing irrigation systems and also to expanding irrigation service 
to previously non-irrigated areas.  Irrigation development thus includes 
responsibilities of operations and maintenance, in addition to construction activities 
which establish new irrigated area.  The particular facet of village-level irrigation 
development this dissertation investigates is the upgrading and construction of surface 
water infrastructure such as canals, pumps, measuring devices, sluice gates, and 
diesel generators (for pumping water uphill).  Such infrastructure provides the ‗bones‖ 
of an irrigation system, around which other operational activities occur, including fee 
collection, delivery scheduling, and maintenance.  The structural, management and 
operational elements together comprise a village‘s irrigation system.   
Infrastructure provision and planning is a controversial budgetary activity for 
every village in China, involving coordinated decision making, tight budget 
constraints, and potentially uneven distribution of benefits (i.e. which sections of the 
village get lined canals, new control gates, etc).  How such budgetary decisions are 
made, and what entity makes such decisions, have been found to impact the outcomes 
of projects in terms of:  villagers‘ sense of ownership and desire to maintain the 
infrastructure (Coward 1986); how projects suit the ecological and social needs of the 
community (Uphoff 1991); and lastly, if the community has the local capacity to 
operate and maintain the infrastructure component, i.e. high tech drip irrigation 
systems (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007).  The outcomes of irrigation infrastructure 
development, although only one aspect of a local irrigation system, have been found 
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to contribute to reducing villages‘ poverty levels (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006) and to 
spur economic development (Fan 2002).  
Presuming that even the technical aspects of surface water irrigation 
development -- such as canal design, reliance on pumps, purchasing decisions over 
diesel generators, canal lining material and other equipment – are made within an 
underlying organizational framework, a more systematic analysis of fiscal 
management related to irrigation infrastructure provision is needed.  This analysis 
examines the structure, functions and outcomes of upper-level agencies, local 
irrigation managers and farmers responsible for irrigation system operations and 
development.  The organizational structure used to unpack these relationships is a 
fiscal decentralization framework, where the study measures how degrees of fiscal 
decentralization shift over time.   
1.2.3.  How fiscal decentralization explains irrigation development 
outcomes 
Given the need to understand more clearly how the impact of localized policy 
making and planning on irrigation development and performance, one way to 
accomplish this is by tracking and analyzing local irrigation development in a place 
with different levels of hierarchy involved in irrigation development.  The degree of 
decentralization can be assessed in two ways: 1) by examining composition of funds 
for developing local irrigation systems and 2) examining the degree of decision 
making autonomy over irrigation project funding held by local irrigation managers 
and upper-level irrigation agencies.  The impact of fiscal decentralization on 
irrigation development can be evaluated by looking at how variation in degrees of 
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fiscal decentralization results in different outcomes including: distribution of 
irrigation investment, water conservation, crop yields and farmer incomes.   
A broad literature on organizations and institutions across disciplines asserts 
that the internal structure of institutions matter for development (DiMaggio 1991; 
Ostrom 1991; Krishna 2002).  Across these literatures, organizations and the 
intermediary forces affecting outcomes, differ widely.  The theme tying together the 
disparate organizational theories is that underlying processes, not tied to rational 
behavior, explain organizational variation.  For the purposes of this dissertation one 
particular set of underlying processes is examined, that is, decision making around 
flows and channels of revenues and spending, or fiscal structure.  Fiscal structure is 
one element of local government organization and one that has yet to be investigated 
for the case of irrigation provision, particularly in water scarce locales. 
Why is fiscal structure critical to understanding local irrigation development?  
How fiscal decisions are made has profound consequences over all aspects of a given 
project‘s outcome, not limited to: what is built, how it is built, where it is built, who 
are the primary beneficiaries (and who are not), and ongoing maintenance and 
operation of the facility.  The interplay of public and private investment, and the 
underlying decision-making processes over allocation of budgetary funds, comprise a 
village‘s fiscal structure for irrigation provision.   
As villages have become more financially self-sufficient (Oi 1992; Wong 
1997) following a series of decentralization policies enacted during the post-reform 
era, villages often lack requisite capital resources to provide public goods, including 
irrigation infrastructure (Fan, Zhang et al. 2002; Tsai 2007).  In addition, village-level 
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investment portfolios have become more diverse than in pre-economic-reform.  
However, despite fiscal constraints, local irrigation investment activity in China 
continues to increase, yet there is little understanding as to the channels impacts of 
village-level public and private investment activity. 
The main hypothesis put forth in this dissertation is that fiscal policy structure 
influences distribution and outcomes of irrigation development.  Examining the 
diversity of fiscal policy structures within China‘s rural villages will aid in 
understanding successes and failures in China‘s irrigation development.  By paying 
heed to both village-level fiscal phenomena as well as institutional structures 
surrounding these phenomena, this study contributes to explaining obstacles to 
improving village-level irrigation management that are up to now, undocumented for 
northern China.   
1.3. Research objectives and questionsThis dissertation aims to 
examine how local fiscal policy impacts the channels and outcomes of village-level 
irrigation infrastructure provision in northern China between 1998 and 2008.  Further, 
this dissertation aims to contribute to explaining how a strong over-arching 
bureaucracy impacts local irrigation development outcomes and how water scarcity 
drives private investment behavior. 
Using village-level surface water management panel data sets collected by the 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), this study examines two facets of 
irrigation provision, (1) the channels and magnitudes of village-level investment 
across the sample villages, and (2) how local authority over irrigation funding 
impacts irrigation development outcomes.  These analyses will be carried out using 
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descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis to examine irrigation investment into 
70 villages in northern China.   
This dissertation examines two primary questions related to the above stated 
objectives: 
1) Examine channels of investment:  What incentives drive different 
sources to invest in village-level irrigation development? 
2) Examine how fiscal decentralization impacts irrigation development 
outcomes:  How does the degree of local fiscal authority over irrigation revenue and 
spending impact village-level irrigation system performance? 
To analyze these questions, this study uses village-level survey data from 
three provinces in northern China (Hebei, Henan, and Ningxia -- see Figure 1 for a 
map of the study area) dating between 1998 and 2008.  Within this dataset, and 
during the author‘s time in the field in northern China, variation was observed across 
villages and over time in irrigation investments, decision-making structures, projects 
types and water-resource conditions, leading to formulation of research questions to 
assess how flows of funds and irrigation outcomes have changed in China over the 
10-year study period. 
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Figure 1 Map of China with study area darkened 
 
1.4.  Placing the study: Irrigation and fiscal 
decentralization in modern China 
This dissertation examines local irrigation infrastructure provision processes 
to better understand how China‘s decentralized fiscal structure impacts regional 
irrigation development distribution and on-the-ground irrigation system performance.  
This is accomplished by investigating the case of northern China where roughly 42% 
of the nation‘s population lives, 250 million small plot farms operate, yet where water 
availability is only 757 m
3
 per capita, about one-tenth of the world average 
(World.Bank 2009).  Northern China, known as the ‗bread basket of China‘ also 
produces about 25% of China‘s grain (McKinsey 2009).  Recent droughts have 
affected 21 million hectares of crops and brought attention to the need to improve 
irrigation efficiency in order to maintain the nation‘s food security.   
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Modern China presents a vivid and compelling case through which to examine 
fiscal and organizational aspects of irrigation development for several reasons.  First, 
despite widespread reforms to promote irrigation efficiency and large influxes of 
infrastructure investment to improve water distribution, China‘s record for improving 
irrigation-related water conservation and alleviating poverty, without disrupting 
agricultural production, remains poor.  Second, despite a record of poor performance, 
investment into irrigation development is relatively high, and comes to the village 
through multiple channels, including government agencies, village collectives, 
contractors and farmers.  Next, the political structure of village-level irrigation 
governance has shifted numerous times over the last 30 years -- from a highly 
centralized system, to complete fiscal decentralization, and more recently, to a re-
concentration of fiscal authority over public projects at a regional level.  This 
variation allows both for a rich research design framework and an interesting story of 
how fiscal reform affects natural resource utilization.  Lastly, enduring water 
shortages in the study region, northern China, allow one to scrutinize irrigation 
investment, in response to changing water resource conditions.  Such crossroads 
create an interesting and useful case for examining environmental infrastructure 
planning. 
Amidst the numerous political, fiscal, agricultural and land use changes 
occurring in northern China, this dissertation aims to probe a small aspect of these 
colossal shifts.  Digging deeper into the issues of water scarcity, food production and 
infrastructure provision decision making, this dissertation expands understanding of 
land-society-natural resource interactions, in northern China and in other arid regions 
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of the world, by untangling the relationship between infrastructure investment, water 
resource scarcity and local fiscal authority. 
1.5. Précis 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the conceptual 
framework for the dissertation, as well as introducing the data and sample for the 
study.  Chapter 3 tracks the history of irrigation investment for surface water 
irrigation infrastructure in northern China using data over a 25-year period.  The 
chapter first builds a timeline of policy events affecting irrigation development during 
the study period.  Next, chapter 3 empirically analyzes surface water irrigation 
infrastructure investment in 70 villages in northern China between the years 1981 and 
2008.  Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the determinants of investment, and then 
uses multivariate analysis to examine the determinants of village-level surface water 
irrigation infrastructure channels of investment for the sample villages.  The 
determinants analysis investigates the targeting and demand side determinants of 
investment sources.  Drivers of private investment into surface water irrigation 
development are also examined.  Measures of investment, targeting and demand side 
factors are described in detail.  Chapter 5 analyzes impacts of localized authority on 
irrigation development outcomes.  This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on 
center local decision making for water-resource related infrastructures.  Measures of 
local revenue authority, water planning authority and irrigation development 
outcomes are described.  Next, the chapter uses multivariate analysis to examine how 
varying levels of local revenue authority over irrigation revenue and spending impact 
irrigation system performance.  The study uses several measures of revenue authority 
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to examine how local fiscal policy structure on irrigation outcomes in northern China.  
Chapter 6 reviews major findings and ties findings to larger policy questions around 
irrigation, fiscal policy and rural development.  It concludes by reviewing this 
dissertation‘s key theoretical contributions and directs for future research.   
  
  
 
 
Chapter 2:  Conceptual Framework: Linking 
theories of decentralization to irrigation 
development 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework to assess whether and how 
decentralization affects irrigation development and to answer the research questions 
posed in chapter 1.  Two particular aspects of decentralization are examined using 
village-level irrigation infrastructure investment as a means of assessing levels and 
impacts of decentralization on irrigation development.  First, diversity in village-level 
irrigation investment portfolios is considered an indicator of fiscal decentralization.  
Chapter 4 explores how different incentives drive diverse funding channels and 
investment levels into village-level irrigation investment portfolios.  Second, varying 
levels of irrigation revenue and spending authority to make irrigation investments are 
considered a form of China‘s fiscal decentralization structures.  Village-level 
irrigation revenue and spending authority are used to assess how decentralized fiscal 
and water planning authority impact specific irrigation development objectives, 
including water conservation, increasing crop yields and increasing farmer incomes.  
These two facets of decentralization, drivers of diverse channels of investment and 
impacts of revenue and
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 spending authority on irrigation development, provide the backbone of the two 
conceptual frameworks that will guide this dissertation.   
This chapter is divided into five parts.  The first part presents the empirical 
framework guiding this study, examination of village-level irrigation infrastructure 
investment channels and development decision making authority.  The second part 
presents an conceptual that specifies the relationships among variables used in 
analyses in chapters 4 and 5.  The third part introduces the northern China study area.  
The next part describes the data used for this study including the population, sample 
and survey instruments used for the study.  A summary concludes the chapter.   
2.2. A “bottom up” analytical approach 
The 2 conceptual frameworks presented in this paper are unique within the 
fiscal policy and irrigation development studies as they are neither province-level 
studies of fiscal decentralization, nor are they case studies of 1-2 villages, as fills the 
irrigation development literature.  Instead, this paper uses a village –level perspective 
to examine the crossroads of fiscal policy and irrigation development for northern 
China in 70 villages over a 10-year time period.  Irrigation development is viewed 
from the basic building block of rural Chinese society, the village, and a number of 
different conceptual dimensions are presented to examine fiscal structures present in 
northern China and the impacts of local fiscal authority on irrigation outcomes, as 
tracked in these 70 villages and reported by village leaders and surface water 
irrigation managers. 
In order to understand how and why fiscal decentralization impacts local 
irrigation development outcomes across northern China, this study focuses upon the 
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most basic unit of governance in rural China, the village.  Although field-level 
practices offer insight into agricultural water use practices and agricultural 
productivity, this study takes a step back, or a step up in this case, to view the larger 
institutions around on-field irrigation infrastructure investment, that is the village.  
Doing so allows viewing on-field practices as a set of behaviors nested within the 
larger irrigation bureaucracy, following in the tradition of organizational theorists 
Granovetter and Dimaggio (Granovetter 1985; DiMaggio 1991).  Further, given the 
characteristics of surface water irrigation systems as a common pool resource, defined 
as ―a valued natural or human made resource facility that (are) available to more than 
one person and subject to degradation as a result of overuse‖ (Ostrom 1991), studying 
irrigation provision at the individual level leaves out important issues of coordination, 
public and private investment decision making, interactions with the bureaucracy, and 
other contextual factors necessary to understand a village‘s irrigation development 
story.  Province and regional-level studies also fail to locate the bulk of irrigation 
planning decision making, which often takes place within the village itself. 
In China, the nexus of local power is the village administration (leader, party 
secretary, irrigation manager).  From the grassroots (village) level, one can observe 
how funds flow and policy decisions channel their way to the village.  Policy and 
investment decisions often wind down the bureaucratic hierarchy, from the State 
Council, to the province, county, township, and finally, to the village.  
Implementation of policy and investment priorities at the local level in China has 
created a wide range of on-the-ground investment frameworks for irrigation system 
development.  Understanding how village fiscal decisions are made, and how this 
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relates to the larger regional, village and irrigation system operations, is the basis for 
this unique view of irrigation development in China. This dissertation uses survey 
data collected at three points in time (2001, 2004, and 2008), for seventy villages in 
northern China representing a wide range of local fiscal policy arrangements for 
surface water irrigation infrastructure provision.  In doing so, this study uses an 
inductive approach to assess fiscal decentralization in China and how decentralization 
policies impact irrigation development. 
While villages in this study are located in different parts of northern China, 
the physical structure of canal systems in each irrigation district (ID) and their 
organization are similar. Each ID has a set of main canals that take their water 
directly out of the Yellow or Hai Rivers, which run west to east across north and 
northeast China (refer to Figure 1 for a map of the region). Officials from the ID, 
depending on their allocations from the regional Water Resource Bureau, or Yellow 
River Basin Commission, make up a water allocation plan for each village. In most of 
the study IDs, there is a metered gate that supplies water to each village. This makes 
each village more or less an independent agent of the ID. Such arrangements are 
typical of villages in northern China next to the Yellow River. The canal network in 
the village, then, is completely maintained by the village and all of the water that 
flows into the village is for the exclusive use of the village‘s own residents (and does 
not have to be shared with villages either up or down stream). In each village, there is 
always one person – whether leader or appointed water manager – that is responsible 
for coordinating water deliveries from the IDs and remittances of water fees from the 
village.    
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2.2.1. Decentralized fiscal policy as a factor hypothesized to impact 
village-level irrigation investment channels and outcomes 
Based on reviews of the determinants of irrigation investment literature and 
impacts of fiscal decentralization literatures (found in chapters 4 and 5 respectively), 
decentralized fiscal policy is hypothesized to impact irrigation development in two 
ways.  First, through diversifying of the channels of irrigation investment in China‘s 
villages.  Second, through variation in degrees of authority over fiscal decision 
making for village irrigation development investments.  Although the literature, 
hypotheses, measures and models will be presented in the analytical chapters 4 and 5, 
it is useful at this early point in the dissertation to introduce the basic conceptual 
frameworks providing the backbone for this study.   
2.2.2. Conceptual Frameworks 
This section presents and describes two separate conceptual frameworks.  This 
first conceptualizes the analysis found in chapter 4, assessing how incentives from 
different funding sources drive levels of investment.  The second conceptualizes the 
analysis found in chapter 5, assessing the impact of local fiscal and water planning 
authority on irrigation development outcomes.   
2.2.2.1.  Drivers of irrigation investment 
Based on literature reviewed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, this study 
hypothesizes that the three main funding sources contributing to irrigation investment 
in China villages – upper-level government agencies, the village collective and 
farmers – each have separate incentives driving how much money they invest into a 
village‘s irrigation investment infrastructure.  In summary of the literature review in 
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chapter 4, while upper-level governments investments are driven by aims to reduce 
disparity and provide high cost public goods to promote private sector productivity 
(Aschauer 1989), public investment by local governments is driven by accountability 
of leaders and local economic base (Zhang, Fan et al. 2004).  Private investment is 
driven by an incentive to avoid water resource uncertainty to make revenue from 
higher value crops. 
The measurement of decentralization in this analysis is village -level irrigation 
investment composition by multiple sources.  Three separate measures of irrigation 
investment are considered:  1) total magnitude of investment from all sources; 2) 
share of investment from upper-level government and village collective; and 3) the 
presence of farmer investment in the village.   
Figure 2 Conceptual model for determinants of village irrigation investment 
from diverse funding sources 
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Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework to guide this portion of the study, 
referred to as ‗drivers of investment‘.  It consists of two conceptual dimensions 
hypothesized to drive investment into village-level irrigation investment, targeting 
factors and demand side factors.  The conceptual model illustrates the posed 
relationships among a village‘s irrigation investment composition, its irrigated area 
and local water resource conditions.  For the upper-level government funds, 
investment levels are determined by: targeting factors including increasing effective 
irrigated area in China‘s villages and providing drought relief.  For local funding 
sources, village collectives and farmers, the drivers to invest can be categorized as 
demand drivers, and drivers include a diversified village economy which generates 
funds for public goods including irrigation and securing water supply in villages with 
low water reliability in order to minimize uncertainty around crop watering.  Other 
village-level variables are included as controls: whether or not the surface water 
manager is a cadre was found to influence the political capital in a village and the 
selection of villages for funding projects (Dong 2000); non-collective management 
such as water user associations or contractors divert budgetary decisions away from 
the village collective, thus impacting the flows of funds into irrigation infrastructure; 
Also considered are socio-economic factors such as number of agricultural workers 
and average farmer income in the village.  The specific hypotheses associated with 
each of these control variables are too many to elaborate upon here, but significant 
effects will be discussed in the results sections in chapter 4.   
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2.2.2.2. Impacts of local revenue authority on irrigation 
development outcomes  
Figure 3 depicts the posed relationships between a village‘s level of fiscal and 
water planning authority and three measures of village-level irrigation performance: 
crop water use, farmer incomes and grain yields.  The literatures informing this 
conceptual framework are the fiscal decentralization and environmental governance 
bodies of work.  Detailed review of the relevant literature, on which this conceptual 
framework is based, can be found in chapter 5.    
Based upon the conceptual model illustrated below, villages with higher levels 
of authority (fiscal and water planning) retained by the village allow for provision of 
irrigation services closely tailored to local conditions, and therefore will result in 
better irrigation development outcomes.  Fiscal authority is conceptualized in two 
ways.  First, fiscal authority is represented as a village‘s marginal retention of 
irrigation revenue (MRR), defined as the portion of irrigation fee revenue retained by 
village for discretionary use as a share of total irrigation fee receipts.  This 
conceptualization of fiscal decentralization has been used in several studies at the 
province, state or county levels (Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Lin and Liu 2000; Akai 
and Sakata 2002).  Fiscal authority is also conceptualized by a number of other 
indicators regarding who has authority over village fiscal decisions including:  who 
sets the irrigation fees, who decides on water allocation to farms, who signs contracts 
and whether or not a village has any local investment.  The presence of local 
investment indicates discretionary spending authority is held at the village level.   
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Figure 3 Conceptual model for estimating impact of local fiscal structure on 
irrigation development outcomes  
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also indicates clearer ownership and division of responsibility over the canal network.  
More defined ownership structures are theorized to increased maintenance and 
investment into canal networks (Nobe and Sampath 1986; Ostrom 1992).  Land and 
water endowments likewise affect water use and agricultural yields, in the positive 
direction, with villages with higher natural endowments using more water and 
producing higher crop yields (Fan and Zhang 2002).  Additional discussion of 
hypotheses of variables with significant effects can be found in the Chapter 5 results 
section.   
2.2.3. Summary 
For both the drivers of investment and impacts of local fiscal and planning 
authority analyses, the study period covers 10 years, as recorded in 3 points in time.  
Several iterations of investment, fiscal and water resource policies changes occurred 
during the study period (see section 3.2, Timeline of economic and political events 
affecting irrigation development in China).  Given the incremental adoption of 
policies across northern China, this study does not account for specific policy changes 
in the analysis.  Instead, the analysis draws on the conceptual categories to measure 
on-the-ground changes in investment, fiscal structure and water planning authority 
that are likely driven by the multiple policy mandates.   
2.3. Study Area:  Northern China 
The three provinces included in the survey study area (Ningxia, Hebei, and 
Henan) are in the north-central and north-eastern regions of China and located in the 
Yellow and Hai River Basins.  Most of the study area is in arid and semi-arid zones.  
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Average precipitation in the upper reach of the Yellow River (Ningxia) is 523 mm, 
671 mm in the lower reaches (Henan and Hebei). Rainfall in the Yellow –Hai river 
basins varies greatly both from year to year and within years.  Thus, the Yellow and 
Hai river basins face severe flood and drought problems.  Primary crops in all three 
provinces are first wheat, then corn.  Rainfall throughout northern China is often 
insufficient to meet the water demand of wheat and corn crops throughout the entire 
growing period, making irrigation necessary to guarantee high agricultural yields.   
Digging deeper into the issues of water scarcity, food production, and 
infrastructure provision decision making, this study expands understanding of land-
society-natural resource interactions, in China and in arid regions of the world, by 
untangling the relationship between infrastructure investment, water resource scarcity 
and decentralized fiscal authority. 
2.4. Data 
At the core of this dissertation is a unique data set, the 2001-2008 Northern 
China Irrigation Management Survey, designed and collected by researchers and staff 
at Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), a research institute of the Chinese 
Academy of Science.  The main designers of the survey and sampling procedure were 
Dr. Jinxia Wang (CCAP), Dr. Scott Rozelle (Stanford) and Dr. Qiuqiong Huang 
(University of Minnesota).  The field work team was made up of CCAP research 
fellows and graduate students from local agricultural universities.  The author 
accompanied the field work team on a separate survey trip in 2006, and joined the 
Ningxia field work team in the 2008 data collection round.  Data collection took place 
in the summers of 2001, 2004, and 2008.    
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The basis for this inquiry into the investment and infrastructure aspect of the 
larger research project is based upon a series of field work trips in Summer 2006 and 
Spring 2008 where the author observed stark contrasts in villages‘ irrigation 
infrastructure and agricultural conditions.  While attending surveys in dozens of 
villages, the author observed one village with pristine water flowing through cement-
lined canals and well-tilled farm plots, while in a village not five kilometers away, 
debris filled dirt ditches were devoid of water and looked unable adequately to deliver 
any water to the fields.  Given these observations, the author decided to look closely 
at data on investment, agricultural water use and local political economies.  Within 
the same county, villages had widely varying levels of irrigation investment, water 
use patterns, incomes and crop productivity.  This work intends to explore this 
variation and explain how village-level irrigation-related fiscal structures, water 
resource conditions, and upper-level investment targeting, contribute to varying rural 
livelihoods and sustainable water resource use outcomes.   
2.4.1. Study Population  
The study population is villages in northern China, numbering around 20,000.  
Northern China is an area with acute water scarcity that includes 40 percent of the 
nation‘s cultivated area and houses almost half of the population (Lohmar, et al., 2003, 
Yang and Zehnder, 2001, Yang, et al., 2003).   
2.4.2. Research design 
This study uses panel data over a ten-year time period to examine hypotheses 
related to the impact of decentralization on investment disparities and irrigation 
development outcomes.  Observed variation in the data is used to create observational 
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groupings and analyze village characteristics at three points in time, 2001, 2004, and 
2008.  Time periods are used to define the length of time in which capital 
expenditures on fixed assets related to surface water infrastructure are made for 
periods: 1998-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007.   
This study takes place in a natural social setting, that is, the conditions 
explored are not designated or assigned by the research team.  A survey was designed 
with the purpose to gather information in order to generalize from the sample of 
villages to the rural northern China population of villages, so that inferences could be 
made at the village-level.  
Within the research population, two conditions were observed which indicated 
that experimentation in order to explain observed phenomena would be possible.  
First, variation in several outcomes of interest was observed (investment levels, water 
use behavior, agricultural productivity levels, and income) as well as possible 
explanatory factors (irrigation governance, village economic diversity, local fiscal 
policy and water resource supply options).  Second, changes over time in many of 
these factors were observed, both the outcomes and the hypothesized explanatory 
factors.  Given these conditions, the survey design team, and later the author in 
analyzing the secondary data, identified a quasi-experimental design as the most 
appropriate method to make inferences about the population.   
Although the quasi-experimental design framework lacks the random 
assignment framework to support valid causal inferences that would occur in the 
absence of the experimental treatment (Shadish, Cook et al. 2002), careful design and 
control in logic, design, and measurement can help rule out alternative explanations 
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for outcomes, and build a solid case for hypothesized explanations of observed 
outcomes.  Unlike the clear control and treatment groups of an experimental design, 
in this quasi-experimental study comparison groups are formed, based on the main 
explanatory variables, to assess impacts of these variables on village outcomes over 
time.    
Construction of comparison groups is not based on random assignment during 
the sampling process, but on assignment from analysis of the survey data.  An 
advantage of this research design, as opposed to random assignment is that the study 
contains potentially fewer internal validity threats from omitted confounders than is 
the case for standard observational studies.  In other words, the source of variation in 
treatment assignment is plausibly "exogenous". 
The unit of analysis is the village.  The village is selected as the unit of 
analysis because the village is the basic building block for rural China‘s bureaucracy 
and where large variation in irrigation investment sources, infrastructure, water 
supply, and investment levels are observed.  For this reason, it is appropriate to 
analyze the village, its agricultural characteristics, its fiscal policy and irrigation-
related investment as independent units.  
2.4.3.  Study sample 
In total, the sample includes three provinces, fourteen counties, and seventy-
eight villages.  Due to the intensity of groundwater use for irrigation in many villages, 
the sample for this analysis is limited to villages using surface water or conjunctive 
use of groundwater and surface water (n=70).  For the impacts of fiscal and planning 
authority analysis (chapter 5), the sample is limited to only Henan and Ningxia 
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Provinces (n=55) due to observed variation in the treatment variables in these 
provinces, and not in Hebei.  The sample is too small to represent northern China, 
thus limiting the study‘s generalizability. 
The data collectors describe the sampling procedure:  
―To increase the variation among regions, provinces were chosen that were 
located in the upper (Ningxia) and lower reaches (Henan) of the Yellow River Basin, 
and the lower reach (Hebei) of the Hai River Basin. In selecting the irrigation districts 
for our study, a number of criteria were considered. From a number of IDs (irrigation 
districts) in each province, the two IDs were chosen based primarily on water 
availability, doing so by selecting one that is upstream in the province and one that is 
downstream. After the IDs were selected, we randomly chose sample villages from 
the census of villages in the upper, middle and lower reaches of the canals within the 
IDs‖ (Wang, Xu et al. 2006). 
2.4.4. Survey instruments 
Data from this large-scale project was elicited via three separate survey 
instruments. A subset of the data is selected from panel data variables in the Surface 
Water Survey and the Village Irrigation Survey.  Surveys were written and conducted 
in Mandarin Chinese and translated by the author and staff at CCAP.  The two survey 
instruments together form the Northern China Irrigation Management dataset which 
includes over 500 variables related to village-level irrigation governance in northern 
China.  The dataset includes panel data for 78 villages in six irrigation districts, in 
three provinces across northern China (Hebei, Henan, and Ningxia).   
Enumerators for the Surface Water Irrigation Survey interviewed each 
village‘s surface water manager.  In some cases this person is also the village leader, 
in other cases, not.  This survey is broken into ten sections covering topics related to 
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irrigation system structure for surface water; water pricing, and detailed longitudinal 
surface water irrigation infrastructure investment.  The investment worksheet section 
of the Surface Water Irrigation Survey asks the irrigation manager to report detailed 
records of village-level investments in surface water infrastructure between 1981 and 
2008, per year, for investment in five physical infrastructure components: electrical 
facilities, canal lining, facilities and construction, pump and motor, and canal digging.  
Surface water managers consulted historic records to report how much was invested 
per item, per year for a thirty-year period.   
In addition to the irrigation water manager, enumerators also interviewed the 
village leader in a separate Village Irrigation Survey.  Village leaders in China have 
traditionally had irrigation management as one of their three primary duties (the 
others include tax collection and population control), and therefore the village leader 
is an appropriate person to provide irrigation-related information.  The contents of the 
Village Irrigation Survey include a range of village characteristics elicited for three 
separate time periods, 1998-2001, 2002 – 2004, and 2005-2007.  The survey 
instrument is divided into 13 sections and covers topics including the basic socio-
economic situation of village, crop production, water resources utilization, water 
projects, water use, investment, and management.   
In China, nearly all villages have accountants that maintain written records 
about many aspects of village life, including information on demographics, the 
economic structure of the village, income, land, etc. In addition (and importantly), 
most villages in the sample kept detailed, community-level records about village 
water issues. Enumerators also held detailed interviews with multiple stakeholders in 
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the village—leaders, canal managers, and farmers—who had been village residents 
for the entire sample period (during 1981–2008). Given the importance of water, 
villagers had little trouble remembering their ‗‗irrigation histories.‘‘ In other words, 
the team is able to rely on leader/managers/farmer recall and accountant records to 
enumerate details of irrigation infrastructure investment. 
All currency figures are in Chinese Yuan (also called RMB), and normalized 
to year 2000 Chinese Yuan using the China Statistical Bureau Rural Consumer Price 
Index.   
2.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented two conceptual frameworks to provide the backbones 
of the overarching hypothesis of this study, that fiscal decentralization impacts 
irrigation development in a number of different ways.  Two conceptualizations of 
processes of fiscal decentralization are presented: First, diversity in local irrigation 
investment sources and second, localized authority over revenue and water planning 
authority.  In the drivers of investment conceptual framework targeting and demand 
side drivers of diverse irrigation investment are presented.  In the impacts of local 
authority conceptual framework, two dimensions of revenue authority are 
hypothesized as impacting irrigation development outcomes.  Although the full 
literature reviews are located in later analytical chapters 4 and 5, the basic conceptual 
formulations showing the relationship between fiscal decentralization and irrigation 
development are presented.  The chapter next describes the northern China study area.  
Lastly, the NCIM dataset, population and sampling framework are described.  The 
literature reviews, research questions, hypotheses and measurements through which 
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these relationships will be assessed are included in the relevant analytical chapters, 
chapter 4 for drivers of village level irrigation investment and chapter 5 for the impact 
of local authority on irrigation development.   
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3:  Tracking modern the political and 
economic history of irrigation development in 
China 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the founding of modern China, several major shifts in policy aims for 
irrigation development have occurred, as have shifts in the economic and fiscal 
structure for making irrigation related investments.  Shifts in policy aims for 
irrigation development include: a shift in the primary aim for irrigation projects from 
increasing the effective irrigation area, to rehabilitating existing irrigated area; shifts 
in water engineering aims from securing supply to water conservation, and renewed 
attention to increasing rural livelihoods while increasing irrigation efficiency.  
Alongside irrigation investment policy shifts, have been changes in China‘s fiscal 
structure from centralized investment planning to decentralized investment planning.  
However, within the decentralized system exists a wide range of levels of local 
authority over investment and water resource planning across China‘s villages.   
Given the number of policy shifts impacting irrigation development, the 
purpose of this chapter is to understand shifts in fiscal policy and irrigation 
development leading up to, and during, the study period.  To accomplish this, this 
chapter first lays out a 
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timeline of major economic and political events affecting irrigation development in 
China.  China‘s modern day irrigation development is divided into four stages for and 
chronicles investment trends and major policy changes occurring during each time 
period.  Next, the chapter uses the NCIM survey data to empirically assess shifts in 
surface water irrigation development in northern China during the study period.  
Changes in composition of village-level irrigation investment portfolios, decision-
making patterns for surface water irrigation infrastructure and irrigation system 
outcomes will be assessed based on the 70-village sample.   
Tracking northern China‘s irrigation development serves two main purposes.  
First, providing basic facts and information describing northern China‘s irrigation 
situation provides an empirical analysis for scholars and policy makers alike 
struggling to improve the effectiveness of limited public funds to reach specific 
policy goals.  Few studies have done this.  Later multivariate analysis will further 
examine such variation.  Second, turning a study of irrigation investment on its head, 
and examining decentralization from the village level upwards, provides a unique 
view of investment portfolios and related decision making.  This bottom up view 
point contributes to a body of empirical evidence of how rural China fits into larger 
debates on central versus local decision making around investment making for local 
infrastructure projects.   The question that remains in open debate is: at which 
jurisdictional level are water infrastructure projects best funded and planned?   
A definitional note, the term post reform is debated in various academic 
disciplines.  For the purposes of this study, post reform is defined following the 
tradition of political science scholars of China‘s institutions (Lieberthal and Lampton 
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1992; Oi 1999) as the period beginning in the early 1980s when rural China 
underwent two major institutional changes, de-collectivization of rural land and fiscal 
decentralization.  These two institutional changes are the basis of the post-reform 
period, as defined for this dissertation.   
3.2.  Timeline of modern China’s surface water irrigation 
investment and development 
The following timeline divides irrigation development in modern China into 
four phases of development, with greater attention to phases following the 1979 
opening up and economic reforms. 
3.2.1.   Phase I (Pre-1979): High subsidy – rapid irrigation development 
era 
After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong 
and the Chinese Communist Party focused national policy toward to the restoration 
and construction of irrigation conservancy projects. Irrigation development projects 
were heralded as an important part of national economic recovery following years of 
civil war.  During the "Great Leap Forward" and "people's commune movement" in 
the 1950s and 1960s, although agricultural yields plummeted, China‘s effective 
irrigation area grew at average annual rate of 3.1%  (MWR 1988).  The national 
government in the 1950s and 1960s met its irrigation development goals of increasing 
water supply and expanding China‘s effective irrigated area.   
During the Cultural Revolution era between 1965 and 1975, effective 
irrigation area expanded from 32.04 million hectares in 1965 to 46.12 million 
hectares in 1975, an average annual growth rate of 3.7% (MWR 1988).  Investment 
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into water infrastructure also rose particularly fast during this period, with an average 
annual growth rate of 10.1% (MWR 1988).  However, 1975 marked the end of the 
China‘s high subsidy-rapid irrigation expansion phase.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, 
irrigation investment patterns changed throughout China.  By the late 1970s central 
government funds to expand irrigated areas ceased and funding to maintain irrigated 
areas also decreased (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003).  
3.2.2. Phase II (1980-1989): Economic opening up, irrigation investment 
declines 
The year 1979 marked the beginning of Deng Xiaoping‘s opening up and 
economic reform period in China, and drastically altered China‘s economic and 
political landscape.  Although the early 1980's rural reform and opening up policy 
greatly contributed to China's agricultural and rural development in the early years of 
the reforms (Brandt, Huang et al. 2002), at the same time irrigation construction 
entered a phase of  unprecedented setback.  Effective irrigation area fell from 48.66 
million hectares in 1982 to 47.87 million hectares in 1986.  In four years irrigated 
area declined by 79 million hectares, an average annual decline rate of 0.4%, making 
this the first time since 1949 that irrigated area declined (MWR 1988).  Water 
infrastructure investments accounted for only 2.7% of infrastructure investment 
during this period.  As investments into urbanization and industry became the 
national investment focus, irrigation development was neglected (MWR 1988) 
Several policies in the early 1980s contributed to declines in irrigation 
development.  First, the 1980 fiscal reform called ‗eating in separate kitchens‘ made 
each sub-national unit of government responsible for its own revenue and 
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expenditures.  A ―bottom-up revenue structure‖ (Oi 1992)  which was instituted in the 
late 1980s and has been referred to as ―federalism, Chinese style‖ (Tsui and Wang 
2004) mandated higher rates of locally retained and controlled revenue.  Under such 
revenue sharing agreements, in effect through 1993, local governments gained greater 
discretion and flexibility in deciding how to generate revenue and make expenditures 
(Oi 1992).   
The revenue sharing policies negatively impacted irrigation development in a 
number of ways.  A study examining the revenue sharing policies in rural China finds 
that villages opted not to invest in agriculture-related projects as agriculture generates 
the lowest returns to local government.  This is because agricultural tax doesn't go to 
the village, while tax receipts for village enterprises go directly to the village 
collective coffer (Oi 1992).  Therefore, local government will prefer to invest in 
enterprises benefitting the local revenue base such as electricity and roads.  Next, 
under the rural revenue-sharing fiscal structure, the central government ceased to 
provide large subsidies for local irrigation systems (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003).  
Under this system village collectives experienced revenue shock as the central 
government no longer financed irrigation or water conservation projects, and villages 
lacked funds to maintain existing irrigation systems.   
Another major policy shift was the Household Responsibility System (HRS), 
first adopted into China‘s agricultural system in 1981.  Questions of ownership over 
village assets under HRS contributed to declines in investment and upkeep of 
irrigation systems.  Under the HRS, the village collective retained ownership of 
village-held productive assets, including the irrigation system components (canals, 
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pumps, and water).  However, due to unclear designation of responsibilities following 
HRS, village leaders throughout China did not designate funds to build or rehabilitate 
agriculture related infrastructure (tube well maintenance, field terracing, canals and 
ditches).  Where the village collective had been responsible for constructing small- 
and medium-scale projects, under HRS, they no longer performed this type of project 
finance and supervision role (Watson 1989; Dasgupta 1997) and hardly any new 
projects were built, nor were existing infrastructures well-maintained.  Village 
collective leaders did retain irrigation management responsibilities including within-
village fee collection and allocation decisions.  Finally, contrary to expectations of 
Chinese and foreign economists, post-HRS, farmers did not make private farm-level 
investments despite potential to improve agricultural productive capacity (Dong 1996; 
Dasgupta 1997).   
The HRS rural reforms affected China‘s local irrigation systems in several 
ways.  First, a lack of clarity in village ownership structures under HRS, left the 
ownership and responsibility over shared assets such as irrigation canals in question, 
and the systems fell into neglect (Wang 2007).  Canal linings fell apart, sluice gates 
ceased to work and trash and debris filled canals throughout China‘s rural landscape.  
By the mid-1980s, fiscal policies mandating local self-reliance left many villages 
unable to maintain or rehabilitate much of the canal infrastructure built during the 
mid-20th-century (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003).   
Finally, implementation of the Law of Ratification, Collection and 
Management of Irrigation Water Fees in 1985 put an end to the free water supplies 
for irrigation and somewhat improved the sustainable financial operation of 
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irrigations projects. The administratively determined fees however, remained well 
below the cost of the water (raw supply, operations and maintenance), often lined the 
pockets of local officials and bureaucracy and did not promote investment into water-
saving irrigation systems.   
Such declines did not go unnoticed by China‘s central government.  In 1986 
and 1987 the Rural Policy Research Office of Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee Secretariat and the Ministry of Water Resources held successive Rural 
Water Forums in which they identified the existing crisis in China‘s irrigation sector 
including: 
 A large number of irrigation project were aging and needed repairs; 
  The drainage capacity of river discharge significantly decreased, 
mainly due to aging wells, other irrigation equipment reaching obsolescence, 
dilapidated facilities, engineering failures and industrial buildings using irrigation 
water. 
 Serious water shortages occurring in North China and coastal areas.   
 Water pollution reached alarming proportions (1987) 
3.2.3. Phase III (1990-1997): Local irrigation investment declines 
Ministry of Water Resources investment data indicates that policies resulted in 
declines in on-the-ground investments into irrigation.  In fact, water infrastructure 
investment as a share of total government infrastructure spending declined during the 
first 15 years of the reform period from 7.1% in 1978 to 1.7% in 1996 (MWR 2000-
2008).  
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As the economic reform period progressed, the government modified the ways 
in which localities and the central government split revenue and spending 
responsibilities.  In 1994 the Chinese government launched reforms to re-structure 
central-provincial fiscal relationships, aiming to replace the previous revenue-sharing 
system with a tax-sharing system (fenshuizhi) between provinces and the central 
government, and also used the system to structure province and sub-province 
jurisdictions (counties, municipalities, townships, villages) (Zhang 1999).  As part of 
the 1994 reforms, irrigation investment decision making devolved to local 
administrative units (counties, townships, irrigation districts, villages) to raise funds 
and administer irrigation investment projects (Lohmar 2002).    
These changes in China‘s fiscal system impacted irrigation development in a 
number of ways.  Foremost, local governments assumed greater responsibility for 
funding local irrigation projects through locally generated revenue.  Despite 
responsibility for funding local irrigation projects transferring from central to local 
governments under the 1994 fiscal reforms, the central government continued to issue 
mandates for reforms aimed at increasing water-use efficiency (Huang, Rozelle et al. 
2009), increasing grain production (Yang and Zehnder 2001) and alleviating poverty 
(Huang, Dawe et al. 2005), thus creating a dynamic push and pull relationship 
between the village‘s fiscal authority and the policy mandates of the overlying 
bureaucracy.  The 1990s drive toward industrialization resulted in general neglect of 
irrigation maintenance and development.   
3.2.4.  Phase IV: (1998-2007) Renewed attention to water conservancy 
leads to increased, yet uneven investment 
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The observed under-provision of local irrigation development by fiscally 
independent village collectives in the 1980s-1990s (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003) 
combined with regional water shortages during the same period, help explain why 
China‘s central government stepped in to provide funds for village-level irrigation 
development during the late 1990s (Hiroshi 2008).  The government took notice that 
the inability or unwillingness of villages to build or maintain irrigation networks was 
disrupting agricultural livelihoods, wasting scarce water resources and thereby 
threatening national food security.  China‘s leaders noted concern that declining 
irrigated area and water shortages threatened northern China‘s wheat crop 
(Development 2004), and responded with a series of policy directives to increase 
spending on agricultural water projects.   
Following the international trend in the 1990s toward institutional reform in 
water resources management, led by major development agencies, China also began 
widespread management reforms including pilot projects with water user associations 
(WUAs) in the late 1990s.  These reforms aimed to increase coordination over water 
management and conserve water (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).  Local water 
management reform is supposed to rely on increased participation by farmers and 
better incentives for managers to improve access to water and increase the efficiency 
of the system (Wang, Xu et al. 2006).  Recent findings indicate that local institutional 
reforms in China have failed to achieve desired results in water conservation due to 
problems of collective action and a lack of proper incentive structures to promote 
more water use efficiency (Wang 2005).   
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Owing to the shift in policy concerns back to rural and agricultural 
development, investment into irrigation during Phase IV increased and investment 
sources into water conservancy development diversified to include higher amounts 
from central government agencies.  By 2005, 48% of funds for water infrastructure 
were invested by local level governments (See Figure 4) including provincial, 
municipal, and village-level governments, and thirty-three percent of investment 
funds came from China‘s central government.  The central government during this 
phase began to re-open funding channels into irrigation development. 
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Figure 4 Investment sources for water infrastructure in China, 2005 
 
Source: ―2005 Statistic Bulletin on China Water Activities‖ Ministry of Water Resources: Beijing, 
China 
 
To address mounting concerns over rural social stability, in 2002 a policy 
called tax-for-fee reform (fei gai shui) was introduced to relieve financial pressure on 
villagers who were being levied fees from local governments looking to generate 
revenue.  The tax-for fee reform eliminated fees levied on rural households, and 
replaced the fees with a single agricultural tax.  Recent examination of the policy 
suggests that while the reform may relieve peasant fee burdens significantly, the 
initial impact on water resources and agricultural production indicates problematic 
trends in water use and crop yields (Mushtaq, Khan et al. 2008).  The tax-for-fee 
reform re-routed ―fee‖ revenue away from the village-collective, thus revoking 
villages‘ discretionary spending funds, some of which had previously supported 
public irrigation projects.   
Such policies aim to improve rural conditions induced by highly decentralized 
policies of the 1990s where villages became financially self-reliant and responsible 
for both revenue generation and provision of local public goods and services.  The 
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end result being high levels of inequality, between regions and villages, and 
crumbling rural public goods brought about by the villages‘ struggle to generate 
revenue sufficient to provide such high cost goods and services.  Additional rural 
reforms aimed at easing the burden on farmers included abolition of the agricultural 
tax in 2006 (Yu and Jensen 2010) which further limited local revenue to support 
public works projects.   
The ending of fees and taxes was accompanied by direct investment and 
project oversight by local irrigation districts (IDs) into village irrigation projects.  
After the cessation of the village levy, village expenditure for public services was to 
be financed by budget transfer from upper-level administration and by case-by-case 
basis fund collection (yishi yiyi chouzi) (Hiroshi 2009).  This reform re-shifted the 
levers of control in local irrigation investment planning and decision making, moving 
authority from the villages, and up to regional water authorities.   
3.2.5.  Summary 
The push – pull dynamic between funding originating at the local level, but 
with strong policy mandates from the upper-level government has created an 
interesting paradox in China‘s local-level irrigation planning and development.  On 
one hand, the national government re-prioritized policy initiatives to improve 
irrigation systems by directing millions of Yuan in investment funds to local 
governments for rehabilitating irrigation systems and promoting water conservation 
(Wang, Ren et al. 2000).  However, despite billions of Yuan in expenditures being 
pumped into water-saving technologies and irrigation management reform initiatives, 
studies indicate that adoption of water-saving technology in villages and on farms is 
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low (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007).  On the other hand, farmers and village collectives 
are responding to water shortages and land use change, but not necessarily by 
conserving water.  Farmers‘ primary response to water shortages has been to modify 
crop selection (Wu, Liu et al. 2005), sink tubewells (Wang, Huang et al. 2005) and 
develop private groundwater markets (Zhang, Wang et al. 2008), while continuing to 
utilize surface water sources as available.  Although northern China‘s water shortages 
are acute, farmers continue to utilize consistent rates of water per hectare, aside from 
cases when water managers receive incentives to reduce water use (Wang, Xu et al. 
2006).  Upper-level government efforts and local efforts, at times appear to contradict 
each other‘s water use goals.   
Based evaluation of the four irrigation development phases, one can see that 
owing to large investments pre-economic reform, China has a large intended 
irrigation service area.  However, many years of neglect and lack of maintenance for 
these structures had greatly decreased the efficiency of these systems.  The 
resurgence of investment since 1998 shows promise of improving the irrigation 
efficiency of China irrigation systems, but the complex jurisdictional issues brought 
about by several waves of fiscal policy reform present challenges to village-level 
irrigation development.   
3.3. China’s multi-layered irrigation development system 
Understanding how fiscal structure impacts irrigation development 
necessitates understanding both the larger bureaucracy for irrigation-related funding 
and village-level financial structures for irrigation projects.  This section describes 
each of these structures.   
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There is no single agency or ministry that has an overall mandate for irrigation 
development in China.  Overlapping of irrigation – related activities exist in 
institutions at national, provincial, county and village levels. Within the village 
setting multiple policy efforts often take place, most often introduced and 
implemented by the village leader and party secretary (Tsui and Wang 2004).  But in 
fact, each policy effort is also organizationally embodied in a particular ministry or 
set of bureaus within a ministry.  Agricultural concerns are the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Animal Husbandry, water resource policy is 
controlled by bureaus within the Ministry of Water Resources, however, large capital 
projects related to irrigation infrastructure construction are carried out by the Ministry 
of Construction which is responsible for management of township infrastructures, and 
water supply projects.  Also at play are the territorial interests of various counties, 
townships and villages due to position along the irrigation system scheme (upstream, 
downstream etc.), or local interests related to flood protection, hydro-power 
development, agricultural development, or water –starved industry (Lampton 2009).   
Despite the fragmentation, the administrative set up for irrigation funding 
through a particular government agency is relatively straightforward.  Administrative 
units, falling below nation and province, follow a hierarchal order of prefectures, 
counties, townships, towns, and villages (Wong 1997).  The Ministry of Water 
Resources bureaucracy, which overseas irrigation water distribution and 
infrastructure development, follows a similar hierarchical structure corresponding to 
the governmental levels (see Figure 5), with the addition of a sub-county unit of 
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irrigation districts.  Irrigation district functions include supervision of intra-village 
water allocation and distribution.   
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Figure 5 Vertical and horizontal structure of the Ministry of Water Resources  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each village relies on a variety of funding processes and sources for irrigation 
development projects.  One source is township- and county- investment funds for re-
distribution to village-level irrigation development.  These upper-level government 
funds originate in two main ways.  First, from the central government budget for 
village irrigation development, funds flow through the bureaucracy and typically end 
up expended via specific projects and larger –scale projects (for example regional 
seepage control or irrigated area expansion) carried out in villages.
4
  Most large-scale 
infrastructure projects include seed funds from the central government and are 
matched by investment from a local administrative unit.  This cycle of matching is 
replicated throughout China‘s infrastructure and development economy, with an 
upper-level source initiating the project, and a local jurisdiction providing project 
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 Examples include project to conserve agricultural water; projects to intensify irrigated area; and 
projects related to flood control (see World Bank reports on irrigated Agriculture Intensification 
Loans). 
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support and matching funds (West 1997).  Aside from upper-level funding, a second 
investment source for village-level irrigation development is intra-village sources 
including farmers, village collectives, contractors and WUAs.  A basic schematic of 
the financial structure of village-level irrigation infrastructure development is laid out 
in Figure 6.   
Figure 6 Basic financial structure of village irrigation development 
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3.4. Tracking surface water irrigation investment in 
northern China 
This section uses the NCIM survey data to lay out a narrative and empirical 
picture of the diversity in irrigation investment profiles and fiscal decision making in 
villages within the study area between 1998 and 2008.  Diverse irrigation portfolios 
are one measure of indication of a decentralized fiscal landscape, with multiple 
funding sources contributing to a village‘s investment portfolio.  This first sub-section 
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aims to describe the distribution of investment within and between villages to 
understand the channels of decentralized irrigation investment.  The second section 
describes villages‘ fiscal structures and processes and examines the relationships 
between various forms of fiscal decision making authority and irrigation development 
outcomes.  Varying levels of revenue and spending authority are a second indication 
of shifting center-local fiscal relationships.  The overall aim of tracking irrigation 
investment and investment decision making is to account for the shifts in levels and 
patterns of irrigation investment and related irrigation outcomes so subsequent 
chapters can further explore what drives these changes.   
Because two different survey instruments are used to complied the data (the 
Surface Water Manager Survey and the Village Leader Survey), the time periods 
accounting for different investment types do not match throughout the assessment.  
All attempt to make the time periods uniform have been made. 
3.4.1. Northern China’s diverse irrigation investment portfolios 
This section uses panel data set from northern China to track and describe 
northern China‘s irrigation landscape based on village leader and surface water 
manager reports of their irrigation systems between 1998 and 2008.  In addition to 
describing the infrastructure, this section also includes reports of villages‘ investment 
sources and projects, as well as financial decision making within the village irrigation 
system.   
3.4.1.1. Village-level surface water irrigation investment portfolios, 
1980s – 2008 
Surface water irrigation systems types and sizes 
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Canal system size over the three provinces varies widely.  Hebei‘s canal 
networks are relatively small, averaging 2,415 meters of lateral canal network per 
village.  In comparison Ningxia‘s irrigation systems are large, averaging 11,000 
meters of lateral canal per village before expansion, and over twenty thousand meters 
per village following major canal expansion completed by 2001.  The lateral (also 
called tertiary) canals feed off the branch canals and run throughout the village 
feeding farm-plots and field ditches.  Figure 7 shows a typical village irrigation 
schematic, with the blue dotted line representing the branch canal, feeding the lateral 
(white line) canals throughout the village.  Field ditches connect farm plots below the 
tertiary canal level.  On average, 92 households per village irrigate with surface water 
in Hebei villages (see Table 1), 281 households per village irrigate with surface water 
in Henan and 341 households per village in Ningxia.  These numbers can be used to 
calculate the spatial density of the network.  Villages in Ningxia average 44 meters of 
lateral canal length per household, indicating either very large farm plot size, or 
spatially dispersed farm plots.  In contrast, canal density in Henan averages seventeen 
meters per household, a more compact canal-to-farm spatial structure. 
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Figure 7 Map of village’s spatial organization in northern China 
 
Author‘s photo, July 2006 
Table 1 Village –level canal system characteristics  
Hebei Henan Ningxia
Average length branch canal (m):
1,761  
(1,892)
1,161              
(1,836)
5,618         
(5,176)
Average length lateral canal (m):
2,415 
(1,693)
 4,790          
(3,371)
15,018 
(18,298)
Surface water irrigating households 
(hh/village):
92 281 341
Density Measure (meters branch canal 
per household):
19 41 165
Density Measure (meters lateral canal 
per household):
271 17 44
 
Data source: Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
*system size was generally stable between 1981 and 2001, with the exception of canal length 
expansion in Ningxia 
n=210, standard deviation in parentheses  
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Most villages in northern China use a combination of gravity and pump-
powered irrigation to water crops.  In Hebei, the primary crops are wheat and corn, 
for which gravity irrigation is used for 50% of surface water applications, and pump-
power for the other 50% of surface water applications.  In the data, the time of 
application and the spatial location of application are not designated, only which crop 
and depth of irrigation water application are reported.  In Henan, where rice paddies 
are cultivated in addition to wheat and corn, a similar split is seen between gravity 
and pump surface water applications.  Farmers use gravity irrigation 52% of the time 
and pumps 48% of the time.  Crop diversity is greater in Ningxia where farmers plant 
melons, vegetables, and fruit, in addition to wheat, corn and rice.  Ningxia farmers 
overwhelmingly rely on gravity fed systems.  Pumps are utilized for surface water 
irrigation for only 10% of field applications, with the other 90% of the applications 
being gravity fed.  
One way that government and farmers have responded to economic and 
environmental perils in rural China is a renewed focus on modernizing the 
agricultural water sector.  At the local level, despite the fact that low surface water 
prices leave little capital accumulation in village budgets to repair or invest into canal 
systems (Ou et al. 2002; Yang et al. 2002), villages continue to invest in irrigation 
infrastructure (see Figure 8& Table 2).  Across the full sample, village collective 
investment declined to 18% in 2008 from 26.2% in 2004, primarily driven by a 
substantial drop in Hebei.  In the 2002-2008 period, private investment became a 
larger share of village investment portfolios in Henan and Ningxia.  This corresponds 
with the increased number of contractors and WUAs in these provinces who fall into 
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the private investment category (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).  These changes also 
correspond with the increase in direct irrigation project development of irrigation 
districts following the tax for fee reforms and agricultural tax abolition.   
Figure 8 Village- level Surface Water Infrastructure Investment in Northern 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Notes:  Upper-level investors include: provinces, counties, and irrigation districts; Local investors 
include: village collective, water user associations, and farmers. 
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Table 2 Sources of funds for surface water irrigation projects (in 2000 Yuan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management Survey, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
a.  CPI adjusted with 2000 as the base year. 
b.  Private includes: farmers, small farmer groups, contractors, and WUAs. 
notes: Quantities include cash investment only, and do not include labor inputs by villagers; Hebei has 
14 sample villages, Henan has 24 and Ningxia has 32. 
 
Although data indicate an overall rise in investment in northern China since 
2000, the total amount expended on surface water irrigation in the seventy sample 
villages varies widely between provinces. Ningxia had the highest investment levels 
during the twelve years in which the survey requested project-specific infrastructure 
expenditure data, at an average of approximately 2.4 million Yuan per year (USD 
$362, 427), while Hebei spent the least, averaging 251,000 Yuan per year (USD 
$37,671) throughout the study period (see Table 3).  Per village spending in Henan 
was the lowest in the sample averaging 23,000 Yuan per village per year, while in 
Village 
Collective
Private
b Governm
ent 
Totals Village 
Collective
Private
b Govern
ment 
1981-1990 2,072        - 7,451    9,523    21.8 - 78.2
1991-2001 14,482      6,167        34,703  55,352  26.2 11.1 62.7
2002-2008 14,169      22,235      38,652  75,056  18.9 29.6 51.5
1981-1990 133           - 75         208       64.1 - 35.9
1991-2001 692           6               71         769       90.0 0.8 9.2
2002-2008 1,248        1,319        14,550  17,117  7.3 7.7 85.0
1981-1990 378           - 1,310    1,687    22.38 - 77.62
1991-2001 6,611        3,628        5,162    15,401  42.92 23.56 33.52
2002-2008 3,755        880           2,228    6,863    54.71 12.83 32.47
1981-1990 1,561        - 6,066    7,627    20.47 - 79.53
1991-2001 7,179        2,533        29,470  39,182  18.32 6.46 75.21
2002-2008 9,166        20,036      21,874  51,076  17.95 39.23 42.83
Quantity of investment  (Yuan/village/year)
a Percentage of investment (%)
Total sample
Hebei Province
Henan Province
Ningxia Province
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Ningxia annual per village expenditures averaged 75,000 Yuan and 50,000 Yuan per 
village per year in Hebei.   
Table 3 Investment quantity and classifications for surface water irrigation 
projects, 1996-2008 
*Yuan is inflation adjusted to base year 2000 
Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management Survey, Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
 
 Irrigation infrastructure components: canal digging, pump, electricity and 
diesel generators, electricity line 
b
 Irrigation infrastructure components:  underground pipes, surface pipeline, 
measuring equipment, sprinklers, drip facilities, buildings 
investment 
amount 
(Yuan*)
% of 
expenditures 
/ source /  
project type 
investment 
amount 
(Yuan*)
% of 
expenditures 
/ source /  
project type
full sample
village 
collective 1,000,246  2.8% 8,496,637       24.1% 9,496,884
farmers 2,354,594  6.7% 1,487,659       4.2% 3,842,253
upper-level 
government 1,201,763  3.4% 20,737,049     58.8% 21,938,812
Hebei Province
village 
collective 112,495     3.7% 249,650         8.3% 362,145
farmers 15,240       0.5% 204,614         6.8% 219,855
upper-level 
government 51,691       1.7% 2,381,542       79.0% 2,433,232
Henan Province
village 
collective 115,015     3.5% 565,832         17.4% 680,847
farmers 1,374,031  42.2% 68,159           2.1% 1,442,191
upper-level 
government 117,676     3.6% 1,013,328       31.1% 1,131,004
Ningxia Province
village 
collective 772,737     2.8% 7,681,155       27.5% 8,453,892
farmers 420,941     1.5% 658,109         2.4% 1,079,050upper-level 
government 1,032,397  3.7% 17,342,179     62.1% 18,374,576
water supply security 
projects
a
performance improvement 
projects
b
total 
expenditures  
(Yuan*)
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Sources of funding 
In order to understand the changes in irrigation investment over time and 
between different sources in villages, the rate of investment per village is calculated 
for three main investment sources, upper-level government, village collectives and 
private sources including farmers, small groups of farmers, contractors and WUAs.  
Investment rates and composition of investment vary between time periods and 
provinces (see Table 2).  Hebei stands apart from the other two provinces for its low 
average investment into surface water irrigation works at 6,032 Yuan per year village, 
compared with Henan and Ningxia at 7,984 Yuan per year village and 32,628 Yuan 
per year village, respectively for annual average between years 1996 and 2008.  
Further, villages in Hebei rely almost entirely on within-village investment for 
surface water irrigation infrastructure, up to the 2002-2008 period where overall 
investment increased, and upper-level government investment as a portion of the total, 
comprised 85.0% of village surface water irrigation investment.   
Where farmers comprised up to 23.6% of surface water irrigation 
infrastructure investment in Henan between 1991 and 2001, in Ningxia during the 
same period, upper-level government contributed 75.2% of the funds, which were 
also more than double the mean village rate of investment for Henan during the same 
time period, 15,401 Yuan per village for Henan, and 39,182 Yuan per village for 
Ningxia. 
Spending on surface water irrigation infrastructure sky-rocketed in Hebei 
between 2002 and 2008 spurred by almost 2.4 million Yuan in infrastructure 
investments provided by the Hebei Province Water Resource Bureau, amounting to 
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40 Yuan per irrigated hectare in Hebei Province during this 6-year time period 
(17,117 Yuan per year per sample village).  Per hectare spending may be a better 
indicator by which to compare spending to compare the capital expenditure rate 
instead of the absolute amount.  Per hectare spending in Hebei was a low 3.58 Yuan 
per irrigated hectare between 2002 and 2004, while in Ningxia per hectare 
expenditures in the same time period were 15 Yuan, and 3.75 Yuan per hectare in 
Henan.  The highest per hectare spending during the study period was in Ningxia 
between 2005 and 2008 with 40.34 RMB per hectare spent on surface water irrigation 
development. 
Within the 70-village sample, investment into surface water infrastructure, 
both by upper-level government agencies and local investors, namely village 
collectives, contractors, WUAs and farmers, fluctuated during the study period, 
although annual mean per village investment increased after 1988 (see Figure 5).  
Throughout the 30-year period, mean upper-level investment is greater than mean 
local investment, with exceptions in years 1995 and 2001.  In 1995 local mean local 
investment was 1,104 Yuan (USD 160) per village and mean upper-level investment 
per village was only 487 Yuan (USD 70.88) per village.  Such numbers illustrate a 
pattern of very low quantity of investment over all.  During the tail end of the study 
period there is a sharp spike in mean investment levels for all investment sources, 
with an average of 28,000 Yuan (USD 4,174) per village from upper-level 
government, and 12,000 Yuan (USD 1,789) per village from local sources.   
Project types and infrastructure components 
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To understand more about the project types into which projects government, 
village collectives and farmers invest, this section examines investments according to 
project type, where projects are categorized according to the project aim of 1) 
securing water supplies or 2) improving irrigation performance.   
The primary infrastructure investment project for irrigation is construction of 
buildings and  canal lining with sand, stones, or cement (see Table 4), amounting to 
82% of project funds between 1996 and 2001, and 61% and 69% of total project 
investment in 2002-2004 and 2005-2007, respectively.  Both project types aim at 
improving irrigation performance and efficiency.  Lining existing canal networks 
reduces seepage and increases delivery efficiency en route to the fields.  Canal lining 
comprised 62% of village collective project funds in Henan and 30% of village 
collective funds in Ningxia.   
Table 4  Surface water investment quantity, by project type 
canal 
digging
pumps & 
motors
electricity 
/ diesel canal lining
measuring 
equipment
buildings & 
facilities
total 
expenditures
Full sample
1996-2001 608,893  1,552,510 138,991  8,568,714 -              12,619,120 25,788,621  
2002-2004 454,371  197,245    -        1,896,363 33,025          232,115     3,464,735    
2005-2007 730,820  430,791    442,983  5,188,794 21,336          2,161,879   10,581,197  
* Yuan is inflation adjusted to base year 2000
a.  
Irrigation infrastructure components: tubewell, pump, electricity and diesel generators, electricity line
b.
Irrigation infrastructure components:  underground pipes, surface pipeline, measuring equipment, sprinklers, drip 
facilities, buildings
(Yuan* / time period)
water supply security projects
a
performance improvement projects
b
 Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management Survey, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
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Water supply security projects comprise much smaller share of villages‘ 
irrigation investment portfolios, but interestingly comprise a large share of farmers‘ 
investments, 42% (1,374,031 Yuan) of total investment in Henan and 6.7% of total 
investment share across the entire sample (see Table 3).  Measuring equipment 
remained low on the project expenditure list for all investment sources across 
provinces.  During the last survey round in 2008 however, farmers and villagers 
indicated increased funding toward water gates including sluice gates and on-field 
gates to better control water delivery.  Other infrastructure expenditures include 
pumps, electricity facilities, and other maintenance and rehabilitation projects that are 
constructed to improve the performance of existing irrigation systems.   
Data indicates a dramatic shift in investment activity by farmers.  Private 
funds investment in Henan amounts to over 1.4 million Yuan over the twelve year 
period (see Table 3).  The majority of funds invested by farmers and WUAs went 
toward pumps and diesel engines, indicating the need to move water over flat and 
uphill terrain to reach outlying fields.  In Ningxia, expenditures by upper-level 
government and village collectives are roughly even, as are expenditures between 
similar project types.  Government records and interviews indicate that upper-level 
agencies often provide funds conditional on matching funds provided by the local 
government, and expenditures into priority irrigation development projects (Interview 
with Water Resource Engineer in Ningxia, 2008).  These investment records support 
such policy structures.   
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3.4.2.   Relationship between drivers of investment and investment 
sources 
This section explores the drivers of investment from three sources 
contributing to village-level irrigation investment portfolios – upper level government, 
village collectives and farmers.   
3.4.2.1. A progressive investment policy?   
A hypothesis examined in this dissertation (see section 4.3.2.) is that the 
upper-level government is pursuing a progressive investment policy by targeting 
villages with less capacity to service their intended irrigated area.  According to the 
NCIM data, upper-level government investment is greater, on average, for villages 
with existing high irrigation service levels (see Table 5).  During the later survey 
period, 2005 to 2007, investment levels of villages with high share of irrigated area 
were considerably higher than villages with lower capacity to irrigate their land.  To 
evaluate whether or not China is engaging in a progressive irrigation investment 
strategy, such results suggest that more in-need villages are not receiving investment 
funds, but villages that already have relatively high-functioning irrigation systems 
continue to receive the bulk of investment funds.  In the three investment periods 
analyzed, villages with above median levels of service provision consistently have 
higher levels of investment than villages with below median service provision levels 
(see Table 5).   
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Table 5 Village's irrigation service level* & investment funds received from 
upper-level government (n=70) 
high irrigation 
service level
low irrigation 
service level
high irrigation 
service level
low irrigation 
service level
high irrigation 
service level
low irrigation 
service level
Hebei - - - - 15,420            79,180            
- - - - (24,196) (283,276)
Henan - - 11,916           8,103            147,636          -
- - (16,851) (24,784) (138,844) -
Ningxia 71,890          138,729        43,690           37,501          123,869          97,603            
(133,525) (199,485) (150,010) (98,587) (271,504) (310,550)
Mean per period investment according to irrigation service level                                                                                                                 
(normalized to 2000 RMB)  (standard deviation in parentheses)
1996-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007
*irrigation service level measured as the share of actual irrigated land as a portion of intended irrigated land   (high= 
greater than 75%)  
Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management Survey, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
3.4.2.2. Water availability and irrigation investment behavior 
Another hypothesized driver of irrigation investment for village collectives 
and farmers is water supply uncertainty (see section 4.3.2.).  When managers were 
asked to assess their village‘s water reliability, respondents indicated that water 
resources are decreasing in northern China‘s villages.  60% of respondents in Hebei 
said that water was relatively scarce and constrained agricultural and non-agricultural 
production.  Responses in Henan and Ningxia were slightly less dire, with the 
majority of respondents indicating that water resources were sufficient in the short 
term, but shortages could become a problem in the future.   
A major difference in irrigation system characteristics between villages is the 
availability and use of alternative water sources, including rain water and 
groundwater.  In Hebei, only 24% of villages rely exclusively on surface water for 
irrigation.  In contrast, 81% of villages in Ningxia only use surface water resources.   
To assess the relationship between villages‘ investment, water resource 
conditions and economic activity, t-statistics measuring correlation are calculated.  T-
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tests indicate a strong relationship between the presence of investment, from all 
sources, and a village‘s sole reliance on surface water to irrigate crops (Table 6).  
There is also a strong correlation between a village‘s surface water irrigated area and 
the presence of investment from each of the three sources, where larger irrigated area 
is associated with investment by each of these three investment sources.  The number 
of years where there is no water in the village-level (tertiary) canals and village 
collective and upper-level government investment are also positively correlated.  
Percentage of irrigated land for cash crops is positively correlated with presence of 
private investment, indicating farmers are making a rational investment decision to 
improve the water delivery systems in order to secure water supply for higher value 
crops.   
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Table 6 Land and water resources for villages with presence of private, village 
public, and/or upper-level public investment 
mean mean mean mean mean mean
Resource endowment
Dummy of irrigates with 
surface water only: 0.609 0.307 0.580 0.240 0.685 0.2717
t= 
Area irrigated by surface 
water (ha / village): 3532.3 2404.4 3714.0 1984.8 4136.6 2179.2
t= 
Has drought in last year 
(dummy=1 if yes): 0.435 0.396 0.420 0.393 0.444 0.391
t= 
Number of years (in last 3) 
with no water in canals: 0.870 0.887 0.693 0.993 0.537 0.984
t= 
Agricultural Economy
percent of irrigated land for 
cash crops: 0.238 0.187 0.197 0.197 0.140 0.214
t= 1.273* 0.0016 1.965**
noyes no yes no yes
0.482 0.410
5.800***
0.698
0.094 1.9845** 2.572**
5.92***
5.678***
upper-level 
investment 
(n=58)
 private 
investment 
(n=46)
village 
investment 
(n=92)
3.9181*** 5.561***
2.947***
 
Data source: Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Notes:  Levels of statistical significance P>|t|:*=0.001, **=0.05, *=0.10, absolute value of t-statistic 
reported. 
 
While investigating what explains the rising trend of private investment into 
surface water irrigation infrastructure in northern China‘s villages, different pictures 
emerge of villages with and without private investment (see Table 7).  Looking only 
at villages with private investment in 2008, the 20 villages with private investment, 
on average, have a strong economic base including higher village enterprise income 
and local incomes.  Land and water resources are also different in villages with and 
without private investment.  Villages with private investment report that in 1.29 years 
(out of the last 3) there was a period of no water in the canals, compared with only .93 
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years for villages with no private investment.  These statistics, along with the 
exclusive reliance on surface water sources for irrigation, suggest that water supply 
availability does influence private investment decision making.  Other social and land 
resources indicators are relatively similar between the two groups of villages.   
To further what determines investment for various investment sources, 
multivariate analysis is utilized in chapter 4. 
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Table 7 Characteristics of villages with and without private investment into 
surface water irrigation infrastructure, 2008 
 Without 
private 
investment 
(50 villages) 
 With private 
investment 
(20 villages) 
Demand Side Factors
Income per capita (real 2000 RMB) 2,449           3,976           
(986) (2,966)
Village Enterprise Income (real 2000 RMB) 4,009           11,073         
(18,397) (43,897)
Population 1,055           1,048           
(756) (458)
villagers with greater than middle school 
education (%) 50.1            47.2            
(21.31) (24.80)
Number of different crops grown 3.94            3.50            
(1.02) (1.10)
branch and tertiary canal length (meters) 8,299           24,957         
(12,387) (36,621)
Distance from county urban center 5.99            5.43            
(12.14) (3.43)
Land & water resources
number of years in past 3 without water in canals 0.93            1.29            
(1.34) (1.40)
surface water use only 0.25            0.60            
(0.44) (0.50)
Non-collective irrigation management 0.40            0.90            
(0.49) (0.31)
Sown area per capita (hectares) 3.04            3.75            
(1.89) (1.79)
Data Source:  2008 Northern China Irrigation Management Survey; Mean 
value reported, standard deviation in parentheses  
3.4.3.  Assessing impacts of shifting levers of village irrigation fiscal and 
water planning authority in northern China 
Based on the NCIM data, in this section describes shifts in fiscal arrangements 
in China during the study period.  Alongside developments in village-level irrigation 
management institutions, changes are also occurring in regional water management 
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institutions (Yang, Zhang et al. 2003; Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009) as well as village 
fiscal policy and regional fiscal bureaucracies (Oi 1992; Wong 1997).  In light of the 
many layers involved in fiscal and irrigation planning policy, this study drills down 
into the actual decision making processes regarding irrigation fiscal and water 
planning practices. 
Irrigation management institutions diversified and evolved considerably 
during the ten year study period.  While traditional forms of irrigation management 
led entirely by the village collective leaders and the party secretaries dominated 
through the 1990s, after 2001, villages began adopting reformed institutions such as 
WUAs and contracting (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).  In 2001, the government began 
promoting irrigation management reform institutions, however collective 
management remained the primary management style with 58% of villages using 
traditional management forms.  By 2004, 17% of villages transitioned to WUAs, and 
55% of villages used contracting to manage all or part of their irrigation canal 
network.  In 2008, all villages in the sample in Ningxia used WUAs or contracting, 
and 17% of villages in Henan used contracting or WUAs (see Table 8). 
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Table 8 Village control over irrigation decision making, and fiscal account 
information, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A measure of  the degree of a village‘s fiscal authority, that is authority to 
generate, keep, and make discretionary choices about irrigation revenue, is the 
marginal retention of village irrigation revenue (MRR).  Among 55 villages in the 
north China sample between 2002 and 2004, villages retained around 15% of 
irrigation fees, and submitted about 85% to the irrigation district, or other water 
supplier (see Table 9).  In absolute terms, during this same time period, a typical 
Unit
North 
China 
(n=55)
Henan 
(n=23)
Ningxia 
(n=32)
Villages with non-traditional 
irrigation management
a
:
%
64.3% 16.7% 100.0%
Share of irrigation revenue 
retained by village
b 
:
%
3.5% 4.9% 2.2%
% where village coordinates 
intra-village irrigation:
%
30.4% 12.5% 43.8%
% where village collects 
irrigation fees:
%
16.1% 12.5% 18.8%
Village fiscal resources
cd
Village total revenues
   Village-level fees (tiliu): yuan / person 73.0 85.7 60.4
   Land contracting fees: yuan / person 31.4 17.4 45.4
   Canal contracting fees: yuan / person 3.1 0.0 6.3
   Surface water irrigation 
fees:
yuan / person
111.8 52.6 171.0
   Village enterprise income : yuan / person 125.9 44.9 206.8
Village irrigation 
expenditures:
yuan / person
81.7 91.6 71.8
a
 non traditional irrigation management includes contracting and water user association
b 
shares are averages from province or all north China sample
c
 population calculated based on farmers (of working age) present in the village
d
 All currency figures normalized to year 2000 Chinese Yuan
(revenue average based on non-zero average)
Village Authority over Irrigation Systems
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village collected 102,610 Yuan in fees and submitted around 69,472 Yuan to the ID 
or water supplier (see Table 9).  By 2008, the MRR situation changed and irrigation 
district bureaucracies began collecting larger shares of villages‘ irrigation revenue 
(see Figures 8 & 9).  By 2008, although the total amount of fees rose, mostly due to 
increased tariffs, a typical village retained only 3% of the irrigation fees collected, at 
around 3,461 Yuan per village, a sharp decrease in retained revenue.  This pattern 
however, is not uniform across the sample villages.  Although from 2001 to 2004 the 
number of villages with a high MRR level remained constant at 28% of villages (16 
out of 56), by 2008 only 4 villages (7%) in the sample continued to retain over 17% 
of irrigation fees for discretionary use by the village irrigation leadership.  This shift 
reflects gradual policy adoption of tax-for-fee reform and the beginning of more 
direct provision of irrigation funding by central government agencies. 
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Table 9 Breakdown of share of village irrigation fees remitted to irrigation 
district and amounts retained within villages (n=55) 
Values are RMB normalized to year 2000 RMB based on the CSB Rural CPI 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Average marginal retention rate: 0.15 (.24) 0.16 (.25) 0.03 (.1)
Average annual amount of 
irrigation fees collected within 
village: 102,610 (143,126) 77,957 (61,214) 130,396 (106,391)
Average  annual amount  paid to 
irrigaiton district: 69,472   (67,419) 60,774 (53,114) 126,935 (105,176)
Average  annual amount  of 
irrigation fees retained by village: 33,138   (114,047) 17,183 (38,130) 3,461     (10,635)
Average amount retained by 
villages with high MRR: 100,675 (190,293) 41,750 (57,402) 26,231   (23,322)
Average amount retained by 
villages with low MRR: 2,264     (4,915) 4,081   (6,416) 1,184     (4,936)
2001 2004 2008
 
Source: CCAP, 2001 - 2008 North China Irrigation Management Survey 
Figure 6:  Marginal Retention of Irrigation Revenue in Northern China Villages, 
2001 to 2008 
 
Source: CCAP, 2001 - 2008 North China Irrigation Management Survey 
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Figure 9 Village irrigation marginal retention of revenue 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CCAP, 2001 - 2008 North China Irrigation Management Survey 
 
It is reported by farmers that farmers collecting fees from farmers reduces 
tension between farmers and the other fee collectors (village secretary) who collect 
many other fees from farmers.  It is also observed that by 2008, increasingly, fees go 
directly to the water supplier (ID) bypassing the village secretary, perhaps eliminating 
the possibility of skimming or mixing the irrigation budget into the general village 
budget (see Table 10).  The direct remittance of fees by farmers to the supplier makes 
the trail of public fund distribution more transparent, one aim of the tax-for-fee 
reform. However, such facts only indicate change in the nature of the transaction, not 
the share of fees submitted to the ID.   
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Table 10 Division of fiscal responsibilities. Share of decision making controlled 
by person or group (n=55): 
2001 2004* 2008 2001*** 2004*** 2008*** 2001 2004 2008
contractor - - - 31.8% 35.4% 19.6% - - -
irrigation district 47.1% 52.1% 54.3% - - - 58.0% 62.5% 79.5%
village secretary 
(committee) 17.6% 12.5% 4.3% 31.8% 22.9% 10.9% 26.0% 14.6% 11.4%
small group leader - - - 22.7% 20.8% 4.3% - - -
WUA leader - - - 0.0% 6.3% 23.9% - - -
WUA members - - - 0.0% 2.1% 30.4% - - -
village water manager 2.0% 6.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 0.0% - - -
farmers themselves - - - 0.0% - - - - -
county or township 27.5% 22.9% 34.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.0% 22.9% 9.1%
other 5.9% 6.3% 4.3% 11.4% 10.4% 10.9% - - -
*other=negotiation
***other=no one does it
sets village irrigation fees collects farmer fees
settles village irrigation 
account
 Source: CCAP, 2001 - 2008 North China Irrigation Management Survey 
 
In another aspect of village irrigation fiscal policy, it is observed that 
irrigation fee setting also changed over the study period, where village leaders and 
party secretaries ceded authority over setting irrigation fees to upper-levels of the 
irrigation bureaucracy (see Table10). Although the percentage of IDs responsible for 
setting irrigation fees remained constant, in around 50% of the villages, a shift took 
place where the village‘s party secretary had set the irrigation fee (18% of villages in 
2001 and 13% of villages in 2004), and fee setting authority moved up the 
bureaucratic ladder, to the level of township or county water resources bureaus.  This 
trend could have several explanations.  First, pro-rural reforms enacted since 2000, 
such as ―three abolitions, two adjustments, and one reform‖ and tax-for-fee rural 
reform aim to ease the burden on farmers and limit the power of village governments 
to levy ad hoc fees on villagers as a source of village revenue (Yep 2004).   
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In addition to irrigation fiscal policy, a vital component of irrigation 
management is accounting for the raw water resources and coordinating and planning 
usage among various local stakeholders, including other villages on the trunk canal 
system, village farmers, and other water users within the village (small businesses and 
enterprises).  One aspect of planning, setting village allocation plans, became more 
concentrated in the hands of few decision makers, typically the regional water 
suppliers ID or township (see Table 11).  While another planning task, coordinating 
water deliveries, remains much more grassroots with contractors, WUAs and village 
committees retaining responsibility over coordinating water deliveries within the 
village.  A governance–type function, deciding on management institutions, remains a 
top-down policy mandate primarily decided upon by ID, county, or township. 
Table 11 Division of irrigation planning responsibilities, share of decision 
making controlled by person or group (n=55): 
2001 2004* 2008 2001*** 2004*** 2008*** 2001 2004 2008
contractor: 14.3% 2.0% 0.0% 27.9% 34.9% 16.7%
irrigation district: 61.2% 84.0% 65.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 26.1% 0.0% 25.0%
village secretary 
(committee): 4.1% 2.0% 0.0% 11.6% 7.0% 7.1% 13.0% 25.0% 0.0%
small group leader: - - - 7.0% 7.0% 0.0%
WUA leader: - - - 0.0% 2.3% 47.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
WUA members: - - - 0.0% 2.3% 9.5%
village water manager: - - - 11.6% 11.6% 0.0%
farmers themselves: - - - 20.9% 14.0% 2.4%
county or township: 12.2% 8.0% 26.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.9% 75.0% 75.0%
other: 8.2% 4.0% 7.3% 20.9% 20.9% 16.7%
*other=negotiation
***other=no one does it
Sets village allocation plan Coordinates water Decides on management 
 
These descriptions of villages‘ levers of fiscal and water planning authority 
point to general shifts in concentrations of fiscal and planning control, with a marked 
re-assertion of fiscal authority from villages, to IDs and counties.  The impact of the 
75 
shifting levels of authority remains unclear and can be better understood by using 
multivariate analysis (see chapter 5). 
3.5. Conclusion 
In addition to demonstrating a large commitment on the part of the central 
government to modernize northern China‘s small-scale irrigation systems, these data 
suggest that private sector involvement is also rising, and with a particular focus on 
investing in infrastructure to secure local water supply.  Even more dramatic than the 
changes in the composition of local investment components however, the data shows 
a rapid increase in the quantity of irrigation-targeted investment funds flowing into 
China‘s villages.  According to the data, total investment increased over three-fold 
from the 2002-2004 period, to the 2005-2007 period.  The rate of project 
implementation since 2002 was funded by a wide range of sources, including upper-
level government, village collectives and farmers.  In tracking the evolution of 
irrigation investment in northern China‘s, one sees a profile of a rural economy that is 
in the midst of a flurry of irrigation development activity. 
The tracking of investment and policy trends in China‘s irrigation sector 
reveal several clear trends.  First, increased investment by the upper-level government 
and private sources (contractors and farmers) indicate a decisive shift from the 
decentralized system that characterized China‘s irrigation sector through 2002.  
Irrigation funding and management is gradually moving out of the hands of the 
village collective.  However, the fiscal trend is not characterized by re-consolidation 
by the central government alone.  Private investment activity by farmers and 
contractors is rising steadily, and is related to two observed phenomena.  First, 
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irrigation management reform has designated clearer canal ownership rights under the 
contract-type management system.  Next, farmers that grow cash crops need a reliable 
water supply and appear to be willing to investment their private funds to secure 
water for growing higher value crops.  Although such findings are based on basic 
statistical analysis, these provide a basis for further understanding shifts in China‘s 
irrigation development landscape. 
Northern China‘s village-level irrigation systems can be characterized as 
diverse, mobilized, and yet, under performing in their primary task of conveying 
water to crops.  What this chapter did not address is the question of why.  As the 
previous section indicates, given the diverse composition of investment portfolios, it 
is unclear what factors lead to different village-level investment structures, or how 
these structures contribute to the observed diversity in irrigation performance 
outcomes.   The following chapters examine in depth what factors contribute to 
diverse funding portfolios in northern China‘s villages, and next, how intra-village 
fiscal authority explains why some village irrigation systems perform better than 
others.   
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4:  Assessing the determinants of 
investment: how separate incentives drive 
diverse irrigation portfolios 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the determinants of local irrigation 
investment in northern China between 1998 and 2008.  This is accomplished in two 
ways.  First by reviewing the literature on determinants of irrigation investment from 
three scales: upper-level government, village collectives and farmers.  Next, based on 
the hypotheses derived from the literature, this study uses detailed village-level fiscal 
and water resource data to assess drivers of development for each of the three above 
mentioned sources in northern China‘s villages.  Further, this study assesses in which 
cases farmers follow conventional patterns and relies solely on upper-level 
investment funds to build local irrigation systems, or alternatively, in which types of 
villages farmers contribute private funds for irrigation infrastructure upgrades.  
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This study has two specific objectives.  The first aim is to examine the reasons 
underlying diversity in village-level surface water irrigation investment portfolios.  
To accomplish this, descriptive statistics are presented to describe how progressive 
investment policy, water supply uncertainty and economic base explain variation in 
irrigation investment between villages in the study area.  Next, this study aims to 
identify and measure the determinants of the magnitude and sources of village-level 
investment into irrigation infrastructure.  To accomplish this, several multivariate 
models are specified based on the hypothesis that different investment sources have 
different underlying incentives driving the investment. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  The next section reviews 
existing literature on determinants of village-level irrigation investment according to 
the investment source – central government, village collectives and farmers.  
Following this, research questions are hypotheses are presented.  The following 
section assesses the determinants of village-level irrigation investment using 
descriptive statistics to probe the connection between various investment sources and 
explanatory variables of interest.  Next, measures and models for the analysis are 
presented.  In section 4.5, multivariate models of village-level investment sources and 
magnitudes are estimated, and the results of econometric analysis presented.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the results. 
4.2.  Literature review - Determinants of irrigation 
investment from different sources 
This literature review summarizes the global literature on determinants of 
irrigation investment, according to the scale of investment, central or national 
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government, local government and private (farmer).  The literature included in this 
review specifically examines differences in investment behavior by public and private 
sectors, but further scrutinizes changes in investment behavior under different degrees 
of centralization.  Although in a decentralized fiscal system local governments hold 
responsibility over local public works, in China, as in many nations, national 
governments remain primary investors into irrigation infrastructure development, 
despite the formal fiscal system.   
Increasing investment into irrigation infrastructure is one policy response of 
the government to remedy water shortages by increasing irrigation water-use 
efficiency.  Despite large central government investments and mandates to local 
governments to improve irrigation systems, little agreement exists as to why local 
irrigation infrastructure remains in such disrepair (Feder, Lau et al. 1992; Lohmar, 
Wang et al. 2003).  Scholars attribute the current state of China‘s irrigation 
infrastructure disrepair to large cuts in the national budgets for irrigation funds (Wang, 
Ren et al. 2000), local fiscal constraints (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003) and lack of clear 
ownership of network canals (Lohmar and Wang 2002) following the 1978 reforms.  
Increasing financial pressure at the local level, combined with inefficient 
management, have likewise been identified as two of the major sources of problems 
related to under provision of irrigation systems (Tang 1992).  Given that China‘s 
major food grains are mostly irrigated by surface water (Jin and Young 2001; Huang, 
Rozelle et al. 2006), maintaining functioning irrigation works is critical to 
maintaining a productive agricultural sector (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006).    
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4.2.1. The role of central and national governments in public irrigation 
investment 
Central governments are the main contributors to irrigation systems 
worldwide and in China (Briscoe 1999). Despite annual global expenditures of 
around US$ 36 billion annually into irrigation development (IEG 2006b) (pg 8), 
observers note that irrigation investment record keeping is poor and most nations 
consider irrigation investment a poverty reduction measure, and therefore do not track 
irrigation investment performance (Briscoe 1999).  Although the international record 
on irrigation investment is mixed, recent findings affirm irrigation‘s role in reducing 
poverty (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006; IEG 2006a), increasing agricultural productivity 
(Fan, Zhang et al. 2002) and maintaining food security (Huang, Rozelle et al. 1999).   
A few notable studies attempt to make sense of nation-level irrigation 
investment.  A study of national irrigation investment in the Philippines examines 
how economic and social forces induce public irrigation investment.  Authors Hayami 
and Kikuchi hypothesize that irrigation development by the National Irrigation 
Administration is guided by rational criteria of long-term social profitability of 
investments measured as: benefit-to-cost ratio of productivity to investment measured 
via the long-run calculation of improvement of land quality relative to increasing cost 
of expansion of cultivated land area, and the return on investment of increased 
agricultural productivity due to irrigation modernization (Hayami and Kikuchi 1978).  
Their findings indicate that investment in irrigation as a means to augment cultivated 
land quality is more profitable than investment in expansion of cultivated area by 
expanding irrigated land area.  Although findings from this study lack of longitudinal 
data to calculate the long-term costs and returns for investment in opening new arable 
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land over time, this study provides evidence that irrigation development should 
consider rehabilitation of existing irrigated land in a targeted irrigation development 
strategy, not simply targeting all funds toward expansion.     
Although no national level irrigation investment studies exist for China, one 
can infer from other public investment studies that in China, as in many nations, the 
central government  uses levers of fiscal policy as a tool by which to administer state 
irrigation and water conservation policies (Oksenberg and Tong 1991).  China‘s 
central government sets policy agendas through Five-Year Plans, and administers a 
central government budget to coordinate and financially support implementation of 
Five-Year Plan policies in the provinces.  Given the wide umbrella of contributions of 
irrigation to rural and national welfare including, food security, poverty alleviation 
and economic development, tracking explanations for national level irrigation 
investment is not straightforward.  Within the last decade in China, increasing 
attention has been placed on evening the rural-urban divide via rural development 
policies and investment (11
th
 Five Year Plan) including large levels of national 
investment for agricultural water conservation and management programs.  Increasing 
attention has also been placed on curbing environmental and natural resource 
degradation and securing China‘s food supply via agricultural modernization (Huang, 
Rozelle et al. 1999; Zhang, Luo et al. 2006), yet the policy strategies behind these 
efforts have not been carefully examined.   
4.2.2.  Determinants of sub-national public irrigation investment 
Explanations of sub-national investment decision making include several 
scales of investment decisions including: state, province, county, and village 
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investment-making frameworks.  Within this group of studies, several explore 
different forms of local government accountability to explain public investment 
distribution.  Alternatively, a burgeoning literature in local fiscal policy examines 
channels of investment in the context of evolving fiscal and political systems where 
localities assume primary responsibility over local public goods provision.  Although 
work on both topics is vast, this review is limited to works that focus on irrigation 
infrastructure specifically, or include irrigation infrastructure within a larger 
discussion of rural public goods provision. 
A study of public investment in Bolivia, before and after fiscal 
decentralization, uses objective measures of local need for water and agriculture 
infrastructure to evaluate how socio-political and administrative factors determine 
investment decision making by central and local government levels (Faguet 2002).  
Faguet finds that the responsiveness of leaders to local needs and knowledge of  local 
ecological characteristics, along with greater attention to maintenance and operations, 
increases the provision of service associated with infrastructure projects (Faguet 
2002).  Faguet also finds that the distribution of funds toward less-productive sectors 
decreased when controlled by local governments.  The findings contribute to a 
growing literature on public investment allocation under different fiscal structures.  
Though there is wide debate on the merits of  local versus central investment decision 
making, Faguet‘s findings support the theory of local corporatism in China (Oi 1992), 
wherein local governments focus upon local economic development needs, higher 
productivity (income enhancing) economic infrastructure projects (roads, electricity, 
education), while neglecting lower priority sectors such as agriculture or tourism.  
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Notably in the Bolivia study, poorer local governments received little to no 
investment funds from the central government, and continue to invest little post fiscal 
decentralization.   
Another group of studies focuses on the relationship between public 
investment and local fiscal policy in rural China.  Economic reforms across China in 
the late 1970s redistributed fiscal decision-making authority from the central 
government to lower levels of China‘s bureaucracy (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992).  
Processes over decision-making and allocation of resources, both monetary and 
natural resources, devolved to provinces, counties, townships and counties which 
often had competing development priorities (Schroeder 1992).  Focusing on the 
composition of local economic activity in rural China, studies identify village-level 
economic diversity as the main determinant of a village‘s ability to provide public 
goods supporting agriculture, including irrigation and drainage projects.  Local 
economic diversity in the form of a local industrial base, and hence a higher local tax 
base, allows village collective governments to re-distribute funds (Tam 1988; Oi 1992; 
Wong 1997) toward infrastructure projects.  However, funding irrigation remains a 
low priority investment option since returns to agricultural investments are lower than 
industrial returns, and increased agricultural tax receipts (if agricultural productivity 
rises) do not go to the village (Oi 1992).   
Recognizing the diversity of local economic activity as contributing to higher 
levels of local public goods provision, Dong et al investigates what happens in less 
industry-developed rural communities in China, where lack of industrial tax base has 
led to the decline of agriculture infrastructure (Dong 2000).  Dong categorizes 
84 
villages according to types of economic activities, and looks to see how village 
collective activism differentially determines the provision of village-level public 
goods across village types.  Dong attributes low levels of investment activity to two 
factors.  First, lack of accountability and public trust in villages without elected 
leaders and second, the inability of poorer villages to mobilize new revenue sources, 
thus contributing to a cycle of poverty within poor villages.   
Within the studies of local public infrastructure provision in China, no clear 
picture of the determinants of village-level infrastructure has emerged.  While the 
fiscal policy analyses focus on the structure of the local village economy, and the 
political economy analyses focus upon accountability of political leaders in making 
public investments, few of the studies examine infrastructure provision as a sum of 
the actions of scales of investing parties, including public and private sources.   
Further, none of the studies on local public infrastructure investment, to my 
knowledge, evaluate how uncertainty imposed by natural resource scarcity impact 
farmer and local government investment decision making.  Nor do the studies on 
infrastructure provision consider how the multi-layer investment environment impacts 
irrigation investment decision making.   
International development experience has shown that not all infrastructure 
investment makes a community better off and that the structure of public investment 
provision matters (Aschauer 1989; Berke, Chuenpagdee et al. 2008).  In the following 
section, therefore, I explore the motivation for private investment into irrigation 
infrastructure and how private and public investments into irrigation development 
interact.   
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4.2.3.   The role of farmers in local irrigation investment 
Up to this point, given the cheap price of irrigation water in China, it has been 
found that farmers lack a price incentive to conserve water, and irrigation system 
users have yet to invest much into improving local irrigation infrastructure or 
installing water saving technologies (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006). Others speculate 
the lack of private investment into irrigation does not relate to water conservation 
measures at all, but is related to land tenure insecurity in China‘s countryside (Watson 
1989; Feder, Lau et al. 1992; Dong 1996; Brandt, Huang et al. 2002). Indeed, 
following transition to HRS, observers of China‘s rural development noted surprise at 
the lack of private investment into agriculture related fixed assets (Watson 1989; 
Feder, Lau et al. 1992; Dong 2000) once farmers assumed responsibility for farm-
level production.   
Previous research explaining farmers‘ private investment into surface water 
irrigation falls into two primary academic arenas, institutional and public economics.  
Based on extensive field work and case studies on irrigation systems in developing 
countries, institutional scholars of common pool resource goods have found that 
under certain institutional arrangements, farmers will invest their private funds 
toward rehabilitating or developing shared irrigation infrastructure (Wade 1988; 
Ostrom 1992).  Institutionalists' research into natural resource governance identifies 
collective action as a necessary pre-requisite for irrigation users (farmers) effectively 
to manage their resource system (Uphoff 1986; Ostrom 1991).    
Based on the findings from the extensive institutionalists‘ literature on 
irrigation, one may ask, can collective action explain village-level private investment 
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in China?  The answer is, likely not, for two primary reasons.  First, decision making 
over key water resource and fiscal choices in village-level irrigation systems is the 
responsibility of the government.  Farmers lack control over basic decision making 
related to quantity, timing or delivery of irrigation water, thus obscuring the incentive 
a farmer may have to address collective irrigation development.  Field work 
interviews reveal farmers will often prefer to wait for the government to provide 
investment funds rather than put forth funds themselves.  Second, field work on 
participatory irrigation management found that Chinese farmers remain generally 
disenfranchised within current institutional structures (Ou, Zachernuk et al. 2004; 
Wang, Xu et al. 2006).  Although collective action may be present in varying degrees 
and contribute to agricultural and social development, no compelling evidence in 
China points to collective action as an indicator of village irrigation investment 
activity.   
A second school of thought regarding farmer‘s private investment into surface 
water irrigation comes from public economics, and relates to a farmer‘s rational 
assessment of infrastructure‘s ability to offset risks (uncertainty) involved in water 
resource procurement.  Arrow and Lind (1970) use the theoretical example of a 
farmer‘s decision to invest in irrigation infrastructure to demonstrate their theory of 
appropriate levels of investment for public goods between private and public sectors.  
According to Arrow and Lind, for risk averse farmers in climatic uncertainty 
(drought), the farmers would value the project at more than the expected value of the 
marginal benefit of the irrigation investment, and expend their private capital toward 
infrastructure development, to stabilize their incomes in times of uncertainty (Arrow 
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and Lind 1970).  Although the hypothetical example on the un-even private benefits 
of public investments is noted, their point neglects the social value of agriculture 
(food supply) in that streams of benefits of irrigation only accrue as increased income 
for the farmer.  Likewise, the opportunity cost of no irrigation would be the loss of 
income stability in water-short period.  Social costs and benefits indeed would be 
pooled by the tax-paying rural and urban residents in the form of migration, famine 
and food security.   
Feder et al (1992) looks at farm–level investment in China in the post-
household-responsibility-system era and finds that farmers‘ perception of land tenure 
security impacts private investment into productive assets.  Although Feder et al 
notes that in the early 1990s "alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods of 
the infrastructural type have not been established, public investments have suffered a 
decline," the study does not systematically account for levels of public investment 
which omits a key factor in private decision making behavior (Aschauer 1989).  
These findings also are limited by the cross-sectional nature of the data, which is 
especially troubling for investment analysis as the impact of policy decisions takes 
time to manifest into investment decisions and is especially troubling for investment 
analysis as capital investments are lumpy in nature and a single time period neglects 
local or regional investment cycles.  For the case of irrigation development, the 
investments are not into privately held land, but into shared canal networks, therefore 
subject to different set of investment behavior theories (Ostrom 1992).   
Dong (1999) disputes Feder‘s view explaining the dearth of private 
investment and notes that other factors such as small farm size where large capital 
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investment in non-divisible equipment (such as farm animals, water pumps, and 
tractors) inhibit private investment, and also notes low profitability of agricultural 
production and access to credit markets, as more important factors in determining 
private agricultural investment.  An earlier study on village irrigation financing finds 
the determinant of farmers‘ private investment into the local system depends upon 
whose initial investment created the system (Coward 1986).  If farmers create the 
system, in terms of planning and labor, thereby creating a sense of ownership, they 
are more likely to contribute future investments into operations and maintenance.  
This work follows on the work of fiscal policy scholars and examines how public 
investment levels and uncertainty in water supply explain private investment into 
fixed irrigation assets at the village-level.   
4.2.4. Limitations of previous research 
While it is not reasonable to expect perfect consistency across a range of 
regions and time periods explaining the determinants of village-level infrastructure 
investment, this review builds a compelling body of evidence regarding the 
importance of the village as unit within a larger system of bureaucratic relationships 
that impact the investment activity of the village collective, and actors within the 
village including farmers, small group leaders and contractors.  Exclusion of attention 
to targeting factors that upper-level government agencies use to allocate investment 
funds to villages may also explain the diversity of public investment levels, including 
village investment.  Yet few empirical investigations have been made into how 
processes of decision making, at multiple jurisdictional levels, result in differing 
levels of investment into local public infrastructure.  A handful of studies in China 
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offer alternative explanations for why some villages receive higher levels of public 
investment than others. However few of these studies use an economic framework for 
analysis.  Each of the studies relies upon cross-sectional data which makes 
determining the causal direction between village characteristics and investment 
problematic.   
Another important factor not systematically accounted for in the analyses 
reviewed is the factor of passage of time between the explanatory variable category, 
investment allocation policy, and the behavior this study aims to explain, irrigation 
infrastructure investment.  Due to lags between decision making and project 
implementation, investment frameworks cannot be understood in a cross-sectional 
framework accounting for only one period of time.  Without using longitudinal data, 
it is difficult to establish the temporal precedence of possibly endogenous policy 
factors as determinants of investment allocations.  Moreover, estimates from studies 
based on cross-sectional results have limited generalizability due to unobserved time 
specific factors, and cannot account for sequential patterns in targeting investment, 
investment decision making, and project implementation.  Dynamic analysis can 
assess policy objectives by examining lagged impacts over multiple time periods. 
The shifts in investment policy for irrigation provision can be unraveled 
further by looking at the irrigation investment behavior of upper-level government 
agencies, villages and farmers in northern China.  Assuming provincial, county, 
village collective governments and farmers are making rational budgeting choices 
regarding investments into irrigation infrastructure, in addition to responding to 
policy directives requiring certain levels of spending, one can begin to understand 
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variation in the irrigation investment decisions being made into irrigation 
infrastructure into northern China‘s villages.  Directives from the central government 
and Ministry of Water Resources call for efforts to be made to equalize disparities in 
northern China‘s irrigation development with the goals of alleviating poverty in the 
poorest areas, installing technology to conserve water, while also increasing system 
wide efficiencies in massive water works systems (MWR 2006).  Indeed, examination 
of village-level infrastructure provision at multiple investment scales, including 
regional public investment from provincial and county level water resource bureaus, 
irrigation districts, and grassroots sources, village collectives and farmers‘ private 
funds, will contribute to understanding irrigation development in China.  
To examine further the determinants of village-level surface water irrigation 
investments, this study offers an approach that differs from those used in previous 
studies.  First, findings on the provision of public goods in rural settings explore how 
issues of accountability in governance impact public good provision (Faguet 2002; 
Zhang, Fan et al. 2004; Tsai 2007) in terms of how the government meets the needs 
of the people (does supply meet demand?), but stop short of evaluating resource 
constraints imposed by natural resource scarcity.  This study considers how changing 
environmental conditions factor into public and private infrastructure investment 
decisions.  Next, unlike most studies that use a rough proxy for levels of irrigation 
service provision, irrigation service capacity is measured based on the surface 
managers‘ report of actual irrigated land versus intended irrigated land to gauge how 
close to capacity a village‘s irrigation service lies.  In this way, the results will show 
if irrigation investment agencies are following a progressive investment strategy for 
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irrigation development, and if the government is targeting villages based on 
equalizing disparities based on expanding the quantity of irrigated land or improving 
the quality of currently irrigated land.  Third, this study uses a panel data set to 
account for sequential lags between decision making and project implementation, to 
establish temporal precedence of a particular policy framework leading to various 
investment allocation patterns.  Most studies fail to do so.  Finally, this study employs 
a fixed effect model to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the village level that 
otherwise may obscure the relationship between investment amount, investment 
source, and decision-making criteria. Estimating a fixed effect model, the analysis can 
estimate the change in investment levels as local conditions change over time.  This 
will work as long as the decision-making criteria do not change as a function of time-
varying omitted variables.  In looking exclusively at irrigation infrastructure, and not 
the village‘s entire stock of public goods, this chapter offers a chance to explore the 
relationship between investment activity and infrastructure development under 
different water scarcity conditions.    
4.3.  Research questions and hypotheses 
 
4.3.1. Research question 
 
The primary question this chapter‘s study seeks to address is: 
 
 What incentives drive different sources to invest in village-level 
irrigation development? 
 
4.3.2.  Hypotheses 
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Following the fiscal policy and irrigation management literature, hypotheses 
focus on understanding the relationship of progressive investment policy, water 
resource uncertainty, and economic activity and villages‘ irrigation investment 
portfolios. Based on the literature, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
Targeting policies set by the government drive upper-level government 
investment into village irrigation development: 
(H1) Upper-level governments target villages with less irrigation 
infrastructure in order to equalize effective irrigated area between villages and 
thereby increase regional irrigation efficiency levels     
 
Demand-side factors drive local investment into village irrigation 
development, from both local governments and farmers: 
(H2) Villages facing water resource uncertainty invest in order to secure 
water resource access and participate in the local agricultural economy. 
 
In addition to public investment, this research also measures the determinants 
of private (farmer) investment behavior.  Hypothesis 3 theorizes as to which types of 
villages farmers are more willing to contribute private funds toward irrigation 
infrastructure: 
 (H3) Risk aversion related to reducing water supply uncertainty and securing 
participation in the agricultural economy drives private investment into fixed 
irrigation assets. 
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In addition, other village-characteristics that may explain village-level 
investment portfolios are included in the assessment to understand how other socio-
economic characteristics determine irrigation investment channels in villages.   
4.3.3. Summary of hypotheses 
To examine the determinants of village-level surface water irrigation 
investment and explain the enormous heterogeneity observed across villages in 
magnitude and source of surface water irrigation investment (Research Question 1). 
This study examines the hypothesis that different funding sources have different 
incentives to invest and uses village-level data from 1998 to 2008 associated with 
varying levels of irrigation investment from three different sources -- upper-level 
government, the village collective, and farmers -- to test these hypotheses. 
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4.4. Assessing the determinants of village irrigation 
investment portfolios 
This section examines variation in levels and source of investment across 
village and years in the northern China sample and further examines the main 
explanatory factors hypothesized to determine levels of irrigation investment.  The 
two categories of explanatory factors examined as the underlying incentives driving 
investment behavior are: targeting factors and demand side factors.  Summary 
statistics for the main dependent and explanatory variables are presented for 2001, 
2004 and 2008.  The sources of investment aggregated for each year are also 
presented.  Finally, the 70 villages are divided into quartiles according to their 
investment levels to assess how targeting and demand-side factors are distributed 
across the investment quartiles.   
 
 Table 12 Summary statistics for determinants of village-level irrigation investment  
 
Variables for Determinants of 
Investment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables:
Investment per hectare (RMB / 
irrigated hectare / period) 70 25 60.7 0.0 429      70 7.0        22.4        -    167    70 23.0 59.1 0.0 373
Presence of private investment 
into surface water infrastructure 
development (dummy, 1=yes) 70 0.19 0.39 0.0 1          70 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 70 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Targetting variables 70 70 70
Irrigation Service Capacity (% of 
Irrigated land actually served) 70 0.77 0.30 0.02 1.00 70 0.77      0.31        0.19  1.28   70 0.49 0.45 0.00 1.00
Income per capita (2000 RMB / 
person) 70 1441 749 297 3271 70 1574 854 286 3432 70 2807 1834 492 15748
Demand side variables:
Surface water only (dummy, 1=yes) 70 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 70 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 70 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Sown area per capita (hectare / 
person) 70 3.34 1.57 0.98 7.64 70 3.24 1.62 0.80 9.50 70 3.26 1.95 0.79 9.20
Number of years (in last 3) with no 
water in canals 70 0.11 0.49 0.00 3.00 70 0.37 0.82 0.00 3.00 70 1.17 1.38 0.00 3.00
Village Enterprise Annual Income  
(in 1,000 real 2000 RMB) 70 2 5.70 0.00 29.70 70 10.0 75.0 0.0 667 70 5.2 26.2 0.0 197
Leadership: 70 70 70
Cadre leadership of irrigation water 
operations (dummy, 1=yes) 70 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 70 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 70 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Non-collective irrigation 
management (dummy=1 of yes) 70 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 70 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 70 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
System size (meters of canal) 70 7920 13183 0.00 99400 70 9667 14917 0 99400 70 12807 22310 0 166000
Other Controls:
Number of laborers in village 70 818 448 154 2340 70 866 466 160 2200 70 1054 697 200 3800
Share of population that graduated 
from middle school (%) 70 45 18.1 10.0 89.0 70 46.4 22.7 1.7 92 70 48.6 22.6 8.0 93.0
Distance to county urban center 
(km) 70 19 16.7 1.0 100 70 19.3 16.7 1.00 100.0 70 6.2 11.2 0.0 100.0
20082001 2004
 
Source: CCAP, NCIM data set
1
1
3
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An average village in this sample in 2008 is located in Ningxia and invests 23 
Yuan per hectare per year into surface water irrigation infrastructure.  This village has 
had no water in its canals for 1.17 of the last three years and therefore can only 
irrigate 49% of the intended irrigated area.  This village also uses groundwater to 
irrigate its land.  This village likely has either a contractor or WUA managing its 
canal network which includes 12,807 meters of canal.  A farmer in this village makes 
2,807 Yuan per year and farms 3.26 hectares of land. 
Summary statistics for the determinants of investment dependent and 
explanatory variables (see Table 12), indicate high levels of fluctuation in mean 
investment levels between the survey years.  Whereas investment per hectare reaches 
25 Yuan per hectare per period in 2001 and 23 Yuan per hectare per period in 2008, it 
declines to only 7 Yuan per hectare per period in 2004.  Although the rate of total 
investment changes between survey periods, the presence of farmer investment did 
not vary as much from year to year, reaching as high as a mean of 25% in 2008, and a 
low of only 13% of villages having presence of private investment in 2004.   
The main targeting variable of interest, irrigation service capacity remain 
steady at 77% in 2001 and 2004, indicating that the average percentage of intended 
irrigated area actually receiving irrigation services is 77%.  This average drops to 49 % 
by 2008.  Such a pattern suggests that actual irrigated area, as a share of intended 
irrigated area, is decreasing.  This could be due to water shortages or lack of 
infrastructure to bring water to the previously irrigated areas.  A measure of irrigation 
water reliability, number of years in the last three with no water, increased year by 
year throughout the study period.  In 2001 the average portion of a year without water 
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in the canals was .11 years (40.15 days), compared with 1.17 years in 2008 (427.05 
days).  This indicates increasing unreliability of the surface water system to provide 
water to crops.  Two economic measures, village enterprise income and per capita 
farmer income also changed considerably during the study period.  Village enterprise 
income peaked in 2004 at an average of 10,000 Yuan per village, but decreased to 
5,200 Yuan per village by 2008.  On the other hand, per capita farmer income peaked 
in 2008 reaching an average of 2,807 per farmer, an increase of almost 100% during 
the 7-year period.   
Another source of variation between villages and between years is the 
composition of investment.  Table 13 below tallies the different investment 
composition profiles for the sample villages during each survey period.  The most 
common investment portfolio in the study period was found in 2001 and 2004 and 
includes upper-level government and the village collective as comprising the village 
irrigation investors.  This portfolio type changed after 2004, declining from 31 
(44.2%) and 24 (34.2%) villages having this portfolio type in 2001 and 2004, to only 
8 (11.4%) villages in 2008.  Following this portfolio type, the next most common 
portfolio is no investment into irrigation development.  The village and private 
investment portfolio type did not vary much between years, ranging from 7 to 9 
during the study period.  Private investment by farmers and contractors is rarely the 
only investment source, but rather private investment accompanies village or 
government investment activity.  Although this chart illustrates both the changes and 
diversity in irrigation investment portfolios, what drives these different portfolio 
types remains unexplained.   
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Table 13 Investment sources for surface water irrigation infrastructure 
investment source 2001 2004 2008
Upper level public  investment only 4 4 6
Upper and Village Public Investment only 31 24 9
Village Public Investment only 8 9 8
Village Public and Private investment only 8 7 9
Private Investment only 0 0 1
Upper and Private Investment only 1 0 0
Upper, village public, and private investment 6 3 11
no investment 12 23 26
70 70 70
Year
 
Source: CCAP, NCIM data set 
 
 Table 14 Relationship between level of irrigation investment and village factors, 1996-2007 
Irrigation 
investment 
level
mean 
investment 
per level (year 
2000 RMB)
irrigation 
service 
capacity 
(share)
has drought 
(dummy =1 
if yes)
per capita 
income 
(year 2000 
RMB)
share of non-
ag workers 
in village 
number 
village 
enterprises 
(#)
sown area 
per capita 
(ha)
use surface 
water only 
(dummy =1 
if yes)
water 
scarcity (# of 
years in last 
3 with no 
water in the 
canals)
Bottom 25% 5,941                  0.816 0.211 1,424           55% 0.895            2.231 0.105           1.15
3rd 25% 24,023               0.746 0.241 1,878           36% 2.103            2.933 0.276           1.10
4th 25% 90,238               0.964 0.214 1,887           31% 3.679            3.361 0.357           0.57
Top 25% 567,697             0.999 0.536 2,345           39% 3.464            4.743 0.607           0.22
target factors demand factors
 
 
1
1
7
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To further examine the investment characteristics of different types of villages, 
the 70 villages are subdivided into quartiles based on each village‘s level of irrigation 
infrastructure investment (see Table 14).  Villages in the top 25% of levels of 
investment average 567,697 Yuan total investment between 1996 and 2007, while 
villages in the bottom 25% average only 5,941 Yuan in total investment over the 11 
year period.  Based on the irrigation investment level quartiles, the means of the main 
explanatory factors are measured for each investment quartile to assess how 
investment and various factors are related.  The descriptive results for the targeting 
variables, irrigation service capacity, drought and per capita income suggest a non-
progressive investment pattern.  A village‘s capacity to irrigate its intended irrigated 
area follows closely and in a positive direction with a village‘s irrigation investment 
level.  Assuming the majority of funds come from upper-level government sources, 
such a pattern indicates a non-progressive investment strategy for equalizing 
irrigation capacity between villages.  53.6% of villages in the top investment group 
report having a drought and also have the highest income per capita, at 2,345 Yuan 
per capita compared with 1,424 Yuan per capita for villages with the lowest amount 
of irrigation spending.   
On the demand side, the per-quartile analysis reveals that villages in the 
highest investment bracket have larger land endowments per farmer, at 4.74 hectares 
per capita.  Interestingly, different from the reports of drought, a villages‘ level of 
water reliability is negatively associated with the level of investment.  That is to say, 
a higher level of water reliability is associated with the higher investment villages.  
As this descriptive analysis does not breakdown the source of investment, further 
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multivariate analysis is needed to unpack how these characteristics drives village 
investment portfolios.   
4.5. Multivariate models assessing the determinants of 
irrigation investment 
Several arguments explaining irrigation investment patterns have been raised 
by observers of China‘s irrigation development, but there has been a lack of empirical 
research based on village-level data to assess their validity and importance.  Although 
descriptive statistics provide a starting point for unraveling explanations behind the 
diversity in northern China‘s irrigation investment landscape, they do not provide 
conclusive or consistent explanations.  For more in depth analysis, this section 
develops several multivariate models.   
Based upon a review of the irrigation development literature, this study poses 
that differential public irrigation investment levels in villages is a result of policies 
aimed at equalizing surface water irrigation service capacity.  This study also assesses 
how village water shortages and a diversified village economy drive local level 
irrigation infrastructure provision – from both the village collectives and farmers.  
Measures are categorized as targeting factors, for the underlying incentives 
explaining upper-level government investment, and demand-side factors, for the 
incentives driving local investment. 
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4.5.1. Variables and measures 
 
4.5.1.1. Dependent variables: Magnitudes and share of investment 
per source 
Multivariate analysis will be conducted using three different types of 
dependent variables measuring investment (see Table 15 below).  For determinants of 
levels of total village investment, a continuous variable irrigation investment per 
hectare, is used during three time periods (1998-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007).  
Next, to assess the determinants of the share of investment from different sources, 
upper-level investment as percentage of total and village collective public investment 
as a percentage of the total investment, is used for each investment period.  A 
disaggregated investment variable is used next to explore what determines the 
magnitude of investment from various sources.  To accomplish this, a log of 
investment for upper – level and village collective investment, is used for each period.  
For determinants of the willingness of farmers to invest private funds, a dichotomous 
variable private investment is used to identify if any form of private investment into 
surface water irrigation was made during the time period.   
4.5.1.2.  Explanatory Variables: Targeting and demand side 
determinants  
Targeting factors: A progressive investment policy for irrigation development? 
A recent village-level study of rural investment in China examined 
heterogeneity of investment, from upper-level and village-level sources, in villages 
throughout China.  In looking at targeting factors, or village characteristics that make 
a particular village more attractive for receiving upper-level investment funds, the 
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study found that China‘s commitment to an emerging progressive investment strategy 
became apparent in the early 21
st
 century (Zhang, Luo et al. 2006).  That is to say, the 
rate of upper –level investment into poorer villages rose higher than funding to richer 
villages.   
But, what does a progressive investment strategy for irrigation look like?  To 
achieve stated goals of increasing agricultural yields, while using water more 
efficiently, recent policy documents indicate that instead of continuing to expand 
effective irrigation area per the goals of pre-2007, focusing investment efforts on 
rehabilitating currently irrigated areas will lead to greater efficiency in both land and 
water use in northern China (Cai 2010).  It is unclear at this point whether investment 
funds target increasing the quantity of effective irritated area, or the quality of 
irrigation works on currently irrigated area.   
Given the changing definitions of progressive investment policies for 
irrigation development, this analysis investigates how China‘s progressive investment 
policy works for irrigation investment.  Indeed, to spur agricultural productivity and 
increase standards of living in rural areas, increasing irrigated  area has been a central 
goal of local and national water control policy (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006), but the 
investment processes by which the government is achieving this goal are not well 
understood.  To understand if a progressive investment policy is driving China‘s 
irrigation investment strategy, this study assesses how funds are reaching less 
irrigation developed areas and next, how funds are reaching more water scarce areas.   
To measure a village‘s irrigation service capacity level, this study draws on 
previous work on irrigation service, measured as the ratio of irrigated land to 
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cultivated land, (Hu, Huang et al. 2000; Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006), but base the 
measure for this analysis directly on surface water managers‘ annual accounts of 
actual irrigated area within their village, as a percentage of intended irrigated area.  
This aims to identify actual irrigation service capacity, not only the quantity of 
expanded area. 
Comparison groups will be used according to high and low irrigation service 
capacity measured in the year previous to the data collection.  High irrigation service 
capacity is defined as villages with greater than 75% of irrigated area actually 
irrigated in the previous year, and serves as the treatment group, and villages where 
less than 75% of designated irrigated sown area is actually irrigated are control 
villages.  Within the regression analysis, the service capacity of 2001 is used as a 
baseline and regress a lagged high irrigation service capacity variable on the 
investment dependent variable for years 2004 and 2008.  This research design is used 
to assess if villages with greater need to improve their irrigation services receive 
higher levels of investment in the subsequent period.   
Other targeting factors include per capita farmer income as a measure of 
farmer‘s livelihood and the village‘s drought status.  Water resource scarcity also 
impacts government decision making based on government‘s responsibility to 
respond to calamitous events (such as a drought or flood) to reduce food production 
disruptions  and avoid income loss (Besley and Burgess 2002).   
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Demand side factors:  Local water resource uncertainty and economic activity 
Previous research indicates that irrigation user investment will increase in 
order to reduce supply uncertainty, under certain institutional conditions (Arrow and 
Lind 1970; Wade 1988).  To measure a village‘s water supply uncertainty, this study 
uses surface water managers‘ reports of two water availability measures:  number of 
years in the last three with no water in the canals and reliance on only surface water 
to understand how village-level government and farmers alter their investment 
patterns based on levels of water scarcity.  Reliance on surface water indicates 
whether or not the village relies exclusively on surface water, instead of conjunctive 
use of surface and ground water sources.  Reliance on one source of water is 
hypothesized to increase water uncertainty risk.  Based on previous work indicating 
the a village‘s level of commercial economic activity drives local public investment 
(Dong 2000), annual village enterprise income is used to measure village commercial 
activity.   
 
Village-level controls 
Other control variables included in the models include management 
characteristics including irrigation management type and whether or not the irrigation 
manager is a cadre.  To control for land resources, the analysis includes variables for 
wheat yields, canal system size (meters of canal length) and sown area per capita in 
the village.  The analysis also controls the number of laborers in the village, percent 
of villages with greater than middle school education and distance from an urban 
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center.  For the sake of parsimony, hypotheses for significant factors will be 
discussed in the results section.   
4.5.2.  Methodology and Models 
This section uses multivariate analysis to estimate how different incentives 
drive of village-level irrigation investment from three different sources in northern 
China.  Five separate models are introduced and the methodologies for each model 
are described.   
The models used to estimate how different incentives drive village-level 
irrigation investment are divided into two types (see Table 15): Total village 
investment models aggregate all investment sources to estimate what drives variation 
in magnitude of investment in northern China.  Two dependent variables, investment 
per hectare and a log of investment are used.  The log model produces marginal 
effects.  The next set of models decomposes village investment by sources to separate 
out what drive investment from upper-level government, village collective and 
private investors.  Targeting and demand-side explanatory factors are used to explain 
varying levels and sources comprising a villages‘ surface water investment portfolio.  
A logit model estimate what drives private investment in villages is also specified.  
More detailed models specifications and methods follow this section. 
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Table 15 Determinants: Models, Variables, and Analytical Tools 
Model Dependent Variable (s)
Key Independent 
Variables
Analytical 
Tool
Investment 
Magnitude Model
total irrigation 
investment per hectare
▪irrigation service 
capacity                                       
▪water availability
Fixed effects
Marginal Effects 
Model
log of total irrigation 
investment
▪irrigation service 
capacity                                       
▪water availability
Fixed effects
Village Investment 
Share Model
village investment, as 
% of total
▪resource mobilization                                   
▪wateravailability*ag.
economy
Random 
effects tobit
Upper-Level 
Government Share 
Model
upper-level government 
investment, as % of 
total
▪irrigation service 
capacity                            
▪water availability
Random 
effects tobit
Presence of 
Private Funds 
Model
binary variable equal to 
1 in villages with 
presence of farmer 
private investment 
▪water availability                                      
▪wateravailability*ag.
economy
Conditional
fixed effects 
logit model 
unit of analysis: village
    Total village investment models:
    Decomposition models:
 
4.5.2.1.  Methodology for analysis of progressive irrigation 
investment policy 
Based on the previous discussion, the link between magnitude of village 
irrigation investment and its determinants can be represented by the following 
equation: 
                                                         (1)  
Where village infrastructure investments per hectare      (the per hectare 
normalization controls for heterogeneous village sizes) are regressed on time effects 
   ,      a dummy variable indicating if the actual surface water irrigated area is 
greater than 75% an irrigation service capacity measure.  To account for time 
108 
requirements in the provision of infrastructure, this analysis lags the key independent 
variable Irrigation Service Capacity to account for the time needed to assess and 
direct projects toward areas of most need.  Due to the lag structure, the analysis only 
includes villages‘ investment per hectare for years 2004 and 2008.  Wit is matrix of 
water scarcity variables including number for years (in past 3) when the village 
experienced no water in the canals and a dummy variable for presence of a drought, 
for in village i in time period t,, and a vector     of proxies of political and 
geographical characteristics, to identify how leadership characteristics are associated 
with higher irrigation infrastructure investment.  γ is a vector of socio-economic 
controls including number of meters of tertiary and branch canals, net per farmer 
income, province and amount of non-agricultural economic activity.  The error term 
for the fixed effect models is decomposed into two parts,    is the unobserved village-
level heterogeneity for the fixed effects models, and     is the idiosyncratic error term 
which is assumed to be  uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables.   
To estimate the difference in investment provision between villages with high 
and low levels of irrigated serviced area between the three time periods, the analysis 
includes an interaction term St-1 * Ti, where T=2 for 2004, and T=3 for 2008. 
To estimate the determinants of different proportions of investment from 
various sources, the analysis uses the fixed effect Tobit estimator to regress the 
impact of the explanatory variables listed above on Uit and Vit indicating share of 
upper-level government and village collective investment, per village, per period.   
4.5.2.2.  Methodology for determinants of farmers’ willingness to 
invest  
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To estimate the factors related to the determinants of farmers‘ willingness to 
invest private funds toward irrigation development, the conditional fixed effects 
logistic model is preferred overall and referenced in the following discussion.
5
  To 
explain the binary outcome of private investment into surface water irrigation system, 
the analysis employs a logit model to explain two outcome possibilities: villages with 
presence of farmer private investment and villages without presence of private farmer 
investment. The conditional fixed effect logit model provides a way to estimate the 
effects of independent variables on a dichotomous outcome variable when the 
observations are grouped, and group membership affects the outcome (Chamberlain 
1980).  In this case, villages serve as the grouping unit, farmers within the villages 
exhibiting a willingness to invest private funds into surface water irrigation 
infrastructure serves as the group outcome.  The following model is specified a model 
to estimate the probability that a village has farmers willing to invest private funds:  
Logit(p) = log 





 p
p
1
=log(p) – log(1-p)     (2) 
using the equation: 
logit(pit)
)(23221 itiitititit DZWG      (3) 
Where itp  represents the probability of a positive outcome (p=1) for private 
investment for a village i in time period t.  Git represents my matrix of economic 
diversity terms including crop diversity, percent of worker in village state-owned 
                                                 
5
 Results of a Hausman Test for model specification between fixed effects and pooled logit report with 
high probability, that the differences in coefficients are not systematic, by failing to reject the null that 
ρ=0. (chibar2(01)=8.01, p(ρ=0)= 0.452) This indicates a preference for the conditional fixed effects 
logit model. 
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enterprise, number of people in the workforce, and per capita income.  Wit is matrix of 
water scarcity variables including number for years (in past 3) when you experienced 
no water in the canals and a dummy variable for presence of a drought, for in village i 
in time period t;  itZ  a matrix of control variables that represent other village factors 
affecting irrigation system performance.  Specifically, the analysis includes a number 
of variables to hold constant the village‘s land resources, irrigation system structure 
and village socio-demographic characteristics. 
The analysis assumes the idiosyncratic error term ℇit, is uncorrelated with any 
of the explanatory variables or the dependent variable.  This logit model estimates the 
odds ratio using a conditional fixed effects model, where I can control for village-
level heterogeneity contributing to the presence of private investment in the term μi.  
The model‘s odds ratios explain the likelihood that a village will have farmers willing 
to invest their private funds into irrigation infrastructure.  A White Test is used to 
measure heteroskedasticity and do not detect heteroskedasticity (Prob>chi
2
 = 0.16).  
Autocorrelation is detected in the model (chi
2
= .029, tresidlag=4.10).  To counter the 
presence of autocorrelation AR(1), robust standard errors are used which correct for 
biased standard errors and z-statistics.  
4.5.3.  Results 
To identify the relationship between investment provision and irrigation 
service disparity, this analysis employ a three-wave panel data analysis of village-
level irrigation systems and estimate multiple models for my dependent variables.  
The panel structure of the data allows us to probe differences between villages over 
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three time periods, and within villages over the time periods.  To achieve the goal of 
estimating village–level determinants of irrigation infrastructure provision, several 
estimation methods can be utilized.  A standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
has several drawbacks such as producing biased parameters due to omitted 
unobserved heterogeneity associated with explanatory variables within villages.  
Similarly, an OLS model will estimate biased standard errors when the errors are 
heteroskedastic or dependent within a group, when there is correlation for 
observations within a village across time periods. When omitted time-invariant 
variables are correlated with the key explanatory variables, a fixed effects model will 
provide a consistent and unbiased estimate of the parameters while concurrently 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in each village. Alternatively, if omitted 
time-invariant variables are uncorrelated with the key explanatory variables, a 
random effects model will provide a more efficient estimate than would fixed effects
6
.   
In order to use the most appropriate estimator, the analysis employs an 
appropriate parameter estimation method based on model specifications tests 
including Hausman and the Breusch-Pagan conducted for the dependent variable.  As 
for any panel dataset, the presence of correlation between subsequent error terms in 
either the positive or the negative direction is a likely problem, the Breusch-Godfrey 
method is used to test for autocorrelation in each model. 
4.5.3.1.   Determinants of magnitude of irrigation provision 
                                                 
6
 A chi
2
 value 49.79, p=0.00001 for the test between random and fixed effect models allows us to reject 
the null of systematic differences between coefficients and prefer the fixed effects model.  The 
Hausman test results verify a strict assumption of the random effects model, that the idiosyncratic error 
term,  , is correlated with the explanatory variables, therefore the fixed effect estimator is preferred.   
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In estimating Eqn. (1) with the survey data, the econometric estimation 
performs well (Table 16). Most of the coefficients of the control variables have the 
expected signs and a number of the coefficients are statistically significant. For 
example, the coefficient of using surface water only variable is positive and 
statistically significant (Models 2 and 3, row 6). Even if the management 
characteristics are dropped (Model 2) econometric estimation still performs well and 
there are few differences among the estimation results.   
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Table 16  Regression analysis of the determinants of surface water irrigation 
provision  
irrigation service  
capacity only, 
within treatment 
interactions
 irrigation 
service capacity 
& water, no 
management
irrigation service 
capacity, with 
water and   
controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Targeting variables
1 High irrigation service level in 1998-2001 -7.21 40.88 41.65
-0.37 (18.12)*** (18.76)***
2 High irrigation service level in 2002-2004 79.80 55.15 54.45
(2.53)*** (19.33)*** (20.96)***
3 High Service * Treatment Post 2001 88.1 87.92
(2.75)*** (2.76)**
4 High Service * Treatment Post 2004 9.67 20.61
(0.11) (0.48)
5 per capita farmer net income (RMB/ person) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Demand Side variables
6 Use only surface water to irrigate (dummy = 1 
if surface water only)
72.81 73.43
(26.44)*** (27.24)***
7 Number of years with no water in the canals 5.56 5.13
(6.25) (6.44)
8 Sown area per capita (ha/person) 0.51 0.97
(5.27) (5.53)
9 village enterprise annual real income (RMB) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Management Characteristics
10 Surface water manager is cadre (dummy=1 if 
yes) -10.17
(20.14)
11 Non collective management (dummy=1 if non 
collective management) -8.67
(15.75)
Basic Irrigation Conditions
12 log of meters of canal in village (meters) 6.45 10.46
(23.14) (25.05)
13 gross irrigation infrastructure through previous 
period (RMB)
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Other Control Variables
14 Annual wheat productivity (kg / ha) -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
15 log distance from village to county capital (km) -3.16 -0.73
(6.32) (7.78)
16 Share of workers that graduated from middle 
school (%)
-0.05 0.00
-(0.28) (0.29)
 R
2 0.27 0.47 0.48
observations 140 140 140
villages 70 70 70
F - joint sig of X 5.92*** 3.03*** 2.54***
F - joint sig of villages 1.71** 1.80** 1.71**
Dependent variable: surface water irrigation investment per hectare, t+1, t+2 using a fixed effects model
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Data source: CCAP, Northern China Irrigation Management Survey. 
  
Notes:  absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  Levels of statistical significance P>|t|:*=0.001, 
**=0.05, *=0.10; Constant not shown in table for parsimony.  Year dummies for 2004,  and 2008 not 
shown in results;  constant not shown for parsimony 
 
Results from the regression analysis indicate that irrigation service provision 
in northern China‘s villages is not being equalized, but rather that villages with high 
levels of functioning irrigation serviced area continue to have higher investment than 
villages with lower levels of surface water irrigation capacity.  From the results, one 
can see that within the group of villages that attained a high level of irrigation service 
capacity during this ten-year period, a village with high level of irrigation serviced 
area between 1998-2001 will invest, on average, in 2002-2004, 88.10 RMB per 
hectare, more than a village that had low-serviced area between 1998-2001, holding 
all else constant.  For villages with actual irrigation serviced area greater than 75% of 
the intended irrigated serviced area in investment periods 1998-2001, and 2002-2004, 
total investment in these villages was higher than villages with low levels of irrigation 
serviced areas, by 42 RMB per hectare, and 55 RMB per hectare, respectively, 
holding all else constant.  In other words, villages with high service levels are keeping 
high service levels, and villages with low service levels are not developing their 
infrastructure to be able to irrigate greater than 75% of the land intended for irrigation.   
The descriptive results show that there is little movement from low level of 
actual serviced area, to high level of irrigation serviced area, multivariate results 
confirm that since high-serviced areas continue to invest significantly more funds 
toward irrigation infrastructure than low-service areas, irrigation service disparity will 
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continue to exist in the countryside, despite policy objectives to equalize irrigation 
services across rural northern China.   
Across all models, a village that only uses surface water to irrigate invests 72 
RMB more per hectare into surface water irrigation than a village utilizing 
groundwater or conjunctive water sources, holding all else constant.  For villages 
relying exclusively on surface water, all irrigation infrastructure investment supports 
surface water development, including canals, pumps, electricity equipment, as the 
infrastructure funds are not being allocated between groundwater and surface water 
irrigation development.   
4.5.3.2.   Determinants of irrigation investment from different 
sources 
Although analysis of the determinants of surface water irrigation investment 
per village yields interesting results on the overall patterns of investment in northern 
China, an underlying problem with the structure of the analysis lies in the dependent 
variable, rate of investment per hectare, is the sum of investment from multiple 
investment sources.  In closely looking at the explanatory factors for different sources 
of village investment, it could be expected that each source – village collective, 
upper-level government, and private investors – could have separate determinants for 
investing.  Aggregating the sources of investment could have consequences on the 
underlying structure of my model.  To address such concerns, in the following 
sections, the analysis disaggregates village-level irrigation investment in several ways.  
First, the dependent variable is divided into proportion of investment from upper-
level and village collective.  Due to the fact that in a small proportion of the villages 
116 
there is a third source of investment, private farmer investment, the share of village 
collective and upper-level investment does not add up to one.  Since the proportions 
do not add up to one, separate regressions are run for each of these dependent 
variables, and report results for each of the regressions.   
The presence of private farmer investment in village-level irrigation provision 
is a small but rising trend across northern Chinese villages.  Due to the large number 
of zero – private investment villages, a dummy variable is used to measure presence 
of private investment within the village and report results from the logistic regression.  
Lastly, aside from the share of investment from upper-level and village collective 
sources, it is also interesting to measure determinants of the magnitude of different 
investment sources within the villages.  To accomplish this, separate regressions are 
run for total investment for each of the three time periods, for village collective and 
upper-level government investment sources.   
After dividing investment by source, regression results indicate good model fit, 
and the relationship between several explanatory variables and share of the 
investment source is more precise (see Table 17).  In this more precise viewing of the 
determinants of village-level investment, the picture becomes more vivid of 
government‘s difficulty in reaching and improving irrigation services in under-served 
areas.  Although it would be expected that the signs on the coefficients between the 
upper-level government and village collective sources would be opposite, this is not 
always the case.  In terms of targeting villages for irrigation infrastructure 
development, upper-level government funds throughout the ten-year study period 
were consistently allocated to villages with more developed surface water irrigation 
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provision capacity.  In looking to see how the village collective may respond to 
upper-level government investment, in 1998-2001, village collective investment in 
locales with high levels of irrigation service capacity dropped, while upper-level 
investment rose.   
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Table 17 Determinants of surface water irrigation investment by source, for 
2001, 2004, 2008 
dependent variable -  share of village investment 
source from:
 upper-level 
government (tobit 
estimator)
a 
Village Collective  
(tobit estimator)
a 
Demand side factors
1 Village enterprise annual real income (RMB) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
2 Crop variety (number of different crops grown) 0.0938 0.2456
(0.11) (0.13)**
3 Sown area per capita (ha/person) 0.1470 0.0607
(0.08)** (0.09)
4 Log of meters of canal in village (meters) 0.1226 -0.0673
(0.12) (0.13)
5 Gross irrigation infrastructure through previous 
period (RMB)
0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Targeting factors
6 Per capita farmer net income (RMB/ person) 0.0001 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00)**
7 High level of irrigation service 1998-01 0.9347 -1.2926
(0.39)*** (0.49)***
8 High level of irrigation service 2002-04 -0.0841 -0.0423
(0.42) (0.50)
9 High level of irrigation service 2005-07 1.1233 0.4852
(0.39)*** (0.45)
10 Number of agricultural workers 0.0004 0.0007
(0.00) (0.00)***
11 log distance from village to county capital (km) 0.0482 0.0893
(0.16) (0.17)
Water Resources
12 Use only surface water to irrigate (dummy = 1 if 
surface water only)
0.5858 0.7175
(0.25)*** (0.29)***
13 Number of years with no water in the canals 0.0253 -0.1880
(0.12) (0.14)
14 Drought (dummy =1 if drought reported during 
investment period)
0.4765 0.1506
(0.29)* (0.34)
Other factors
15 Share of workers that graduated from middle 
school (%)
0.0028 0.0007
(0.01) (0.01)
16 Surface water manager is cadre (dummy=1 if 
yes)
0.0735 -0.2266
(0.26) (0.30)
17 Non collective management (dummy=1 if non 
collective management)
0.5412 0.51
(0.28)** (0.31)**
Wald Chi
2 30.04** (18 dof) 29.23** (18 dof)
observations 210 210
villages 70 70  
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Data source: CCAP, Northern China Irrigation Management Survey. 
  
Notes:  a. Coefficients are marginal effect, absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  Levels of 
statistical significance P>|t|:*=0.001, **=0.05, *=0.10; Constant not shown in table for parsimony.  
Year dummies not shown in results;  constant not shown for parsimony 
 
On the demand side, land resources, measured as sown area per capita has a 
positive relationship with each investment source.  The variety of crops grown in the 
village has a positive and statistically significant relationship with village collective 
investment into surface water infrastructure development. Villages with more 
agricultural expertise related to crop varieties, especially higher value crops and 
watering requirements may calculate surface water improvements as having a positive 
return on investment for non-grain, higher value crops.  The number of workers in the 
village is an important determinant of village investment into irrigation infrastructure 
development.  The amount of available labor for agriculture is a critical input into 
agricultural production, aside from other production factors including capital 
(infrastructure), land and raw materials.  Village leaders making budgeting decisions 
where all critical production inputs are present will make higher investments into the 
capital portion of production when labor is available.   
From the village collective investment determinants, more diverse crops are 
associated with a higher share of village-level investment than with upper-level 
government investment (see Table 17).  These results support Oi‘s 1992 finding that 
local investments are made to support local economic development.  In this case, 
village collective investments are made to support higher value agricultural 
production in the form of cash crop revenue, despite the fact that no taxes are 
collected on this revenue. 
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Water resource conditions matter more for determining upper-level irrigation 
investment priorities than village-level investment.  Although for both sources, the 
exclusive use of surface water plays a determining role in investment allocation 
between villages, water availability also plays a role in determining upper-level 
investment allocation.  If fact, water availability yields opposite direction of impact 
on investment determination between upper-level government and village collectives 
(Table 9, line 13).  Where upper-level governments will allocate more to villages with 
unreliable water supply, in villages with unreliable water supply, the village 
collective will invest a smaller share of total investment monies.  When considering 
the village-level and upper-level government policy priorities, this trend makes sense.  
Upper-level government not only makes investments to ensure economic and 
agricultural development, other priorities include poverty alleviation, and 
guaranteeing stable agricultural output throughout periods of natural disaster 
(including severe droughts).  This finding supports previous research that found water 
resource scarcity impacts government decision making due to government‘s 
responsibility to respond to calamitous events (such as a drought or flood) to reduce 
food production disruptions  and avoid income loss (Besley and Burgess 2002).  
Increased funding for drought stricken villages may come from targeted emergency 
relief funds routinely used in the case of weather related emergencies including floods, 
droughts, and plant disease outbreaks. 
When considering the magnitude of investment by source, results support 
findings in the previous models, with a few notable exceptions (see Table 18).  
Having fewer number of workers matters for determining the magnitude of upper-
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level government investment but the number of workers does not matter for the 
magnitude of village investment.  One less agricultural worker per village results in 
0.20%
7
 decrease in upper-level government investment over the investment period, 
holding all else constant (Table 10, Row 11).  The number of workers is a positive 
and significant determinant of investment across models, holding other factors 
constant.  Other targeting factors for investment match the previous findings and 
remain significant.  Villages with high level of irrigation service capacity continue to 
have higher levels of investment than villages with lower irrigation service capacity, 
holding all other factors constant.   
Non-collective management is positive and significant for upper-level 
government and village collective investment.  This could be for two reasons.  First, 
WUAs and contractors receive implementation subsidies as part of the larger 
irrigation institutional reform campaign.  Next, institutional reform also clarifies canal 
rights and responsibilities and creates an incentive for investment.  If improvements 
are made on the canal network and the contractors can collect higher fees due to 
improved service, better incentives are in place to spur investment.   
  
                                                 
7
 The precise percentage increase is calculated using the formula:       [   ( ̂ )   ] 
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Table 18 Regression analysis of the determinants of the magnitude of surface 
water irrigation provision, fixed effects, 2001-04, 2005-07 
Upper-level 
government
Village 
collective
Demand side factors
1 village enterprise annual real income (RMB)
0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
2 crop variety (number of different crops 
grown in village) 0.2758 0.3758
(0.35) (0.55)
3 Sown area per capita (ha/person) 0.0814 0.5993
(0.28) (0.44)
4 log of meters of canal in village (meters) -2.6911 -0.5498
(1.32)** (2.10)
5 gross irrigation infrastructure through 
previous period (RMB) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Targetting factors
6 High level of irrigation service 1998-01 1.8991 1.7890
(0.96)** (1.53)
7 High level of irrigation service 2002-04 2.4942 3.4641
(1.03)*** (1.64)**
8 Use only surface water to irrigate (dummy = 
1 if surface water only) 4.07 1.24
(1.15)*** (1.83)
9 Number of years with no water in the canals 
0.2743 -0.1754
(0.31) (0.50)
10 Drought (dummy =1 if drought reported 
during investment period) -1.1979 -0.8060
(0.91) (1.44)
11 Number of agricultural workers -0.0020 0.0013
(0.01)** (0.00)
12 per capita farmer net income (RMB/ 
person) -0.0001 0.0007
(0.00) (0.00)*
13 log distance from village to county capital 
(km) -0.0811 0.6922
(0.45) (0.71)
Other factors
14 Surface water manager is cadre (dummy=1 
if yes) -0.76 -3.64
(1.02) (1.62)**
15 Non collective management (dummy=1 if 
non collective management) 0.76 -2.19
(0.80) (1.28)*
16 Share of workers that graduated from 
middle school (%) 0.00 0.04
(0.01) (0.02)*
 R
2 
0.49 0.37
observations 140 140
villages 70 70
F - joint sig of X 2.86*** 1.71*
F - joint sig of villages 3.77*** 1.01
Dependent variable: log of surface water irrigation investment quantity, by source
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Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management 
Survey. 
  Notes:  a. Coefficients are marginal effect, absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses.  Levels of statistical significance P>|t|:*=0.001, **=0.05, *=0.10; 
Constant not shown in table for parsimony.  Year dummies not shown in results;  
constant not shown for parsimony 
 
Interestingly, the direction of correlation between explanatory variables and 
the magnitude of investment by source, often works in the same direction for upper-
level and village collective investment, suggesting a complementary relationship.  Of 
note in these results is the relevance of village-level irrigation management in 
determining village collective investment levels.  Magnitude of investment decreases 
when the irrigation system has a non-collective management.  This result aligns with 
the concept of both non-collective forms of management such as water user 
associations and contract management to separate the finances for irrigation from the 
general village collective budget with the aim of cost recovery within the village 
irrigation system (Lin 2003).  Factors such as whether or not the surface water 
manager is a cadre and the villages‘ general education level also drive village 
collective investment due to stronger political relationships (Zhang, Fan et al. 2004).  
4.5.4.  Farmers’ willingness to invest private funds 
Finally, the analysis assesses in which types of villages farmers, WUAs and 
contractors invest private funds toward surface water infrastructure development (see 
Table 19).  These results support previous findings that in villages with greater 
economic diversity and higher income levels, farmers will invest private funds toward 
collective goods, in this case surface water irrigation infrastructure.  Results indicate 
that villages with higher per capita income have a higher probability of farmers‘ 
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willingness to invest private funds toward irrigation infrastructure, holding other 
factors constant. 
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Table 19 Determinants of farmer surface water irrigation investment, for 2001, 
2004, 2008. 
dependent variable: presence of private 
investment in village
(1) (2)
Demand side factors
1 village enterprise annual real income (RMB) 1.0000 1.0000
(0.00)* (0.00)
2 Access to credit 3.8444
(4.58)
3 crop variety (number of different crops 
grown in village)
0.5297 1.2133
(0.35) (0.38)
4 Sown area per capita (ha/person) 1.4303 1.5722
(0.47) (0.74)
5 log of meters of canal in village (meters) 1.9194 1.4294
(1.29) (1.16)
Other factors
6 per capita farmer net income (RMB/ person) 1.0010 1.0012
(0.00)** (0.00)**
7 Number of agricultural workers 1.0005 1.0006
(0.00) (0.00)
8 log distance from village to county capital 
(km)
0.7660 0.7596
(0.43) (0.44)
9 Use only surface water to irrigate (dummy = 
1 if surface water only)
19.4523 18.787
(1.85)** (31.18)*
10 Number of years with no water in the canals 0.9627 0.9353
(0.47) (0.35)
11 Drought (dummy =1 if drought reported 
during investment period)
2.9551 3.9627
(1.16)** (3.16)*
12 Drought * surface water use only 0.0301
(0.05)**
13 Share of workers that graduated from middle 
school (%)
0.9921 0.9918
(0.02) (0.02)
14 Surface water manager is cadre (dummy=1 if 
yes)
-0.6355 -0.6555
(1.01) (0.96)
15 Non collective management (dummy=1 if non 
collective management)
6.8910 17.4994
(1.10)** (21.49)***
Wald Chi
2 21.40** (12 dof ) 28.48***(14 dof )
observations 210 210
villages 70 70
determinants of private surface water irrigation investment, for 2001, 2004, 2008. 
Logit conditional fixed effects model
b 
 
b.  odds ratios reported,  z statistics in parentheses. 
Data source: Northern China Irrigation Management Survey. 
Notes:  Levels of statistical significance P>|t|:*=0.001, **=0.05, *=0.10; Constant not shown in table 
for parsimony.  Year dummies not shown in results;  constant not shown for parsimony 
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Water resource conditions also matter in farmers‘ willingness to invest private 
funds toward irrigation infrastructure development.  Within the sample, in villages 
across northern China, farmers react to water scarcity by investing private funds, 
under certain conditions.  In villages utilizing only surface water resources for 
irrigation, farmers are willing to invest private funds toward irrigation infrastructure 
during drought periods, holding other factors constant.  This finding supports 
economic theories of farmers‘ investment decisions under uncertainty.  Water 
resource scarcity has been found to impact resource users‘ decision making related to 
irrigation fixed capital investment.  User investment will increase in order to reduce 
supply uncertainty, under certain institutional conditions (Arrow and Lind 1970; 
Wade 1988).   
These results suggest that economic conditions and lack of alternative water 
resources in water scarce times make farmers more likely to invest their private funds 
into infrastructure provision.  Although this is an important finding, results over a 
longer time frame looking at farmers‘ decision making under climactic uncertainty 
would be needed to understand better the long –term versus short-term reactions to 
water scarcity.   
4.6. Conclusion 
Results from the determinant of investment analysis reinforce earlier 
descriptive results suggesting a very active yet fragmented investment activity in rural 
northern China.  This chapter has three main findings.  First, the government targets 
investment funds toward villages with high levels of existing irrigation serviced areas, 
thus focusing on increasing the quality of irrigated land in northern China but not 
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expanding the quantity of surface water irrigated area.  Second, results indicate that 
unreliable water supply spurs investment from two groups, upper-level government 
and farmers, but not from the village collective.  Third, farmers are reacting to water 
scarcity by investing private funds into infrastructure that secures water supply, thus 
investing in order to increase water supply certainty and sustain agricultural yields in 
times of water shortage.  This indicates a decisive shift in the local over power over 
local irrigation management in China. 
Investment into China‘s surface water irrigation infrastructure in many cases 
defies conventional theory on investment into public goods
8
.  Scholars of irrigation 
investment in lesser developed nations have found that when governments provide 
large capital investments in common pool goods, individuals will not contribute their 
personal money to building or maintaining such goods (Ostrom, 2002).  In other 
debates exploring the relationships between land use rights and investment, it has 
been found that ambiguous property rights laws for both villages and individuals, 
increases risk associated with local and private investment into agriculture-related 
infrastructure (Feder, Lau et al. 1992) and leads to under-investment into high-value 
capital goods such as tractors, canals, and maintenance facilities.  Results from this 
chapter indicate that in China, contrary to theory, upper –level government and 
private farmers are investing in irrigation infrastructure including canals lining, 
electric pumps, and maintenance sheds.  Despite problems of chronic water shortages 
                                                 
8
 Irrigation systems fall into a class of public goods called common pool resources (Ostrom 1992) that 
are defined by 2 characteristics:  1) goods where that are difficult and costly to exclude someone from 
using, and 2) goods subject to the overuse of the good where one person‘s use subtracts from benefits 
available to others. 
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and potential free-riding within communities, farmers continue to invest private funds 
into irrigation infrastructure. 
 
  
 
Chapter 5:  Assesing the impacts of decentralized 
fiscal and water planning authority on irrigation 
development outcomes 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The confluence of China‘s changing fiscal governance (centralized, 
decentralized, federalism Chinese Style, etc.) and the local nature of water resources 
makes irrigation infrastructure investment an interesting crossroads to probe the 
impact of fiscal decision making authority at various bureaucratic levels on irrigation 
system performance.  To examine the underlying fiscal processes mentioned above, 
this research engages the larger natural resource governance question, at what level of 
government are local-level infrastructure provision decisions best made?  i.e. by local 
leaders, resource users or upper-level government agencies?  And, how do irrigation 
outcomes differ according to who decides upon the infrastructure development and 
planning?   
In answering these questions, this chapter aims to contribute to the 
understanding of fiscal and water resource planning of village-level irrigation systems 
in northern 
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China and to the larger debate on how decentralization impacts outcomes 
related to natural resource related infrastructure.  This is accomplished in a number of 
ways.  First, this section describes patterns of fiscal hierarchy in place for village-
level irrigation management.  Next, by measuring how village-level authority over 
irrigation investment impacts the effectiveness of irrigation development.   To 
accomplish these goals this chapter pursues three objectives.  First, this study presents 
an empirical framework to understand changes in village-level irrigation fiscal policy 
which illustrates the dual pressures of fiscal re-concentration and water resource 
planning devolution occurring in China‘s irrigation development.  Second, this study 
documents changes in fiscal structure within and across 55 villages in northern China 
between 1998 and 2008 to understand the evolution of various fiscal forms, and why 
certain forms may exist in some places and not others.  Last, this study analyzes the 
impacts of fiscal structure on meeting three irrigation development policy goals of: 
water conservation, increased crop yields and poverty alleviation.  Descriptive and 
multivariate analyses are used to unpack how village-level fiscal structure may 
incentivize some irrigation activities, while impeding others. 
Irrigation development efforts are cast as the product of decision-making 
processes of village and irrigation managers set within a village and irrigation 
bureaucracy framework.  Conceptualizing irrigation development as a result of fiscal 
decision making made within a set of formal and informal institutions allows the 
study to bring insights from fiscal policy and political economy theories to bear on 
broader questions of local resource management and irrigation system performance. 
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Two notes on the focus of this study.  First, this article does not capture the 
informal "politiking, bargaining and negotiating" (Oksenberg and Tong 1991) of the 
annual national financial and planning conferences within the Water Resource or 
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Bureaus.  However, in focusing upon village–
level irrigation, the study can assess how levers of fiscal and irrigation policy function 
within villages, and separate the functional division of authority over fiscal and water 
resource planning decision making, as reported by village leaders and irrigation 
managers.  Indeed, the study can capture which irrigation-related processes are under 
the discretionary control of villages.  Second, given the importance and magnitude of 
agriculture in northern China, the selection of northern China as a case by which to 
analyze the relationship among fiscal policy, water planning and irrigation 
development, is both timely and necessary. 
5.2. Literature Review:  Decentralized decision making 
and irrigation development outcomes 
Although little has been written on fiscal governance of China‘s village 
irrigation systems, one can piece together studies on irrigation, institutions and fiscal 
structure studies in China to understand general trends in China‘s irrigation practices 
and fiscal management.  This first section reviews the current state of irrigation 
related institutions and fiscal policies in China.  Next, the literature on the 
decentralization debate in environmental governance is reviewed.     
5.2.1.  State of local irrigation fiscal policy in China 
In the past 30 years, irrigation decision-making processes, related to both 
monetary and water resources, have devolved to provinces, counties, townships and 
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villages (Schroeder 1992; Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).  An indication of devolved 
decision making in surface water irrigation infrastructure provision is the observed 
trend toward increased local investment and project planning for irrigation 
infrastructure (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003; Fan, Zhang et al. 2004).  Although surface 
water irrigation institutions appear to be evolving toward localized control, it remains 
unclear where the actual locus of authority lies over village-level fiscal and water 
resource decision making  (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006; Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).   
Amid increasing diversity of local irrigation institutions, observers have yet to 
identify what has changed in functional decision-making processes related to capital 
investments, revenue distribution or village-level water allocation.  As scholars and 
government officials look to scale up investment in rural infrastructure with the aim 
to improve incomes and sustain agricultural yields, but facing tight budget constraints, 
better understanding of the impact of fiscal authority on the effectiveness of public 
investment into irrigation development can help inform policy solutions that meet 
regional water conservation and agricultural development goals. 
Twenty years before the introduction of irrigation management reform, 
China‘s central government began experimenting with decentralized fiscal policy by 
creating various revenue sharing arrangements that changed the rules for sharing of 
locally collected revenues (Oksenberg and Tong 1991)
9
.  Under post-reform rules, 
local governments gained greater discretion and flexibility in deciding how to 
                                                 
9
 A large literature on fiscal policy in China exists and categorizes the many different revenue sharing 
forms, and the impacts of such agreements in the post-reform era.  For much more detailed look at 
China‘s fiscal contracting, extra budgetary revenue structure, and other experimental fiscal policies see: 
Oksenberg and Tong (1991),Wong (1991),  Oi (1992),  West (1995), Jin et al (2005), Lin and Liu 
(2000), Tsui and Wang (2004).   
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generate revenue and make expenditures (Oi 1992).  The local fiscal incentive 
approach provided a clever way in which localities could achieve the macro-
economic development goals of the central government in ways that also benefitted 
local governments.  The underlying theory being that if local governments retain a 
significant portion of the increased tax revenue, they will promote economic 
development in order to get more tax revenue; this sharing arrangement to support 
market development is known as the "helping hand" approach (Tsui and Wang 2004; 
Jin, Qian et al. 2005).  What began as a center-province fiscal system soon was 
mimicked throughout China‘s sub-national bureaucracy as a way of arranging fiscal 
policy throughout China‘s administrative hierarchy (Jin, Qian et al. 2005).   
As China‘s irrigation sector adapted to the reform policies, revenue sharing 
between the village and the irrigation line agencies (irrigation district, township water 
resources bureau, etc.), and indeed within villages themselves, villages struggled to 
co-operate in fiscally sustainable ways.  The plight of China‘s irrigation sector is thus 
embedded within central and province level efforts to improve rural fiscal policy by 
devising incentives and institutional reforms to promote the provision of local social 
and public goods.   
The local fiscal self-sufficiency model produced various problems in village 
irrigation development.  Presently, many villages‘ fiscal problems begin on the 
revenue side of the fiscal sustainability equation.  Surface water irrigation markets in 
China, similar to irrigation water markets throughout the world, do not operate 
according to laissez-faire principles thus the price of water is below market value.  
Surface irrigation water price is typically set by the township or county price bureau.  
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A central problem for local irrigation system finances is the artificially low price of 
irrigation water, and resulting low revenue stream for local irrigation system 
investment, or operations and maintenance activities.
10
  Thus, little capital 
accumulation for repair or investment to canal systems exists to minimize conveyance 
losses (Yang, Zhang et al. 2003; Ou, Zachernuk et al. 2004), or invest into water 
efficiency equipment (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007).   
Government policy keeps water prices artificially low to ease the burden on 
farmers and implicitly subsidize agricultural communities (Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003; 
Shalizi 2006).  However, because irrigation water service is generally poor and 
farmers have little say over the quantity or timing of deliveries, farmers have little 
incentive to pay more in flat water fees unless they get more, in terms of better timing 
and reliability of water provision  (Ou, Zachernuk et al. 2004).  In many cases in 
China and other developing countries, public agencies‘ fail to collect fees from 
farmers at all to support operation and maintenance activities (Easter 1986; Johnson 
1990; Gulati, Svendsen et al. 1994; Maskey and Weber 1998).  One goal of allowing 
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 The problem of irrigation water pricing in China is debated widely Yang, H., X. Zhang, et al. (2003). 
"Water scarcity, pricing mechanism and institutional reform in northern China irrigated agriculture " 
Agricultural Water Management 61(2): 143-161, Dinar, A. and J. Mody (2004). "Irrigation water 
management policies: Allocation and principles and implementation experience." Natural Resources 
Forum 28: 112–122, Tsur, Y., T. Roe, et al. (2004). Pricing Irrigation Water  Principles and Cases 
from Developing Countries. Washington, D.C., Resources for the Future..  Three main obstacles face 
water pricing advocates. First, irrigation water has a larger social imperative than simply watering the 
earth, including crop production and enhancing rural incomes.  After decades of projects aimed at 
instituting water pricing for irrigation water, advocates of water pricing a the World Bank 
acknowledge that determining pricing policies for agricultural water use should incorporate the effects 
of pricing on agricultural productivity and farmer incomes Dinar, A. and J. Mody (2004). "Irrigation 
water management policies: Allocation and principles and implementation experience." Natural 
Resources Forum 28: 112–122..  Second, the infeasibility of measuring water volumetrically at the 
entry point of the millions of small plot farms in the developing world prohibit volumetric pricing.  
Third, the lack of an institutional structure that designates clear usufructory rights that would allow a 
farmer to buy and sell his water allocation makes the institutional provide a further obstacle to market 
based water pricing.     
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agricultural water prices to rise, aside from controlling the demand for water via 
pricing, is to allow communities to establish financially self –sufficient irrigation 
management systems, where the water fee revenues equal the water system 
expenditures, and irrigation funds are collected and held separate from other village 
fees. 
A series of irrigation management reforms introduced in the late 1990s aimed 
to solve many of the coordination and budgeting woes faced by China‘s village 
collectives struggling to manage the irrigation systems.  Such reform institutions 
include water user associations (WUAs) and contracting which take the irrigation 
management function away from the traditional village collective management 
(Huang, Rozelle et al. 2009).  WUAs place operation and maintenance functions of 
village-level irrigation systems, including fee collection, under the direct control of 
the water users.  WUAs are generally managed through an elected committee 
comprised of village representatives.  Contracting is a system in which the village 
leaders contract the villages‘ canals out to an individual, who manages the canal in 
return for a payment.  Recent empirical findings
 
indicate that WUAs and contracting 
have had little effect on water-use savings in China (Wang et al., 2006).  The 
relationship between irrigation institutions and irrigation performance will be 
examined more in depth below. 
Another problem for local irrigation fiscal policy in China is the lack of 
separation between the irrigation budget and the general village budget.  Irrigation 
fees typically are submitted into the general village account with fees for other village 
services, therefore it is unclear if irrigation systems costs exceed revenue, or not.  In 
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many cases, including that of collective management in China, irrigation fees go 
directly into the general village budget and are not set aside to re-invest into the 
irrigation system.  A central tenant of irrigation water management reform, both 
WUAs and contracting, is keeping irrigation funds completely separate from general 
village funds in order that revenues funnel back into the system for structural and 
institutional improvements.  Water services experts believe fiscal management reform, 
with a key stipulation that irrigation finances are separated from the general village 
fund, may help villages better manage both investment and maintenance activities 
(World.Bank 2000).   However, given the lack of actual change in locus of control 
under the WUA style of management reform (Caizhen 2008; Huang, Rozelle et al. 
2009), whether or not irrigation revenues are held in a separate budget to support 
irrigation-related expenditures remains unclear. 
Another factor affecting local irrigation management is the obligation to fulfill 
agency and upper-level government policy mandates.  Although responsibility for 
funding local irrigation projects transferred from central to local governments 
beginning in the early 1980s, central and provincial governments continue to issues 
mandates for reforms aimed at increasing water use efficiency (Huang, Rozelle et al. 
2009), increasing grain production (Yang and Zehnder 2001) and alleviating poverty 
(Huang, Dawe et al. 2005), thus creating a dynamic push and pull relationship 
between the village‘s fiscal authority and the policy mandates of the overlying 
bureaucracy.  
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5.2.2. The irrigation decentralization debate 
A recent surge in interest over the junction between fiscal policy and natural 
resource management has revived a debate on the role of fiscal policy in determining 
resource management outcomes and is useful for evaluating China‘s irrigation 
development.  A current trend in natural resource governance involves decentralizing 
control over fiscal decision making to lower levels of government (e.g. province, city, 
or village-level) and in some cases the resource users themselves
11
, with regard to 
tariff setting, permitting, allocation plans and infrastructure investment (Ostrom 1992; 
Munasinghe 1993; Wegelin-Schuringa 2000).  According to the decentralization 
theorists, in locally operated irrigation systems, the role of the upper-level 
government agencies is to facilitate coordination between smaller jurisdictions and 
not to exact bureaucratic control over local fiscal policy setting (Uphoff 1991; Fischer 
and Huber-Lee 2005).  Although engineering solutions alone rarely achieve water use 
savings or increase crop productivity, theoretically, the responsiveness of leaders to 
local needs and knowledge of  local ecological characteristics, along with greater 
attention to maintenance and operations, improves the provision of service associated 
with infrastructure project (Faguet 2002).  The rationale for localized fiscal 
management is that local leaders are better informed of local needs, and have greater 
accountability to local constituents, and will therefore make better decisions on 
infrastructure provision than people in higher levels of bureaucracy (Martin 1999; 
                                                 
11
 This trend is highlighted in the collective action literature which hypothesizes that resource users 
will have more to gain than to lose by collectively managing their shared natural resources, also 
referred to as mutually beneficial collective action.  Uphoff, N., M. J. Esman, et al. (1998). Reasons for 
Success: Learning from Instructive Experiences in Rural Development West Hartford, Conn Kumarian 
Press. 
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Jacoby 2000; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Faguet 2002; 
Tsai 2007).   
From an economic perspective, irrigation development promotes rural and 
regional economic development as intensification of land-use and diversification of 
farm crops leads to increased investment and employment (Chapman, Goldberg et al. 
2003).  In economic terms, the relationship between irrigation and rural economic 
development is based on irrigation‘s role as a factor input into agricultural yields (the 
factor output), where in theory the demand for irrigation infrastructure is derived 
from demand for crops supported by the irrigation infrastructure.
12
 Well-functioning 
surface water irrigation infrastructure plays three important roles in delivering the raw 
water resource from the water source to the farm, it:  1) reduces uncertainty for 
farmers in the timing and quantity of expected water allocation, especially during 
unpredictable ―shock‖ periods of draught or flood; 2) increases water use efficiency 
via control of water volume to designated outlets; 3) minimizes loss of water to 
evapotranspiration and seepage en route to farms.  As discussed above, altering levers 
of control over the planning and building of surface water irrigation infrastructure 
will, in theory impact the effectiveness of the infrastructure. Overall system 
performance is affected by farmers‘ maintenance of the structure, using local 
knowledge to develop the appropriate water use plans and the ability to pay for 
upkeep of the infrastructure. 
                                                 
12
 Although there is a demand relationship between irrigation (factor input) and crops (factor output), 
the relationship is not one-to-one.   
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Indeed the debate continues throughout several bodies of literature in regard 
to the strengths and weaknesses of decentralization for water resource management.  
While decentralization proponents argue that integrating local knowledge of the 
resource and collective action incentives (for local managers and users) makes 
resource users feel more invested in improving the system performance (Ostrom 1991; 
World.Bank 2000), recent studies identify a range of problems incurred by locally 
financed and managed systems.  Opponents contend that local governments lack the 
financial and human resource expertise to provide sufficient public services under 
decentralization, thus decision making authority should remain in the hands of the 
central government (Crook and Sverrisson 1999).  Others contend that 
decentralization can increase regional income disparities (Prud'homme 1995).  Critics 
also argue that decentralization leads to more widespread government corruption (in 
the form of ―rent-seeking‖) (Triesman 2000) and over-exploitation of local resources 
to benefit local incomes (Brannstrom 2004).  While governments experiment with 
levels of authority over local irrigation institutions, overall, the debate remains open 
as to which type of governance structure is best for irrigation, and how governance 
impacts system performance.  Using a decentralization framework to analyze 
irrigation development aids in understanding devolution of responsibilities to village 
and local control, yet the current literature often overlooks the interplay of fiscal 
policy with other social and political policy mandates to which villages must adhere. 
In fact, the polarized debate over governance form and irrigation neglects the 
dynamic set of forces at play in China‘s villages.  In particular, an often ignored 
element of decentralization studies are the levers of bureaucratic control retained by 
140 
the central government which limit the discretionary authority of the local 
government (Ribot, Agrawal et al. 2006).  Critiques of decentralized governance cite 
limits on authority as a necessary element of governance to provides checks on local 
authority on issues of corruption, equality, and regional cooperation (Prud'homme 
1995; Faguet 2002).  Studies on irrigation governance, however, have yet to integrate 
developing theories on fiscal policy into empirical work.  The majority of work looks 
at isolated localities in a case study framework, without assessing the inter-
relationships of fiscal decisions making within larger jurisdictional units, such as 
irrigation districts, township, or county.   
5.2.3.  Summary of the literature on irrigation and decentralization 
Although the literature on fiscal decentralization is vast, only recently has 
decentralization been used to examine natural resource management broadly, and 
irrigation development in particular.  In China, shifts in fiscal policy at the village 
level have made it unclear to scholars where the actual levers of control over village 
level irrigation funding and project planning actually lie.  The debate over the 
strengths and weaknesses of decentralization for irrigation investment planning are 
informed by related debates over forest management and decentralized public goods 
provision.  Recent studies on decentralized natural resource management suggest that 
local governments are often ill-quipped to manage these complex systems.  Related 
research finds that decentralized systems in fact, often lie somewhere on the central-
decentralized structural spectrum as policy mandates from the central government 
undermine the independent authority of localities to manage their own natural 
resource systems.   
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5.3.  Research question, hypotheses and analytical 
approach 
 
5.3.1. Research question 
The main research question in this chapter is: 
 How do varying levels of village-level fiscal and water resource 
planning authority impact irrigation development outcomes? 
For the impacts of fiscal and planning authority analysis, sample in this 
chapter is limited to only Henan and Ningxia Provinces (n=55) due to observed 
variation in the fiscal re-concentration variables in these provinces, and not in Hebei.  
Figure 2 in chapter 2 depicts the posed relationships between a village‘s fiscal and 
water planning authority and three measures of village-level irrigation development 
outcomes.   
5.3.2.  Hypotheses 
Based upon the theoretical framework described above, the following 
hypotheses are posed describing the relationship between fiscal policy, irrigation 
investment, and irrigation system performance. 
(H4) Higher levels of authority (fiscal and planning) retained by the village 
allow for provision of irrigation services closely tailored to local conditions, and 
therefore will result in better irrigation and agricultural performance outcomes. 
Sub-hypotheses: 
Hypotheses H4-1.   Devolved fiscal authority, planning re-concentration and  
crop water use 
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H4-11:  Local revenue and planning decision making decreases water use 
through higher service levels and more efficient water conveyance and application 
technologies (increases reliability, quality, and timing).   
H4-10:  Local revenue and planning decision making does not affect water use 
levels. 
 
Hypotheses H4-2.  Devolved fiscal authority, planning re-concentration and 
farmer incomes  
H4-21:  Local authority over irrigation is more responsive to local needs due 
to higher levels of monitoring and accountability of leaders by/to their constituency, 
and results in higher village-wide income gains. 
H4-20:  Local authority over irrigation does not affect incomes. 
 
Hypotheses H4-3.  Devolved fiscal authority, planning re-concentration and 
agricultural yields 
H4-31:  Local authority over irrigation increases agricultural yields by 
providing more predictable and timely water supply (decreases uncertainty around 
key crop input of irrigation water). 
H4-30:  Local authority over irrigation does not impact agricultural yields. 
5.3.3.  Analytical approach 
Similar to the determinants study, this assessment of at irrigation development 
outcomes in northern China will use a quasi-experimental design with three waves of 
panel data.  This study uses comparison groups based on observational data for the 
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analysis of village fiscal policy in three time point, 2001, 2004, and 2008.  The 
research design tests the devolution hypothesis (H4), and is based the observation that 
marginal retention of revenue (MRR), our treatment condition, is changing within the 
sample population over time, with over 90% of villages remitting 100% of irrigation 
fees to the ID by 2008 (see Figure 6 in chapter 3).  Observational groups will be 
classified according to high and low level of Marginal Retention of Irrigation 
Revenues by the village.  Additional hypotheses will be tested via nested models to 
see if other revenue and irrigation planning authority measures influence irrigation 
system performance outcomes.  
The staggered nature of villages‘ transition to lower levels of investment 
authority, villages changing from high to low MRR, raises many important issues in 
the careful structuring of this quasi-experimental design.  Due to the unknown 
establishment of fiscal autonomy levels, observations that would establish baseline 
population characteristics prior to rural reform (de-collectivization) are not possible.  
In fact, villages‘ local fiscal structure transitioned to varying degrees of fiscal 
autonomy throughout the 10-year survey period.  Thus, the study faces two problems 
in experimental design integrity.  First, the two groups of villages may be non-
equivalent in their initial characteristics, and thus the changes observed over time 
may not be attributable to the intervention, but to other omitted factors.  Next, the 
intervention itself may be attributable to existing village characteristics (endogenous 
characteristics) that made this policy change occur within the village, or contributed 
to upper-level government‘s selection of the village for this policy change.  In either 
case, the differences observed between the treatment and comparison groups will be 
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biased due to omitted village characteristics.  The variables and measures are 
described in section 5.5.1 below. 
5.4.  Assessing impacts of shifting levers of authority on 
irrigation development  
This section uses the NCIM dataset as the basis for an analytical framework to 
assess shifts in levers of fiscal and water planning authority occurring in China during 
the 10-year study period.  The functional division of authority over village irrigation 
decision making is first described.  Next, the fiscal re-concentration and water 
planning devolution framework is introduced.  The last section assesses the 
implications of the re-concentration and devolution shifts for irrigation development 
outcomes in northern China.   
5.4.1.  The framework 
Decision making over fiscal policy matters, that is, revenues, expenditures, 
and related decisions, is in China often separate from water resource planning which 
manages the timing, flow and allocation of the raw water resource for surface water 
irrigation.  To conceptualize this distinction and apply it to a study of irrigation 
development, this study draws on terms first applied to a study of fiscal and political 
structure in rural Africa.  In her study on rural power structures in Africa,  Boone et al 
use the terms ‗deconcentration‘ and ‗devolution‘ to refer respectively to the extent of 
state agency penetration of control in the countryside, and the amount of fiscal 
autonomy given to local powerbrokers (Boone 1998).  Borrowing from Boone‘s 
terminology, this work uses the terms devolution and re-concentration to describe the 
development of China‘s village-level irrigation fiscal and water allocation structures 
145 
over the last ten years.  Applying these terms to an economics framework, allows one 
to integrate the behavioral assumptions behind the observed trends of devolution and 
re-concentration to understand how varying degrees of fiscal authority and 
bureaucratic resource management explain irrigation development outcomes.   
Table 20 Decision making activities in northern China's village irrigation 
systems 
Fiscal policy activities Resource planning activities Operational activities
collect irrigation fees set village allocation plan control sluice gates
set irrigation fees coordinate village water deliveries mediate disputes
settle accounts with water supplier maintain canals
sign contracts
make village investments  
Re-concentration is defined as the upper-level government agencies‘ taking 
back authority to make irrigation-related fiscal decisions, such as setting irrigation 
fees, collecting farmer fees, setting irrigation budgets, making capital investments and 
settling the village irrigation account (see Table 20).  Devolution is defined as the 
further granting of local decision making over water resource planning activities 
including setting the village allocation plan, coordinating water deliveries amongst 
farmers and choosing the management institution type. 
According to the NCIM survey data, levers of authority over irrigation-related 
decision making have shifted in the last decade.  In the late 1990s in China, most 
village irrigation systems fell under the Type I or II classification (as seen in Figure 
10 typology chart of degrees of fiscal and water planning authority), characterized by 
high degrees of local autonomy over fiscal decision making and varying degrees of 
water resource planning authority.  By 2008, the irrigation management functions 
changed as more villages migrated to Type III and IV authority regimes.   
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Figure 10 Degrees of authority in village irrigation fiscal and water planning 
I II
III IV
Irrigation planning authority
Fiscal 
concentration
Retains HIGH level of village irrigation fees
Retains LOW level of village irrigation fees
  LOW 
level of 
irrigation 
planning 
authority
 HIGH 
level of 
irrigation 
planning 
authority
 
 
Based on this study‘s analysis of the fiscal related reforms occurring during 
this time period (see chapter 3 Timeline of economic and political shifts impacting 
irrigation development), a number of rural development policies altered the levers of 
control over irrigation development and planning in villages.  As illustrated by the 
shifts of villages into the upper-level government fiscal concentration category 
(Types III and IV), irrigation districts and other upper-level government agencies 
altered revenue sharing agreements and required villages to remit 95% - 100% of 
farmer fees to the upper-level agency (see figure 6 in chapter 3) .  A shift from highly 
devolved fiscal policy to a re-concentration of fiscal authority under the bureaucratic 
control of upper-level irrigation agencies changes villages‘ fiscal and irrigation 
management landscape, and is the material which this analysis will further explore. 
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5.4.2. Implications of re-concentration and devolution patterns 
One important implication of decreased relative and absolute amounts of 
village-level irrigation revenue on the investment behavior of villages in regards to 
expending capital on irrigation infrastructure development.  In fact, although the 
share of irrigation fees remitted to the upper-level agency water bureau increased, the 
share of village-level infrastructure spending by villages remained relatively constant 
whilst the transition to lower MRR occurred.   
The gradual centralizing of fiscal authority into the hands of water and 
irrigation agency bureaucracies has several implications.  First, concurrent to villages‘ 
share of irrigation fees retained by the village (MRR) decreasing; the promulgation of 
WUAs began with the aim of promoting transparency related to water quantities, fees 
and decision making processes.  Irrigation managers, from WUA leaders to 
contractors, assumed greater responsibility for collecting fees from farmers, from 20% 
of villages where a local irrigation manager collected fees in 2001, to 46% of villages 
where a local irrigation manager collected fees in 2008 (see Table 9 in chapter 3).  
The increased responsibility of collecting fees is at odds with promoting local fiscal 
self-sustainability (higher marginal retention of revenue), which is to incentivize 
managers to regularly collect fees by allowing them control over budgeting of the 
collected revenue.  Although an overall trend of re-concentration of fiscal authority 
occurred by 2008, division of fiscal responsibilities varies between villages, with 
some villages retaining higher levels of fiscal independence, and others under tight 
control of ID / county administration.   
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A second implication of fiscal re-concentration is that decreases in relative 
and absolute amounts of village irrigation funds retained undermine local-level fiscal 
decision making authority.  Examples of local-level decision making taken out of the 
hands of local managers include village-level discretionary spending on operations, 
maintenance and capital investments.  Such a shift from devolved authority over 
irrigation and resource management to re-concentrated fiscal authority in the hands of 
upper-level government bureaucracy aims to solve many of the ills associated with 
the ―elite capture‖ problem within China‘s villages (Oi 1992).  The ‗elite capture‘ 
problem occurs when a  large portion of the resources devoted to irrigation 
development fall  into the hands of powerful groups dominating communities (Baland 
and Platteau 2004), thus undermining the usefulness of devolved decision making to 
be more responsive to local needs and providing more targeted and effective public 
goods and investments.    
Where a return to bureaucratized allocation system for making capital 
investments may deflect risks involved with elite capture, it incurs new risks 
associated with cronyism within the bureaucracy, politicized funding decisions not 
reflecting the needs of communities and loss of accountability for villagers and 
leaders for the upkeep and maintenance of capital projects.  An important aspect of 
the re-concentration of central authority over irrigation development is the return to 
bygone days of rural China (pre-1979 reform) where the collective action potential of 
villages and farmers to cooperate in decision making and fund raising was 
undermined by attitude of passive ―waiting in line‖ for government fund and project 
allocation.  The risks of reducing village participation in their own irrigation 
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development efforts includes both the risks to the overall provision of irrigation 
development activities including institutional development, irrigation planning, 
leadership training, capital investments and commitment to operations and 
infrastructure maintenance.   
More bureaucratized water planning decision making has been found to 
remove decision making from the knowledge of the actual resource and result in 
misallocation of water and neglect of irrigation systems (Uphoff 1991).  In theory de-
concentrated operational decision making improves service via: localized knowledge 
of needs, localized knowledge of water and land resource conditions, and increased 
accountability of local operators to local people.  However bureaucratized decision 
making can aid in facilitating cooperation with other regional users; is a mechanism 
to limit local authority and natural resource exploitation (Ribot, Agrawal et al. 2006).  
Shifts in water resource planning for China‘s village irrigation sector remain un-
examined, this study aims to fill this gap and further assess the irrigation outcomes 
related to particular levels of water planning authority found in the northern China 
sample.   
5.4.3.  Summary of variation in local fiscal authority and  irrigation 
development outcomes  
This section considers three indicators of irrigation development, spanning 
both social and environmental realms.  To assess irrigation development performance, 
three positive potential outcomes of irrigation development include: increases in 
agricultural yields, poverty alleviation and water conservation.  More in depth 
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description of shifts in local fiscal authority and irrigation development outcomes is 
found in chapter 3.    
5.4.3.1. Outcome 1: Water conservation 
Decreasing water use on crops is the first irrigation development outcome.  
Despite the Chinese government‘s call to create a ―water saving society‖ (jieshui 
shihui), especially in the dry north China plain, the average village in the NCIM 
sample uses more irrigation water to grow crops in 2008 than in 2001, increasing 
from 381 cubic meters per hectare per growing season in 2001 to 501 cubic meters 
per hectare per season in 2008.  About half of the villages in the sample rely solely on 
surface water for irrigation, while the remaining 50% use conjunctive use of 
groundwater and surface water sources.  One explanation for the rise in crop water 
use may be the improvement of regional and local irrigation infrastructure in northern 
China.  Surface water investment per hectare, including upper-level and local-level 
government funds, averages around 32 Yuan per hectare from 1998 to 2001 and 
31.21 Yuan per hectare between 2005 and 2007.  Investment per hectare drops to 
10.45 Yuan per hectare between 2002 and 2004.  With such investment, gross 
infrastructure stock has steadily risen with the average village having 168,000 Yuan 
(USD 24,597) worth of irrigation capital assets by 2008
13
.  Much of the infrastructure 
development has focused on minimizing conveyance losses, through canal lining 
projects, and improving distribution methods via pumps and diesel pump engines.  
                                                 
13
 Calculated using straight line depreciation schedule. 
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Such increased efficiency and ability to procure more water, may explain how 
villages are able to use more water per hectare, despite the drought conditions.   
5.4.3.2. Outcome 2: Wheat crop yields 
The crop used to assess agricultural and water use outcomes for this analysis 
is winter wheat, making up 62% of sown crop area in north east China (FAO 2008), 
winter wheat is planted in September - October and harvested in April-may (FAO 
2008).  20.4 percent of China‘s winter wheat is produced in Henan.  Spring wheat is 
also planted in Ningxia, whose spring wheat yield comprises 6.3% of China‘s spring 
wheat production.  Spring wheat has a shorter growing season, planted in April-May 
and harvested around August.  Wheat is planted in the dry season and relies on 
irrigation for much of the growing season and is susceptible to droughts and irrigation 
shortages which have occurred frequently over the past ten years, making for 
unfavorable growing conditions during critical stages of the wheat crop‘s growing 
process.   
A typical village in the sample in northern China had relatively stable wheat 
production between 2001 and 2008, averaging about 2,600 kilograms of winter wheat 
per surface water irrigated hectare per year.  According to Food and Agriculture 
Division of the United Nations, average wheat production per hectare for China in 
2000 was 3,729 kilograms per hectare, up from an annual average yield of 1,891 
kilograms per hectare in 1981.  Allowing for slight differences in calculation methods, 
average production in northern China‘s arid and semi-arid zones is lower than China 
as a whole.  In fact, the sample yields are closer to averages in other arid and semi-
arid zones such as India (2,777 kg / ha) or Tajikistan (1,101 kg / ha) (FAO 2008).   
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5.4.3.3.  Farmer income 
Farmer income is the next irrigation development outcome.  Economic 
conditions in China‘s rural regions are poor.  According to the 2000 China National 
Rural Survey conducted by CCAP, the average per capita income (farm and non-farm) 
is US $290  per year (2,257 Yuan), and the average land-holding per capita is 0.148 
hectares (2.47 acres) (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006).  Within the NCIM sample 
population, in 2001 per capita income was slightly less than the national average, at 
US $248.46 annual income per capita (1,697 Yuan), while this study does not 
measure land holdings per se, average sown area per capita is around 1.6 hectares per 
capita, indicating larger farm plots than the national average. 
Where agricultural yields in northern China at the turn of the 21
st
 century have 
been stable, rural incomes have risen steadily.  Per capita income in a typical sample 
village rose by almost twofold between 2001 and 2008, from 1,697 Yuan (USD 249) 
annual income per capita, to 3,229 Yuan (USD 473).  Increasing incomes can be 
attributed to many factors. From remittances sent from migrant workers (Khan and 
Riskin 2008) to development of rural enterprises (Oi 1999) to advances in rural 
agricultural development in the form of irrigation infrastructure (Huang, Dawe et al. 
2005), and other farming technologies. While the rise of rural incomes is remarkable, 
it must be noted that farmers in these villages remain poor, averaging net income of 
around $1.30 per day, per person.   
5.4.3.4.  Assessing Fiscal policy and irrigation development 
outcomes 
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Average agricultural yields in the sample villages fluctuate between all 
periods over the duration of the study.  In 2008, villages with higher revenue 
authority have lower agricultural yields than villages without revenue authority (see 
Table 21).  The fiscal and irrigation planning measures indicate no clear pattern 
related to how fiscal authority relates to agricultural yields outcomes.    
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Table 21 Local fiscal and planning authority and irrigation development 
outcomes 
2001 2004 2008 2001 2004 2008 2001 2004 2008
Revenue Authority
Marginal Retention of Revenue 
is > 17%
Yes 407 412 513 2,351 2,443 2,869 1,726 2,211 2,603
No 371 307 500 2,658 2,578 2,678 1,686 1,665 3,276
Invests local funds in irrigation 
infrastructure?
Yes 433 399 594 2,516 2,691 2,558 1,997 1,950 3,653
No 345 298 384 2,608 2,430 2,850 1,488 1,748 2,723
Village responsibility to collect 
water fees?
Yes 471 329 724 2,576 2,567 2,394 1,836 1,995 3,517
No 347 354 293 2,523 2,551 2,941 1,637 1,796 2,969
Decides water fee within village?
Yes 515 544 177 2,284 2,558 3,012 2,173 2,117 1,486
No 352 300 520 2,633 2,533 2,674 1,594 1,594 3,325
Water management authority
Decides water allocation within 
village?
Yes 477 - 231 2,344 - 3,000 1,988 - 1,476
No 365 365 365 2,608 2,537 2,686 1,649 1,831 3,260
Coordinates irrigation delivery 
within village?
Yes 497 237 723 2,499 2,614 2,559 1,914 1,592 3,239
No 349 380 407 2,589 2,538 2,748 1,637 1,939 3,224
* surface water use only
**light shading is the higher value within the year & fiscal category, dark shading is the lower value
Fiscal Authority & Productivity in villages in northern China (n=55)                                                                                                                                              
Average seasonal water use, wheat productivity
Irrigation Water Use* Agricultural Productivity* Farmer Income
(m
3
 / ha for wheat crop) (kg wheat / ha) (2000 RMB / capita)
 Source:  CCAP: Northern China Irrigation Manangement Survey 
In villages where farmers invest local funds, and where responsibility for 
collecting water fees remains in the village, farmers have higher per capita incomes 
throughout the study period (see Table 21). Within the descriptive statistics, irrigation 
planning authority, such as who decides water fees, did not reveal any clear or 
consistent pattern in differences between villages with different planning 
characteristics.  
For irrigation water use, within the north China sample, villages investing 
local funds into irrigation infrastructure, use more water than villages that do not (594 
m
3
 / ha with local investment, 384 m
3
 / ha without local investment – see Table 13), 
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however the direction of causation is not clear.  When considering the added element 
of level of fiscal authority, measured as a village‘s marginal retention of irrigation 
revenue (MRR) however, it is interesting to note that villages with high MRR 
consistently use more water than villages with lower MRR (also referred to in Table 
15), such villages are often the same ones investing village funds into local irrigation 
infrastructure, presumably with the purpose of procuring greater quantities of water.  
Overall, according to descriptive statistics, villages retaining higher levels of 
irrigation fee revenue have higher water use, slightly lower agricultural yields and 
higher farmer incomes.   
5.4.4.  Summary  
Descriptive assessment of variation in levels of local fiscal authority and 
irrigation development outcomes in northern China reveals large shifts in 
management regimes occurring in the northern China countryside.  On one hand, 
authority over irrigation funds and project planning is being re-concentrated back to 
the direct control and supervision of regional irrigation agencies.  On the other hand, 
water resource planning is increasingly under the control and supervision of the water 
users and contractors.  In both cases, the village collective leadership is playing less 
and less of a role in irrigation management.   
5.5.  Multivariate Analysis: Impacts of fiscal and water 
planning authority on village irrigation development  
Although the descriptive statistics reveal trends across time and space within 
the north China study area, it is not entirely clear how specific aspects of villages‘ 
irrigation fiscal and water planning structure impact village irrigation performance, 
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related to water use rates, agricultural yields and farmer incomes.  To more carefully 
evaluate how variation in fiscal and resource planning structure affects irrigation 
development outcomes, this study employs multivariate analysis. This section 
contains several parts.  First, variables used for analysis are defined and described.  
Next, the research design and analytical approach is described.  The next section 
employs multivariate analysis to analyze the relationship between irrigation fiscal and 
resource planning authority and irrigation performance in villages in northern China 
over the years 2001 to 2008.  The fourth section uses instrumental variables analysis 
to address the ―within system‖ effects, or endogeneity, of the treatment variable on 
the statistical outcomes.  Finally, results are reported and explained. 
5.5.1.  Variables and Measures 
Based on the literature and policy documents for China‘s irrigation 
development goals, three outcomes are used to evaluate the village-level irrigation 
system performance. 
5.5.1.1.  Outcome (dependent) variables 
First, to measure changes in agricultural water use under various fiscal 
management schemes, this study uses a measure of each village‘s seasonal water use 
for one crop common to all village in northern China, wheat.  Based on data from 
2001, 2004, and 2008, a rate for surface water use per wheat crop per hectare, per 
irrigation application each year in each village is systematically calculated (see 
Appendix C for crop water use and crop yield calculation procedures).  The crop 
water use rate for wheat is based on number of seasons and amount of water applied 
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to the wheat crops in each village.   Wheat crop water use is meant to capture changes 
in crop water use between years, and between villages due to changes in water 
application and water allocation practices.   
The next outcome measure is crop yields is based on village leaders‘ and 
surface water managers‘ accounts of annual wheat production in the village,  volume 
(kilograms) of wheat produced per hectare of irrigated land is calculated.  The third 
outcome variable is net annual per capita farmer income for each village, as reported 
by the village leader based upon his records for the previous year.  This measure is 
used to measure changes in farmer income and evaluate the goal of poverty 
alleviation.  All incomes are normalized to real Yuan in the year 2000.  
5.5.1.2.  Explanatory Variables 
Due to the diverse nature of fiscal policy for irrigation management, this study 
avoids uni-dimensionally measuring fiscal decentralization of village irrigation, and 
accomplishes this by following the tradition of other fiscal studies in using MRR as a 
proxy for the level of incentive faced by village irrigation leaders to generate and 
collect irrigation revenue, in addition to other fiscal policy decisions described below. 
Marginal Retention Rate 
One way to measure the degree of fiscal authority of villages is by looking at 
the share of irrigation revenue the village keeps and the share remitted to the 
irrigation district, referred to as the MRR.  In theory MRR increases discretionary 
spending power of local government (Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Oi 1992; Lin and 
158 
Liu 2000; Fan, Zhang et al. 2002; Jin, Qian et al. 2005) and incentivizes revenue 
generation (such as collecting fees; adding ad hoc fees).   
Several studies use the marginal retention of revenue to measure the degree of 
fiscal autonomy, or fiscal incentives, faced by provincial governments.  MRR is used 
both as a fiscal policy measure utilized by central governments to grant local fiscal 
autonomy (Oksenberg and Tong 1991), as well as an empirical measure of fiscal 
decentralization defined as the share of locally collected budgetary revenue the local 
government is allowed to keep (Lin and Liu 2000; Akai and Sakata 2002).  Lin and 
Liu go so far as to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization as the province‘s 
MRR.   
MRR is calculated as the share of surface water irrigation fees retained by the 
village irrigation leadership, as a portion of total fees collected.  Several scenarios 
may determine a village‘s MRR.  It may be the case that the ID charges a determined 
fee, and the irrigation manager simply sets local fees above that in order to secure 
village funds for the irrigation system.  Alternatively, the local irrigation 
administration may designate a fee sharing arrangement, as common in other county-
village fiscal arrangements (Oksenberg and Tong 1991), where no matter what 
absolute amount is collected, a pre-determined share of the proceeds will be retained 
by the village, and the remainder submitted to the ID.  Although it is unclear who 
mandates the portion of fees retained by the village irrigation leadership, variation in 
the levels of MRR within villages and between villages is observed, and it is 
hypothesized that higher levels of funds retained by the village allows for provision 
of goods and services closely tailored to the needs of villagers, and therefore will 
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result in better irrigation and agricultural system performance.  Lastly, variables high 
marginal retention rate and investment per hectare are interacted to assess if 
investment project performance varies when a village retains more funds for 
discretionary spending.   
Other fiscal and water resource authority variables 
In addition to MRR, the analysis includes a set of additional fiscal decision 
making dummy variables, indicating whether or not villages have authority over: 1) 
deciding irrigation fee levels, 2) collecting fees from farmers, 3) making village-level 
irrigation investments, and 4) signing irrigation –related contracts.  To estimate the 
impact of water resource management on village outcomes, the analysis uses two 
dummy variables related to authority over water resource management: 1) whether or 
not village irrigation leaders decide village water allocation plan; and 2) whether or 
not village irrigation leaders coordinate delivery of water for village farms.  The 
analysis will assess if these groups of variables impact village crop water use, crop 
yields and farmer income levels.   
Control variables 
Other control variables included in the models are irrigation management type, 
a few measures of village wealth including village enterprise income, gross surface 
water irrigation stock though the previous time period, whether or not farmers in the 
village invest private funds toward irrigation infrastructure and total surface water 
investment per hectare in the current time period.  The analysis also controls for 
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whether or not the village relies exclusively on surface water, instead of conjunctive 
use of surface and ground water sources, the number of laborers in the village, and 
sown area per capita in the village to measure if economies of scale are occurring 
related to production, water use and income.  For the agricultural yields model, a 
dummy variable for soil quality is added indicating yes if the village has high soil 
quality.  The hypotheses for variables with significant effects will be discussed in the 
results section. 
5.5.2.  Models and methods 
Bias due to lack of establishment of temporality is a gap in current research on 
the relationship between local fiscal policy and development outcomes.  Cross-
sectional designs cannot establish temporal precedence, making them particularly 
vulnerable to invalid inferences due to unobserved characteristics of the village that 
may explain assignment into the treatment (High MRR) category (strong grassroots 
fiscal leadership may be a result of a village‘s strong socio-economic and/or natural 
endowments) occurring concurrently with observed outcomes.  Positive relationships 
between the local irrigation development and fiscal policy can be attributed to (1) the 
community‘s natural and social endowments, (2) the institutional setting of the village 
and local government agencies, or (3) both. Indeed, potential endogeneity is regarded 
as the primary limitation in studies of how fiscal policy impacts development (Lin 
and Liu 2000; Jin, Qian et al. 2005).   
This study uses multiple strategies to control for potential endogeneity 
including use of several models for comparison of the robustness of the specified 
models (see Table 22).  Most fundamentally, this study on the impact of irrigation 
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fiscal policy on local irrigation development outcomes uses three waves of panel data 
through which changes in irrigation and development outcomes  can be examined in 
relation to changes in local fiscal structure over time.  In order to make plausible 
causal inferences on the impact of fiscal autonomy on irrigation development 
outcomes, given the non-random assignment of the explanatory factors to villages, 
careful attention is given to experimental design in the econometric models.  First, the 
careful use of dummy variables in each multivariate model allows me to separately 
account for within comparison group changes (pre-treatment to post-treatment 
changes) (see Equations 4 and 5) and within both groups changes (post-treatment vs. 
post-control changes).   
)()(
pre control,post control,pre treat,post treat, YYYY      (4) 
igtigtigtgttgigt PostY    where,Treat*PostTreat 12  (5) 
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Table 22 Impacts: Models, Variables, and Analytical Tools 
Model
Fiscal 
Devolution 
Model I
Fiscal 
Devolution 
Model II
Fiscal 
Devolution 
Model III
Water 
Resource 
Planning 
Concentration 
Model
Difference-in-
Difference
▪crop water use                                                    
▪crop productivity                                         
▪farmer per capita income
Water Resource Planning 
Authority Measures:                                                  
▪village sets water 
allocation plan                                      
▪village coordinates water 
deliveries
Difference-in-
Difference: Nested 
Models
control variables: irrigation management type,  village enterprise income, gross 
surface water irrigation stock through the previous time period, and net per capita 
income.  To control for other land resources, I include variables for wheat 
productivity, and system size (meter of canal length). exclusive use of surface 
water, the number of laborers in the village, and sown area per capita in the village.  
unit of analysis: village
Key Independent 
Variables
Analytical Tool
▪crop water use                                                    
▪crop productivity                                         
▪farmer per capita income
▪Marginal revenue 
retention rate
2 Stage Least 
Squared
▪crop water use                                                    
▪crop productivity                                         
▪farmer per capita income
Revenue Authority 
Measures:                   
▪village collects fees                                       
▪village sets fees                                      
▪village invests funds into 
irrigation
Difference-in-
Difference: Nested 
Models
Dependent Variable (s)
▪crop water use                                                    
▪crop productivity                                         
▪farmer per capita income
▪Marginal revenue 
retention rate
 
This study utilizes a variation of the difference in difference (DD) model as 
the control model with treatment interactions, understanding that DD is essentially a 
model that allows me to test for whether treatment causes "structural change" in the 
underlying relationships.  This estimator is also called a "within" estimator, since it 
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only "uses" the variation in treatment status within each cross-sectional group.  By 
contrast, the between estimator only uses variation between cross sections of data.   
The estimators above are examples of fixed effect estimators that hold 
constant time-constant village-level characteristics in order to isolate the effect of 
time invariant characteristics of interest from the treatment variable parameters.  
Another measure to increase the validity of the estimators is the use of instrumental 
variables two –stage least squares (IV 2SLS) techniques to correct for assignment of 
villages to the treatment group, based upon unobserved time varying factors. 
Econometric modeling for addressing endogeneity simultaneously models 
predictors of the exposure and the outcome of interest.  In another approach, 
instrumental variables analysis controls for endogeneity through the application of a 
valid instrument. An instrument is a variable that (i) has a causal effect on the 
exposure, (ii) affects the outcome only through the exposure, and (iii) does not share 
common causes with the outcome (Hernan and Robins 2006).   Instrumental variables 
can control for endogeneity due to unobserved characteristics, but the variables‘ 
effectiveness depends on the validity of the instrument.   Also, the instrumental 
variable estimate does not necessarily reflect the average effect in the whole 
population, the target population of interest for exposures, such as village fiscal 
structure. 
5.5.2.1.  Methodology for analysis of impacts of fiscal structure on 
local irrigation development 
To assess the impacts of fiscal structure on development outcomes, three 
dependent variables are used: 1) annual wheat crop water use per hectare per village; 
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2) annual wheat volume per hectare per village; and 3) annual per capita farmer 
income (from farm sources) per village.  All three dependent variables are 
continuous
14
, and recorded for three time periods (1998-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-
2007).  The main explanatory variable, marginal retention rate of irrigation fees is 
measured as a dichotomous variable where MRR equal to or greater than 17% (the 
mean) indicates high MRR and all values less than 17% are classified as low MRR.  
Treating MRR as a dummy variable allows use of MRR as the treatment explanatory 
variable.   
Based on the previous discussion, the link between magnitude of irrigation 
development outcomes and fiscal policy can be represented by the following equation: 
         
               
               
   ∑            
             (6)  
In this model, I measure the average treatment effect is measured as the 
difference between the treatment outcome under low MRR minus the average 
outcome prior to changing fiscal authority structure.     estimates the development 
outcome for village i after the change in MRR.  In the equation above   represent 
each of three irrigation development outcomes, crop water use rate, crop yields and 
farmer incomes.  MR is a village's marginal retention rate of irrigation revenue.  FP is 
a vector of fiscal and resource authority measures and V represents a vector of other 
predictors of irrigation development.  In this model, t=1, 2, 3 and i=village.  For 
agricultural yields, a dummy variable for soil quality is added indicating yes of the 
                                                 
14
 I conduct multiple tests for specification of functional forms on these three dependent variables.  The 
BoxCox test provides an ambiguous result, where a p-value of 0.000 on the null that λ=0 (fail to reject), 
and a p-value of 0.001 on the null that λ=0 (fail to reject).  I run the Wooldridge Psuedo R2, test for a 
logged versus unlogged variable.  The result rho=.067, R
2
, and the R
2
, from the unlogged model = 
0.139, unlogged form is preferred. 
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village has high soil quality.  The error term for the fixed effect models is 
decomposed into two parts,    is the unobserved time-invariant village-level 
heterogeneity for the fixed effects models, and     is the idiosyncratic error term 
assumed is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables.  Village-specific error 
(  in fixed effects models) subtracts out and therefore will not bias model estimates
15
.   
5.5.2.2.  Instrumental Variables 
Although fixed effects model‘s calculation of deviations from the mean 
reveals changes in development outcomes while differencing out time invariant 
village-level characteristics, there still exists the possibility that time varying changes 
within the village could bias estimates of the impact of fiscal structure on irrigation 
development. In order to control for bias due to time variant and invariant, observed 
and unobserved characteristics instrumental variables are used to estimate a Two 
Stage Least Squares Model (2SLS) to correct for bias due to ―within village‖ time 
varying characteristics.  In the absence of homogeneous effects, the 2SLS estimate 
will differ from average effects estimated using fixed effects, even if unobserved 
characteristics did not bias the associations.  A 2SLS model is specified: 
 
                                                 
15
 Hausman Specification Tests are conducted for each model to see if a random effects or fixed effect 
model is preferred.  For crop water use and farmer income, the failure to reject the null (chi
2
=24.62, 
pr>chi
2
=0.0009; chi
2
=15.07, pr>chi
2
=0.0351, for water use and farmer income respectively), indicate 
the fixed effect model is preferred on the grounds of being unbiased and consistency.  For crop 
productivity, the test statistic chi
2
=10.16; pr>chi
2
=0.1797 rejects the null indicating the random effects 
model is preferred on efficiency grounds.  For the random effects model, a version of the generalized 
least squares model (GLS),    In order for random effects coefficients to be valid, the model must be 
strictly homoskedastic and show no first order autocorrelation.  White test results for crop productivity 
indicate no indication of heteroskesdasticity (p value =.368 fails to reject the null of homoskedasticity 
in the model) and no autocorrelation (H0: no first order autocorrelation F(1, 49) = .032;  Prob > F 
=0.8593).   
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                                        (7) 
          
                               (8) 
Where    are instrumental variables to over-identify for the instrumented 
variable,   .  Instrumental variables for this model are: 1) education of party 
secretary, 2) canal system size, 3) policy decision for management reform made by 
(within) village and 4) distance from urban center.   
5.5.3.  Results 
This section reports the results of three sets of multivariate models, to evaluate 
the impact of revenue authority and water resource planning authority on 1) crop 
water use, 2) crop yields and 3) farmer incomes.  In model Set A (crop water use) and 
Set C (farmer income), fixed effects models are specified and sample average 
treatment effects reported (see Equation 3), where model parameters represent 
deviations from the within village means.  These models evaluate how changes in 
marginal retention of revenue within villages altered patterns of irrigation 
development outcomes of interest.  The models also assess how other aspects of 
irrigation governance including other measures of fiscal policy and irrigation 
planning authority impact irrigation development.  In Set B, crop yields models, 
random effects models are specified and again, sample average treatment effects 
reported.   
External validity for each of the three models would require a sufficiently high 
power calculation where the sample would indeed represent the northern China 
population of villages, however external validity in this case is limited by the sample 
size of 56 villages, in a region containing approximately over 2,500 villages (China 
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Statistical Bureau 2008).  The internal validity of the estimates is strong.  The panel 
covers three waves of data over a ten-year time period so that the temporal order of 
precedence is clearly mapped over time, establishing temporal order of cause before 
effect.  In addition, the analysis employs instrumental variables to address concerns of 
endogeneity wherein the treatment (MRR) is correlated with observed or unobserved 
factors (‗confounders‘).  For the IV results, local average treatment effects are 
reported related to a village‘s decline in revenue authority over irrigation funds. 
5.5.3.1.  Crop water use and fiscal authority models  
The crop water use model (Table 23, Set A) performs well, with the specified 
variables explaining 44% (R
2
=0.44) of observed within village variation in village 
crop water use over the three wave panel.  Several of the control variables are 
significant and have signs in the hypothesized direction.  For example, village 
enterprise income has a small but significant impact on rates of village crop water use, 
where for each 100 Yuan in additional income, the rate of crop water use declines by 
2 cubic meters per hectare, holding all factors constant (Set A, Column V, Row 17).  
This suggests several possibilities, either competition for fixed allocations of water in 
the village creates more efficient agricultural water use, or perhaps that surface water 
infrastructure in place for the village enterprise provides efficient means of water 
distribution for farm level distribution as well.  Investment into surface water 
irrigation infrastructure also has a positive effect on water conservation.  For each 100 
Yuan per hectare of investment, a village uses 116 cubic meters per hectare less than 
the village average, holding all factors constant (Set A, Colum V, Row 9).  
Investment rate in the current time period had a significant and positive effect on 
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water conservation, while gross stock in investment, a lagged variables representing 
investment through the previous time period, was of small magnitude and not 
statistically significant.  Such a difference between new versus old infrastructure 
stock suggests that the effectiveness of infrastructure in saving water can be explained 
by a number of factors including a relatively short useful life of surface water 
irrigation infrastructure in the villages, or changes in irrigation infrastructure projects 
aimed at promoting water conservation that became more widespread in the early 
2000s. 
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Table 23 Set A:  Impacts of fiscal & planning authority on crop water use:  
Village-level fixed effects 
Dependent variable: seasonal wheat crop water use (m3 / ha / season)
I II III IV V VI VII
β β β β β β β
1 High MRR * Investment Rate -0.345 
(0.950)
-0.071 
(1.004)
-0.422 
(0.965)
-0.161    
(1.03)
-0.822 
(0.988)
-0.651 
(1.049)
2 High level of Marginal Retention of 
Irrigation Revenue (Dummy=1 if above 
average MRR)
-112.93 
(50.956)**
-124.887 
(55.109)**
-108.97 
(52.049)**
-121.41 
(56.106)**
-98.536 
(53.886)*
-98.110 
(58.739)*
3 Village invests local funds to irrigation 
capital projects (Dummy=1 if yes)
9.863 
(51.826)
7.764 
(52.937)
-17.085 
(56.908)
4 Irrigation water price set by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-59.031 
(72.793)
-56.122 
(74.786)
-54.277 
(77.583)
5 Irrigation contracts signed by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
91.343 
(58.898)
90.2566 
(60.092)
112.20 
(62.71)*
6 Irrigation fees collected by village  
(Dummy=1 if yes)
11.120 
(53.872)
22.020 
(60.228)
-7.733 
(65.559)
7 Allocation decided within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-32.093 
(85.038)
-21.734 
(89.7306)
-88.253 
(98.756)
8 Delivery coordinated within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-27.173 
(47.303)
-25.121 
(54.0122)
29.656 
(61.412)
9 Surface water investment per hectare 
(RMB / ha, for time period)
-1.072          
(0.338)***
-1.163 
(0.339)***
-1.189 
(0.353)***
-1.140 
(0.345)***
-1.166 
(0.359)***
-1.207 
(0.358)***
-1.256 
(0.381)***
10 Sown area per capita (ha / capita) -2.005 
(16.53)
-1.859 
(16.114)
-7.859 
(17.170)
-3.392 
(16.424)
-9.055 
(17.493)
4.320 
(16.37)
-0.540 
(18.345)
11 Water user association (Dummy=1 if uses 
a wua)
47.272 
(58.787)
40.300 
(57.806)
20.994 
(69.497)
64.126 
(68.494)
34.801 
(75.143)
-4.403 
(67.656)
-16.970 
(88.506)
12 Contract (Dummy=1 if uses contracting) 66.395 
(49.371)
85.370 
(49.6217)*
64.450 
(53.019)
100.134 
(54.700)*
75.414 
(57.440)
71.667 
(51.55)
40.370 
(60.465)
13 Number of laborers in village 0.110 
(0.068)
0.091 
(0.067)
0.0850 
(0.071)
0.0923 
(0.068)
0.087 
(0.0733)
0.0748 
(0.0697)
0.064 
(0.077)
14 Drought (Dummy=1 if drought reported 
during time period)
-43.315 
(47.019)
-17.812 
(46.876)
-17.982 
(48.931)
-19.576 
(47.58)
-20.261 
(49.886)
-27.014 
(48.000)
-44.192 
(52.267)
15 Gross surface water irrigation stock (in 
1,000 RMB, through previous time 
period)*
0.0001 
(0.000)*
0.0001 
(0.000)
0.0001 
(0.000)
0.0001 
(0.000)
0.0001 
(0.000)
0.0001 
(0.0001)
0.0001 
(0.000)
16 Only uses surface water for irrigation 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
80.969 
(64.995)
100.863 
(64.867)
65.087 
(73.483)
104.476 
(65.953)
70.723 
(75.049)
177.353 
(79.256)**
165.336 
(91.591)*
17 Village enterprise annual income  (in real 
2000 RMB)
-0.002 
(0.001)**
-0.002 
(0.001)**
-0.002 
(0.001)
-0.002 
(0.001)**
-0.002 
(0.001)*
-0.002 
(0.001)**
-0.001 
(0.001)
18 Private investment into irrigation 
infrastructure present in village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
76.184 
(43.695)*
66.242 
(42.873)
60.322 
(61.245)
62.431 
(43.708)
58.906 
(63.335)
98.092 
(44.753)**
111.536 
(67.023)*
19 2001 -42.358 
(51.676)
-38.182 
(50.79)
-43.438 
(53.859)
-28.052 
(54.025)
-33.889 
(57.800)
-36.316 
(54.891)
-22.815 
(63.378)
20 2004 -176.11 
(42.51)***
-163.483 
(41.703)***
-155.59 
(43.22)***
-163.491 
(42.494)***
-155.553 
(44.378)***
-163.880 
(45.628)***
-154.823 
(49.618)***
21 Constant 323.75 
(121.79)***
346.297 
(120.75)***
374.33 
(126.23)***
342.197 
(122.09)***
368.80 
(128.736)***
306.906 
(128.405)**
331.010 
(137.50)**
22 R2 0.370 0.410 0.430 0.421 0.441 0.447 0.475
23 observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
24 F-Test for joint significance of MRR 
variables
3.49** 3.01** 3.30** 2.87** 6.96** 4.82*
25 F-Test for joint significance of Fiscal 
Authority variables
0.69 0.28 3.91
26 F-Test for joint significance of Planning 
Authority variables
0.23 0.88 1.09
Fixed Effects IV  
 
In evaluating the impact of MRR, a proxy for the level of central versus local 
control over fiscal authority related to irrigation, on crop water use, several interesting 
results emerge.  First, the variable high level of MRR increases the explanatory power 
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of the models as seen in the higher goodness of fit between Set A, Columns I and II, 
where R
2
 increases from 0.370 to 0.400.  Next, the within parameters of high level of 
MRR are consistently significant and of high magnitude.  A village retaining a high 
share of its irrigation revenue uses 121.41 cubic meters per hectare less than average 
usage during periods when a larger share of revenues are submitted to the upper-level 
irrigation agency, holding all other factors constant (Column 5, Row 2).  When high 
level of MRR and investment rate are interacted to assess if investments made within 
the village during the time when villages retain higher levels of revenue and spending 
discretion impact crop water use, the direction of the coefficient is as anticipated, but 
it is not a significant predictor of village-level crop water savings.  The other revenue 
authority policy variables jointly explain a significant amount of variation in within 
village crop water use rate, according to an F-Test of multiple hypotheses (F = 2.87, 
α≤0.05; Column V, Row 24). 
Due the prevalence of unobserved ―endogenous‖ variables that threaten 
statistical validity within public investment and yields models (Aschauer 1989), the 
analysis utilizes instrumental variables (IV)  2SLS models to address the possibility 
of endogeneity in the treatment variable (high level of MRR).  IV models are based on 
Equations 4 and 5, and results for crop water use are reported in Columns VI and 
VII
16
.  The IV models strengthen the explanatory power of the model and also 
produce several more statistically significant explanatory variables.  In the IV models, 
uses surface water only, and one fiscal policy variable, village has authority to sign 
irrigation contracts, are associated with villages‘ crop water use rate.  When a village 
                                                 
16
 Diagnostics for validity and strength  of IV instruments can be found in Appendix B 
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leader or irrigation manager has authority to sign contracts, the village water use rate 
is 112.20 m
3 
per hectare higher than the average usage when a village does not have 
such authority, holding all other factors constant (Column VII, Row 5).  Such an 
outcome may be a result of local irrigation managers having greater authority to 
contract out canals and access to village water supplies, and utilize more water in a 
quasi-privatized water market form.  Additionally, results indicate that within the 
sample villages, where farmers invest private funds into surface water irrigation 
investment, crop water usage is 111.53 m
3 
per hectare higher than average crop water 
use when there is no private investment activity, holding all else constant (Colum VII, 
Row 18).  Such a finding suggests that private investment may be taking place to aid 
farmers to exploiting greater supplies of water in the form of water distribution and 
extraction equipment such as diesel pumps, pipes and generators.  Private investment 
could also increase water distribution efficiency, reducing seepage in the form of 
lined canals, thus moving higher volumes of water to the farm-plot level.   
The high-MRR level estimates under the IV models are close to the estimates 
under the non-2SLS fixed effect models, indicating a robust result.   
5.5.3.2.  Crop yield and fiscal authority models  
Levels of retention of irrigation revenues are not significantly associated with 
changes in crop yields.  In the random effects models (Table 24, Set B), the models 
indicate an acceptable amount of explanatory power, with the variables used 
explaining 38% of variation in crop yields over the ten-year time period (Column V, 
Row 24).  Several of the explanatory variables are statistically significant.  In the full 
random effects models (Column V), results indicate that a village with private 
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investment into irrigation infrastructure development produces 256 kilograms per 
hectare of wheat more per growing season, than a village without the presence of 
private investment, holding all other factors constant (Row 24).  Villages in Henan 
Province have higher wheat production rate than villages in Ningxia, producing 597 
kilograms per hectare more than the Ningxia average village, holding all else constant 
(Column V, Row 20).  Farm plot size also explains crop yields (Columns I – V, Row 
10).  A one hectare per capita increase in average farm size is associated with 46 
kilograms per hectare less seasonal wheat production. 
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Table 24 Set B:  Impacts of fiscal & planning authority on crop productivity:  
village-level random effects 
Dependent variable: kilograms of wheat per hectare per season (kg / ha / season)
I II III IV V VI VII
β β β β β β β
1 High MRR * Investment Rate 13.059 
(107.88)
21.700 
(117.30)
13.922 
(109.41)
24.848 
(118.15)
-44.172 
(111.67)
-35.021 
(121.21)
2 High level of Marginal Retention of 
Irrigation Revenue (Dummy=1 if 
above average MRR)
-0.598 (1.868) 0.080 
(1.946)
-0.663 
(1.886)
0.099 
(1.974)
-0.361 
(1.858)
0.460  (1.972)
3 Village invests local funds to irrigation 
capital projects (Dummy=1 if yes)
-8.111 
(105.07)
-5.999 
(105.88)
49.954 
(114.93)
4 Irrigation water price set by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-127.98 
(147.86)
-127.34 
(151.406)
-146.427 
(155.59)
5 Irrigation contracts signed by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-86.332 
(118.08)
-56.81 
(175.21)
-82.375 
(119.24)
-86.251 
(128.245)
6 Irrigation fees collected by village  
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-239.46 
(119.14)**
-270.35 
(132.62)**
-271.39 
(142.64)*
7 Allocation decided within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-19.953 
(180.74)
52.444 
(190.57)
8 Delivery coordinated within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-24.43 
(103.23)
64.195 
(115.967)
87.326 
(128.71)
9 Surface water investment per hectare 
(RMB / ha, for time period)
-0.621  (0.650) -0.546 (0.694) -0.609 
(0.720)
-0.550 
(0.700)
-0.640 
(0.729)
-0.735 
(0.698)
-0.858 (0.741)
10 Sown area per capita (ha / capita) -45.751 
(25.124)*
-45.322 
(25.33)*
-44.679 
(27.13)*
-45.70 
(25.59)*
-44.100 
(27.417)
-46.292 
(26.403)*
-44.50 (29.62)
11 Soil Type (Dummy=1 if soil type is xx) 135.717 
(142.698)
135.39 
(143.63)
172.15 
(144.86)
135.19 
(145.26)
167.07 
(147.94)
103.777 
(157.46)
122.377 
(167.62)
12 Water user association (Dummy=1 if 
uses a wua)
27.703 
(114.138)
27.094 
(115.10)
192.96 
(143.92)
49.306 
(134.28)
174.53 
(150.139)
35.206 
(126.27)
157.03 
(166.17)
13 Contract (Dummy=1 if uses 
contracting)
-48.538 
(103.303)
-45.049 
(105.17)
7.129 
(118.048)
-34.346 
(110.38)
-8.701 
(122.170)
-56.376 
(107.66)
-31.067 
(126.05)
14 Number of laborers in village 0.097 (0.075) 0.097 (0.075) 0.126 
(0.080)
0.096 (0.076) 0.128 
(0.082)
0.115 
(0.080)
0.142 (0.088)
15 Drought (Dummy=1 if drought 
reported during time period)
-136.86 
(102.09)
-133.46 
(104.08)
-124.98 
(107.73)
-134.90 
(104.81)
-124.96 
(108.48)
-135.63 
(107.64)
-142.86 
(113.27)
16 Gross surface water irrigation stock 
(in 1,000 RMB, through previous time 
period)*
0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 
(0.0001)
0.0002 
(0.000)
0.0002 
(0.001)
0.0002 
(0.0001)
0.0002 
(0.0001)
0.0002 
(0.000)
17 Only uses surface water for irrigation 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
193.43 
(110.50)*
194.81 
(111.36)*
168.17 
(113.42)
198.04 
(112.32)*
166.45 
(115.22)
180.84 
(121.85)
167.57 
(127.26)
18 Private investment into irrigation 
infrastructure present in village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
200.59 
(89.76)**
201.11 
(90.61)**
253.34 
(119.16)**
198.65 
(91.48)**
256.07 
(120.78)**
167.85 
(93.857)*
186.48 
(130.02)
19 Village enterprise annual income  (in 
real 2000 RMB)
-0.002  (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 
(0.002)
-0.002 
(0.002)
-0.002 
(0.002)
-0.002 
(0.002)
-0.002 (0.002)
20 Henan Province 678.26 
(131.72)***
678.87 
(134.02)***
603.09 
(139.55)***
682.85 
(135.13)***
596.62 
(142.98)***
600.66 
(146.90)***
545.24 
(158.16)***
21 2001 36.928 
(114.684)
38.734 
(116.11)
23.984 
(118.90)
50.757 
(120.58)
19.57 
(123.80)
21.786 
(119.47)
6.215 
(127.02)
22 2004 -52.015 
(98.447)
-52.57 
(100.26)
-36.783 
(102.45)
-52.753 
(101.23)
-38.039 
(102.97)
-90.657 
(104.73)
-75.464 
(107.96)
23 Constant 2303.81 
(200.04)***
2296.2 
(202.81)***
2339.2 
(206.73)***
2291.99 
(204.30)***
2344.56 
(210.23)***
2386.76 
(224.74)***
2411.7 
(233.77)***
24 R2 0.354 0.354 0.379 0.355 0.380 0.339 0.366
25 observations 165 0.95 165 165 165 165 165
26 F-Test for joint significance of MRR 
variables
0.04 0.12 0.06 0.31 0.11
27 F-Test for joint significance of Fiscal 
Authority variables
4.48 4.58 1.02
29 F-Test for joint significance of  
Planning Authority variables
0.31 3.91
Random Effects IV  
 
Across IV and non-IV random effects models estimating the impact of fiscal 
and resource planning authority on crop yields, one element of a village‘s fiscal 
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structure appears consistently as associated with crop yields outcomes.  In villages 
where village-level leaders (WUA leaders, WUA representatives, village leaders, 
contractors, etc.) collect the irrigation fees from the farmers, crop yields are less than 
villages where external irrigation agency staff collects the fees (Column 7, Row 6), 
holding all other factors constant.  Overall, MRR, fiscal or resource planning 
variables as categories elicited no structural changes in crop yield outcomes.   
5.5.3.3.  Farmer income and fiscal authority models  
Model Set C (Table 25), estimates how changes in a village‘s authority over 
irrigation‘s fiscal policy and resource planning impacts farmer income.  To 
accomplish this, a fixed effects model is specified to control for unobserved time 
invariant factors at the village-level.  An R
2
 of 0.64 indicates overall good fit of 
model parameters to the sample village characteristics.   
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Table 25 Set C:  Impacts of fiscal & planning authority on farmer income:  
village-level fixed effects 
Dependent variable : annual per capita net farmer income
I II III IV V VI VII
β β β β β β β
1 High MRR * Investment Rate 4.231 
(3.523)
4.299 
(3.760)
4.209 (3.545) 4.133 (3.790) 4.283 
(3.545)
4.092 
(3.903)
2 High level of Marginal Retention of 
Irrigation Revenue (Dummy=1 if above 
average MRR)
-495.41 
(189.57)***
-514.91 
(206.79)**
-513.16 
(192.08)***
-511.62 
(207.49)**
-497.26 
(190.41)***
-457.33 
(218.66)**
3 Village invests local funds to irrigation 
capital projects (Dummy=1 if yes)
-5.535 
(179.28)
-23.741 
(179.07)
227.166 
(207.09)
4 Irrigation water price set by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-86.800 
(273.28)
-128.93 
(276.88)
-17.554 
(2.88.69)
5 Irrigation contracts signed by village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
302.54 
(216.79)
275.03 
(217.16)
431.58 
(233.49)*
6 Irrigation fees collected by village  
(Dummy=1 if yes)
120.68 
(202.11)
259.281 
(221.51)
201.79 
(243.96)
7 Allocation decided within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
266.18 
(313.48)
279.65 
(331.69)
308.21 
(367.62)
8 Delivery coordinated within village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-182.83 
(169.67)
-266.66 
(191.37)
-75.93 
(228.10)
9 Surface water investment per hectare 
(RMB / ha, for time period)
0.616 
(1.252)
-0.073 
(1.258)
-0.209 
(1.319)
0.061   (1.26) -0.020 
(1.322)
-0.212 
(1.270)
-1.022 
(1.415)
10 Sown area per capita (ha / capita) 78.22 
(60.937)
77.090 
(59.474)
59.551 
(63.208)
68.850 
(60.32)
48.548 
(63.952)
80.335 
(59.84)
25.686 
(68.22)
11 Water user association (Dummy=1 if 
uses a wua)
-100.98 
(215.90)
-164.42 
(212.50)
-269.56 
(258.003)
-82.61 
(246.73)
-230.45 
(273.046)
-226.574 
(221.80)
-476.996 
(324.89)
12 Contract (Dummy=1 if uses 
contracting)
-441.15 
(181.51)**
-440.04 
(182.19)**
-527.51 
(195.97)***
-395.85 
(197.96)**
-470.59 
(207.93)**
-466.69 
(185.13)**
-630.97 
(222.54)***
13 Number of laborers in village -0.328 
(0.250)
-0.422 
(0.247)*
-0.445 
(0.264)*
-0.373 
(0.250)
-0.374 
(0.268)
-0.439 
(0.250)*
-0.379 
(0.288)
14 Drought (Dummy=1 if drought 
reported during time period)
-118.69 
(174.22)
-55.102 
(173.69)
-95.165 
(182.86)
-39.129 
(174.934)
-87.222 
(184.10)
-74.558 
(176.04)
-162.009 
(194.18)
15 Gross surface water irrigation stock (in 
1,000 RMB, through previous time 
period)*
-0.000 
(0.0002)
0.000 
(0.000)
-0.000 
(0.000)
0.0000 
(0.000)
-0.0001 
(0.0003)
0.000 
(0.000)
-0.000 
(0.000)
16 Only uses surface water for irrigation 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
-89.746 
(241.49)
-96.238 
(241.29)
-91.916 
(273.72)
-119.403 
(243.23)
-89.913 
(275.08)
-36.91 
(248.53)
83.187 
(340.91)
17 Village enterprise annual income  (in 
real 2000 RMB)
0.0008 
(0.003)
0.0005 
(0.003)
0.002 
(0.004)
0.0003 
(0.003)
0.002 (0.004) 0.000 
(0.003)
0.001 
(0.004)
18 Private investment into irrigation 
infrastructure present in village 
(Dummy=1 if yes)
133.13 
(161.33)
83.970 
(158.58)
102.365 
(218.81)
85.023 
(160.64)
132.238 
(222.41)
87.488 
(159.33)
-38.702 
(247.94)
19 2001 -1290.7 
(189.51)***
-1316.1 
(186.26)***
-1273.5 
(199.52)***
-1337.3 
(195.42)***
-1267.9 
(209.64)***
-1340.2 
(189.56)***
-1288.7 
(234.03)***
20 2004 -1050.2 
(152.86)***
-1018.6 
(149.91)***
-994.627 
(156.63)***
-996.85 
(151.36)***
-969.89 
(158.17)***
-1042.1 
(153.0)***
-982.62 
(182.73)***
21 Constant 3219.6 
(436.80)***
3406.99 
(433.52)***
3424.6 
(454.08)***
3384.7 
(433.88)***
3365.9 
(454.03)***
3434.8 
(440.59)***
3398.9 
(506.3)***
22 R
2 0.599 0.626 0.630 0.634 0.641 0.626 0.640
23 observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
24 F-Test for joint significance of MRR 
variables
3.42** 3.14** 3.57** 3.06** 6.83** 4.45*
25 F-Test for joint significance of Fiscal 
Authority variables
0.54 0.72 4.7
26 F-Test for joint significance of Planning 
Authority variables
0.99 1.32 0.85
Fixed Effects IV  
 
In the fixed effects models for the outcome of net annual farmer income 
(Columns I – V), aside from year variation, which confirms observations in the 
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descriptive results that incomes, although still small, rose between 2001 and 2008, 
there are several other coefficients of interest.  According to the model results, 
contract management is negatively and strongly associated with farmer income (Row 
12).  In villages that adopted contract management, farmer incomes declined by 470 
Yuan per capita compared to pre-contracting average income (Colum 5, Row 12), 
holding other factors constant.  In fact contracting is also associated with another 
irrigation development outcome, water conservation, where contracting style 
management in villages is associated with higher crop water use rates (Set A, Column 
IV, Row 12) than traditional collective management, holding other factors constant, 
confirming earlier results by Wang et al (2005).  The prevalence of contracting as a 
significant predictor of irrigation development outcomes suggests that contractor‘s 
fee structure somehow results in higher overall water use, and perhaps higher levying 
of tariffs imposes higher costs to farmers, without contributing to any increases in 
agricultural yields.   
The bureaucratization and re-centralization of irrigation line agency control 
over villages had a significant and positive impact on farmer incomes.  On average, 
annual farmer net income, was 457 Yuan  more per capita than the low revenue 
authority village average once villages conceded revenue authority to higher level 
agencies, holding all else constant (Column VII, Row 2), once correcting for 
endogeneity of revenue authority in the model via 2SLS.  Additionally, to evaluate 
multiple parameters related to categories of policy-related variables, the null 
hypothesis that for all MRR related parameters,          , is tested implying 
that revenue authority policies as a category have no predictive power in the model.  
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Results of F-Tests comparing restricted versus unrestricted models reject the null of 
no predictive power of MRR variables as a category, indicating that revenue authority 
related variables have predictive power to estimate changes in annual net farmer 
income (F=3.06, α≤0.05; Column V, Row 24).   
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter reveals several important results from shifts in the locus of 
authority over irrigation provision in northern China‘s villages.  First, upper level 
irrigation agencies are re-consolidating fiscal control, and taking local fiscal decision 
making out of the hands of village leadership and directly intervening in village-level 
irrigation projects.  Although this re-consolidation of fiscal and resource irrigation 
planning authority is not resulting in water savings, it is reducing the ―fee burden‖ of 
farmers and contributing to higher incomes.  The direct intervention of the upper-
level water agencies in village-level irrigation development, following the tax for fee 
reform is having on effect, although challenges remain in how to meet the national 
government‘s dual goals of saving water, while not impacting farmer incomes.   
The revenue authority analysis also reveals that where villages retain contract 
type management, the local corporatism structure of the irrigation management hurts 
farmer incomes.  Another way to interpret this is that the higher fees charged by 
farmers for agricultural water use is not resulting in crop revenue increases sufficient 
to off-set the higher irrigation water use rates.  Although the survey does not explain 
why some villages continue to retain higher levels of discretionary spending funds in 
the hand of the village leadership and contractors, this finding underscores the 
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government‘s recent decision to re-assert control over village –level irrigation 
finances.   
As one looks at how shifts in environmental infrastructure impact water use, 
of particular importance in China‘s thirsty northern plains, this chapter finds that 
contrary to much water governance theory, local control and discretionary authority 
by local leadership fails to provide irrigation services that benefit farmers, or saves 
water. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
Having reviewed evidence on the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
irrigation development in northern China, this chapter evaluates the hypotheses put 
forth in Chapters 4 and 5 and summarizes findings to answer the two research 
questions posed within those chapters.  To recall, this dissertation sought to answer 
the larger question, how has China‘s decentralization policy impacted irrigation 
development?  The dissertation ten explored two aspects of decentralization by 
focusing on village-level irrigation investment and asked:  How do targeting and 
demand side factors drive different sources to invest in village-level irrigation 
development?  How does the degree of local fiscal authority over irrigation funding 
impact village-level irrigation system performance? 
Indeed, the overwhelming evidence presented in this dissertation confirms that 
fiscal structure impacts irrigation development – via diverse investment portfolios and 
localized authority over irrigation decision making – but not in the anticipated ways.  
Village-collective management lacked the capacity or resources to effectively manage 
irrigation systems and such a decentralized system left China‘s small scale irrigation 
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works in shambles.  To address this widespread structural decay of China‘s irrigation 
systems, descriptive and multivariate results show a clear re-centralizing of 
investment and irrigation management by upper-level irrigation agencies.  The levers 
of control are shifting away from village collective control over irrigation 
management, and such shifts have large consequences for how village level irrigation 
works in northern China. 
This chapter first revisits the study findings regarding the drivers of irrigation 
investment from three different funding sources.  The next section reviews study 
findings on how local investment authority impacts village-level irrigation system 
performance, also referred to throughout the paper as irrigation development 
outcomes.  Following this, possible strategies are proposed for policy makers to 
maximize the effectiveness of public and private investment into irrigation 
development, while also achieving the aims of increased crop yields, water 
conservation and increasing farmer incomes.  Finally, the key theoretical findings of 
this study are discussed in terms of how this empirical work contributes to the fiscal 
decentralization and irrigation development literatures 
6.2. Summary of findings  
 
6.2.1.  Study Overview 
This dissertation set out to explain how the fiscal processes around irrigation 
infrastructure decision making result in a variety of village-level irrigation investment 
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portfolios, and how decentralized fiscal structure impacts irrigation development 
outcomes of agricultural productivity, water conservation, and poverty alleviation.   
Using fiscal decentralization and irrigation development theory, the preceding 
chapters reveal the how both upper-level government targeting strategies and local 
level demand side drivers determine public and private investment in village –level 
irrigation infrastructure.  The study also investigates how local revenue and water 
planning authority impacts irrigation development performance by examining a 
number of different measures of village level authority, ranging from control over 
discretionary funds, to decision making over key financial aspects such as fee setting 
and contract signing, among others.  Results from the empirical analysis show that 
securing a future water supply, by building infrastructure to access and store water, 
drives farmers to invest and that decentralized control over revenue and spending 
decision making matters significantly for water use and farmer incomes, but not in the 
ways hypothesized.   
6.2.1.1.  Drivers of diverse village level irrigation investment 
 
Upper-level government is not following a progressive irrigation investment 
strategy.  
A progressive irrigation investment strategy would follow the pattern of 
higher upper –level investment into villages with low-levels of irrigation development, 
and  lower levels of funding to villages with highly developed irrigation systems.  
According to study results, the government is targeting investment funds toward 
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increasing the quality of irrigated land in northern China but not expanding the 
quantity of surface water irrigated area.  That is, upper-level government investment 
selection criteria are designed to target villages with higher levels of ability to irrigate 
land in their villages designated as ‗effective irrigated area‘.  This targeting strategy 
departs from earlier strategies by the Chinese government to invest in irrigation 
development with the main aim to expand irrigated area (Cai 2010), but is supported 
by previous cost effectiveness studies that report that focusing on improving quality is 
a more effective irrigating development strategy than expanding irrigated area 
(Hayami and Kikuchi 1978).  If the public investment strategy reflects the policy aim 
of increasing irrigated area in order to spur agricultural productivity and increase 
standards of living in rural areas (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006), either the government 
struggles to reach under-served areas, or alternatively, focuses investment on villages 
with demonstrated capacity to maintain irrigated land.  The targeting strategy appears 
to focus on increasing quality of irrigated land, rather than expanding the quantity of 
irrigated area. 
Upper-level agencies allocate more to villages with unreliable water supply 
than the village collectives themselves. 
As one looks to see what factors determine a village‘s irrigation investment 
portfolio, results indicate that unreliable water supply spurs investment from two 
groups, upper-level government and farmers, but not from the village collective.  
When considering the village-level and upper-level government policy priorities, this 
trend makes sense.  Upper-level government not only makes investments to ensure 
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economic and agricultural development, other priorities include poverty alleviation, 
and guaranteeing stable agricultural output throughout periods of natural disaster 
(including severe droughts), leading to the next major finding of the dissertation. 
Farmers are reacting to water scarcity by investing private funds into 
infrastructure that secures water supply. 
In villages utilizing only surface water resources for irrigation, farmers are 
willing to invest private funds toward irrigation infrastructure during drought periods, 
holding other factors constant.  This finding presents a shift in the investment 
behavior of farmers in agriculture-related assets, an encouraging sign given the lack 
of clarity around canal ownership rights and previous dearth of private investment 
into fixed assets observed in the 1980s (Dong 2000).  Ministry of Water Resources as 
recently as 2007 expressed desire to mobilize farmers to improve irrigation and water 
conservancy structure and note serious concern over lack of farmer investment into 
irrigation infrastructure (Wang 2007).  Rural China‘s drive toward modernization 
requires the participation and investment of farmers, and according to these results, 
farmers, WUAs and contractors are contributing to this aim.   
Results from this study suggest that farmers‘ increased investment activity is a 
response to increasing uncertainty around water supplies necessary to water crops.  In 
recent years, the water reliability from canals has worsened and farmers have resorted 
to finding alternate supplies to augment water supplied via the surface water systems.  
Groundwater wells have proliferated (Zhang, Wang et al. 2008), and in places 
without groundwater, farmers appear to be investing into storage, pumps and piping 
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in order to secure higher volumes of water from the system and store that water for 
use as needed for the crop watering schedule.  Although this study does not 
investigate how farmers cooperate and organize funding strategies to build such 
infrastructures, this would be an interesting area for future research.   
A second issue arising from the types of private and public investment 
portfolios found in this analysis is the lack of coordination and system-wide 
fragmentation resulting from such diverse sources developing along inter-connected 
surface water irrigation systems.  Lack of clear ownership rights along canal systems 
has long been identified as leading to under-investment by villages and by farmers 
over water canals.  Although property rights over canals still belong to the state and 
are managed by the irrigation districts, village-level operators gain a right to collect 
fees for service within the villages, leading to improved canal repair and upkeep of 
the small scale irrigation systems.   
This set of canal responsibility clarifications may help explain the observed 
increases in private investment behavior.  Clear ownership, as written up in contracts 
and operating agreements, designate responsibilities for upkeep and maintenance to 
specific parties, be they farmers, contractors, WUAs or village collectives.  Once the 
responsibilities for maintenance and rehabilitation are tied to a specific responsibility 
party, in theory this leads to rights of fees associated with that canal system and 
motivation to improve the performance of those systems to keep revenues flowing.  
There is movement toward transfer of management rights to contractors and 
associations in the form of enterprises, joint-stock cooperatives and associations that 
have the right to manage and collect fees along the canal system, but clarity over the 
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ownership designations along canal systems is necessary to spur private and village-
level capital investment.  
6.2.1.2. Impacts of local authority on irrigation development 
outcomes 
Upper level irrigation agencies are taking local fiscal decision making out of 
the hands of village leadership. 
A clear shift in the locus of decision making authority over village level 
surface water irrigation investments is observed, with increased revenue authority 
being held at the county and irrigation district level.  The likely explanations for this 
behavior include village collectives‘ failure to invest much money toward irrigation 
infrastructure and in the cases where village collectives do invest, their projects to not 
reflect the water conservation mandates issued by the county and irrigation district 
governing agency, the Ministry of Water Resources.  One can see that the highly 
decentralized irrigation provision system left north China‘s irrigation networks in 
shambles, and upper-level agencies are working to increase coordinated development 
and projects by re-consolidating control over irrigation development in China‘s 
villages.  
Although the reasons underlying the re-consolidation of irrigation 
development decision making are beyond the scope of this dissertation, the 2002 tax-
for-fee system marked a policy shift that constrained village collectives‘ ability to 
levy fees on villagers, and led to decreased discretionary funds in village collective 
budgets.  In this way, the tax-for-fee system also removed many of the public goods 
provision responsibilities from the village collective.  Public goods provision, 
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including irrigation system investment, is now handled on a case –by- case allocation 
system, as managed by the irrigation district or county-level water resources bureau.  
This finding, combined with the determinants of private investment discussion above, 
suggests that going forward, upper-level irrigation agencies, WUAs, contractors and 
farmers will be the primary investors into village-level irrigation rehabilitation and 
upkeep.  Given that the distribution of funds from the upper-level government 
agencies targets already developed areas, the development landscape will become 
more uneven as investments flow toward villages with existing high levels of capacity 
to irrigated their land.   
Contrary to much water governance theory, discretionary control by village 
leadership failed to provide irrigation services that benefitted farmers 
This finding speaks directly to the ongoing debate among environmental 
planners and political ecologists over the optimal locus of decision making over local 
water resource planning.  For the case of irrigation development in China, this 
research shows that greater village-level authority over discretionary funds generated 
by irrigation fee revenue negatively impacts farmer income and that greater upper 
level government control over village irrigation investment projects, although not 
resulting in water savings, does reduce  the ―fee burden‖ of farmers and contribute to 
higher farmer incomes. 
Reconsolidation of planning and fiscal authority benefits farmer incomes for 
two main reasons.  First, although village collectives in China do not have the power 
to tax their citizens, up through 2002 they wielded discretionary power to levy fees 
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for various services.  The 2002 rural tax and fee reform eliminated local governments‘ 
power to levy fees on citizens in order to increases rural incomes.  An unintended 
consequence of this reform was that provision of rural public goods declined, and 
villages and townships struggled to maintain day-to-day operation. Following initial 
implementation of the reform, the central government found itself facing massive 
declines in rural public goods provision, and in response to this latest development, 
the central government stepped up its direct involvement in the provision of public 
goods in the countryside.   
Next, the direct involvement of Ministry of Water Resources‘ sub-agencies in 
village irrigation development introduces more modern technologies aimed at 
increasing efficiency and production on China‘s farms.  The re-consolidation of 
investments suggests a secondary motivation on the part of the Ministry of Water 
Resources, not only to reduce the fee burden on farmers, but also to allow for direct 
involvement of irrigation engineers and professionals in village irrigation projects.  
The direct involvement of irrigation district professionals allows the regional 
irrigation agencies to coordinate projects throughout their service area, and also to 
align village projects with regional policy goals, such as conserving water or 
increasing crop yields.  Although farmers have been slow to adopt many water saving 
technologies (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007), the government‘s unrelenting push toward 
agricultural modernization will be introduced to villages through irrigation district 
and county-level water bureaus‘ technical assistance and close cooperation with 
agency agriculture professionals.   
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6.2.2.  Summary of findings 
In summary, the two aspects of decentralization investigated in this study, 
diverse irrigation investment and authority over local discretionary fees from 
irrigation revenue, have become less decentralized in recent years.  Ministry of Water 
Resources sub-agencies, namely county water resource bureaus and irrigation districts 
are taking back irrigation development control from the villages.  These agencies 
appear to have targeted strategies for irrigation development investments that direct 
funds toward improving irrigation services in villages with existing high capacity to 
provide irrigation water to lands designated as irrigated area.  Villages with low levels 
of irrigation development receive significantly less funding than villages that are able 
to irrigate their intended irrigated area.  Investment activity by farmers and 
contractors is increasing compared with investment in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Given this set of results, the state of decentralization in China‘s irrigation sector is 
shifting, toward a more hybrid approach to irrigation development involving 
irrigation agencies and farmers, contractors and WUAs, but bypassing the village 
collective.   
6.3.  Policy Implications 
The findings of this dissertation are important because of the way they 
generate different kinds of insight into understanding why northern China‘s local 
irrigation projects struggle to achieve their desired outcomes.  When a study is rooted 
at the level of the village, it is able to move away from sweeping generalizations of 
how villages operate and refocus attention on where much of the ‗action‘ and 
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diversity of China‘s irrigation sector is located, amongst village collective leaders, 
irrigation managers and farmers. 
The conflicting priorities for northern China‘s rural development are stark in 
northern China.  On one hand, the government recognizes the emerging water crisis 
and the threat of water scarcity‘s impact on economic development and food security 
(Wang 1999; Guoying 2002; Zhu, Giordano et al. 2004; He, Cheng et al. 2005).  On 
the other hand, government policy continues to overlook long-term water resource 
availability constraints in order to secure the immediate livelihoods of farmers that 
rely on cheap groundwater and surface water for irrigation (Wang, Huang et al. 2006), 
and avoids measures to curb demand for irrigation water such as increasing the price 
of irrigation water (Feng 1999).  Recent attempts to increase water savings via 
irrigation governance reforms at the village-level have not been widely accepted, nor 
have they achieved the anticipated water savings (Wang, Xu et al. 2006).  Scholars 
and policy makers face no easy solution when it comes to enhancing the agricultural 
capabilities in the countryside, given the limited availability of arable land and 
present water constraints.   
To achieve its irrigation development policy goals of conserving water, 
increasing crop yields and increasing farmer incomes, China‘s government changed 
the levers of control over fiscal and water resources planning in villages.  This 
dissertation is the first study to empirically present this shift.  Such changes in 
investment strategies, succeeded mainly in lowering the fee burden on farmers, but 
these shifts have yet to results in water savings or increased crop yields.  Scholars 
have found that returns to public investment into agricultural research and 
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development contribute the largest marginal gains to productive capacity and poverty 
alleviation for rural China (Fan, Zhang et al. 2002).  While irrigation specific 
investments were found to have only moderate impact on overall productivity due to 
the smaller returns of agricultural than non-agricultural enterprises (Fan, Zhang et al. 
2002), the potential benefits of upgraded irrigation systems not included in the study  
include potential gains to farmers in time-savings, water tariff savings, and supply 
reliability (in order to grow higher value, more water fickle crops).  In order to realize 
these gains from investment however, infrastructure investments ought to be tailored 
closely to the local requirements of farmers and constructed in order to minimize 
overall water usage, while improving the timing and reliability of delivery.   
Re-consolidation of fiscal and water planning investment authority by the 
water resources bureaucracy re-introduces irrigation engineers and professionals into 
village irrigation development at a critical time in northern China‘s rural development.  
Land and water quality degradation over the last 20 years of China‘s industrialization, 
coupled with village and farmers‘ reliance on traditional farming methods, has left 
China‘s grain supply vulnerable to extreme weather, water shortages and vermin.  
The impacts of fiscal re-concentration, as noted above, are intended not only to 
control funding, but have a greater organizational aim to allow for direct involvement 
and oversight by irrigation professionals into village irrigation development and 
operational activities.  This movement away from an ‗every village for itself‘ self-
sufficiency development model, allows the agencies to coordinate and strategically 
plan for regional irrigation development. 
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Although results indicate farmers‘ willingness to invest capital, with a likely 
expectation of returns on investment, results also present a host of new policy issues 
for local and regional governments.  First, capital investments such as pumps, new 
canals and diesel engines, in addition to digging mini reservoirs, indicate the 
proliferation of more localized water supply systems, which may benefit the village 
with storage and distribution capacity, but also result in decreasing availability of 
water for neighboring villages, especially those downstream.  Within the regional or 
river basin level system, downstream users may receive less water as upstream users 
secure higher volumes of the fixed water supply to store in ponds and tanks.  
Evidence is emerging that farmers in China are investing heavily in on-farm water 
storage, to respond to uncertainty in surface supply, capture more runoff and return 
flows, and allow flexibility in scheduling (Molden, Bin et al. 2005).  Such patterns 
indicate a need for greater regional planning and supervision to guarantee supply for 
all users along branch canal systems.  
What are the best ways to achieve gains in agricultural efficiency in a way that 
also enhances rural livelihoods?  Regardless of the source, investment into irrigation 
infrastructure has the potential to increase incomes in three ways.  First, by 
decreasing the water volume requirement and overall expenditure on water so that the 
overall private input cost per crop production unit is decreased.
17
  Second, by freeing 
                                                 
17
 It is acknowledged that with a lack of farm plot level volumetric pricing, this income gain may only 
be realized at the village-level when the village water manager receives an incentive to reduce water 
consumption. Wang, J., Z. Xu, et al. (2006). "Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in 
China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings, farmer income, and poverty? ." 
Agricultural Economics 34(3): 315-330. 
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up labor required to wait for unreliable water supply, and time spent locating 
alternative water sources, so that this labor can be allotted to non-agriculture related 
enterprises, including small businesses, wage labor, and education
18
.  Third, improved 
water reliability allows farmers to move away from low priced grain production, to 
grow higher value crops such as field vegetables, fruits and other cash crops that have 
more specific watering requirements and generate higher returns on inputs (Gommes 
1997).  The increasing territoriality over water provision by farmers is a trend that 
needs immediate attention by regional water planners.  
6.4.  Key theoretical findings and contributions 
In addition to direct policy implications, this research represents an important 
contribution from a theoretical standpoint towards 1) understanding the role of water 
scarcity in public and private investment behavior and 2) assessing how shifts in 
fiscal and water planning authority over irrigation investments contribute to local 
irrigation development and 3) the impacts of decentralization on distribution of 
investment.   
This first key theoretical implication of this study‘s findings is that despite 
upper-level government investment into village‘s irrigation infrastructure, under 
water scarce conditions farmers invest their private funds into infrastructure provision.  
Scholars of irrigation investment in lesser developed nations have found that when 
governments provide large capital investments in common pool goods, individuals 
                                                 
18
 Fan, Zhang et al 2002 find that investments in education lead to the highest reductions in rural 
poverty in China.  Therefore the opportunity cost for labor becomes higher as it takes children away 
from education, and adults away from other forms of technical training. 
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will not contribute their personal money to building or maintaining such goods 
(Ostrom, 2002).  Results from this study challenge existing knowledge on farmers‘ 
(private) irrigation infrastructure investment behavior by showing that farmers facing 
water uncertainty, in the form of drought and limited water supply options, are 
willing to investment private money toward irrigation infrastructure development.   
Clear canal ownership designation when canals are managed by WUAs and 
contractors also increases the likelihood that farmers will invest their funds into 
upkeep and development of the village canal system.  This finding support  previous 
work on the importance of ownership rights to incentivize private investment (Kung 
1995; Lohmar, Wang et al. 2003), and introduces findings on ownership structure into 
China‘s irrigation development scholarship.  This movement towards a quasi-
privatized irrigation services system under the management of a profit-driven 
irrigation contractor differs from ownership models in other developing countries.  
Although the responsibility and ownership structures are more clear than under the 
village collective system, privatized irrigation services appear to hurt farmer incomes 
and is a rich area for further research.   
The second important and related theoretical implication of this study is that a 
hybrid regional investment and irrigation planning model, involving regional 
irrigation agencies and farmers, results in better outcomes for farmers than village 
collective management of the irrigation system.  This finding adds to a growing 
literature over the spectrum of decentralization present in managing environmental 
resources in the developing world (Ribot, Agrawal et al. 2006) and in particular 
supports other studies questioning the ability of local governments to handle the job 
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of local resource management (Larson 2002).  Prior to 2002, China‘s decentralized 
irrigation development model placed the village collective leadership in control of 
village irrigation management, investment and operations with little concern over 
their capacity to effectively manage irrigation.  The village collective‘s responsibility 
over irrigation management failed due to several reasons namely:  1) rent-seeking 
from irrigation fees (Repetto 1986), 2) lack of expertise in irrigation technology and 
management (Blanke, Rozelle et al. 2007), 3) lack of funds to maintain and build 
infrastructure (Huang, Rozelle et al. 2006) and 4) lack of financial incentives to invest 
into agriculture-related infrastructure (Oi 1999; Faguet 2002).  This fiscal and 
planning decentralization style of village collective management of irrigation left 
China‘s irrigation infrastructure in ruins, while also hurting farmers by levying 
innumerable fees on farmers as a revenue source for village collective budgets.  
According this study‘s descriptive and analytical findings, a gradual transition to 
direct cooperation between irrigation agencies and farmers has increased farmer 
incomes, and certainly has the potential to lead to long-run transitions to more 
modern and efficient farming practices.  The fiscal style of irrigation infrastructure 
provision matters for creating an agricultural environment that works for farmers, and 
keep farmers on the land growing the food that sustains China‘s growing appetite.   
The question asked by many scholars of decentralization is who benefits and 
who loses under a decentralized fiscal system?  For the case of irrigation development 
in China, this study adds to a body of theoretical work contending that decentralized 
fiscal frameworks are not progressive and that less-well-off villages receive fewer 
funds from the central government and continue to invest less under decentralization 
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(Faguet 2002; Zhang 2006).  Thus supporting a skeptic‘s view of the dangers of 
decentralization (Prud'homme 1995)  However, how decentralization impacts equity 
and efficiency in the case of irrigation development may require a different means of 
assessing disparity than income disparity measures due to limitations on water 
resources across the region.  Studies in the Philippines found that investment into 
increasing the quality of irrigated land was more cost effective than investing to 
equalize irrigated land holdings across villages by expanding irrigated area (Hayami 
and Kikuchi 1978).  The natural resource dependence of irrigation development 
makes the study of disparities and distribution different than simply studying income 
and wealth distribution.  Assessing how distribution of irrigation development 
investment funds contributes to larger scale benefits, such as regional, river basin or 
national, would be a valuable area for future research.   
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APPENDIX A: Instrumental variable diagnostics 
Table 26 Instrumental variable diagnostics 
 
APPENDIX B: Crop productivity and crop water 
use calculation procedures 
C1.  Calculation Procedure for agricultural productivity of surface water irrigated 
land in North China Irrigation Management Data 2001-08. 
To calculate kilograms per irrigated hectare for surface water wheat yields for 2001, 
2004, and 2008, I follow the following procedure. 
Based on 2001-2008 data from the village form survey and surface water 
management form, we can systematically calculate crop productivity rates for each 
village in the sample.  The data is from the village form section D which contains a 
breakdown of the crop production per area divides between irrigated and non-
irrigated village land holdings.    
Steps: 
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1) Select forms D from Village Forms from three data sets: Ningxia 2004; Hebei 
and Henan 2004; village forms 2001.  Copy into new Data form for calculating crop 
productivity in variables folder of dissertation proposal. 
2) Synchronized variables between a) sections D in Ningxia Henan and Hebei 
for 2004 data forms; b) section D between 2001 and 2004. 
3) Standardize crop codes between all data sets.  Crop codes changed between 
2001 and 2004.  I update 2001 dataset to 2004/08 codes. 
4) Village form does not have local crop prices for 1995 – 2001.  Ask to use 
Household survey to create average crop price data base for 2001 –Table E (this step 
not relevant for yield measures). 
5) To find per mu value, multiply RMB per JIN * JIN per MU = RMB / MU.  
The convert MU to hectare.  
6) Next, calculate rate of kilogram per actual irrigated area.   
C2.  Crop water use measurement procedure for village-level survey results from 
North China Irrigation Management Data 2001-08. 
To calculate cubic meters of surface water per irrigated hectare per growing season 
for 2001, 2004, and 2008, I use the following procedure. 
The village crop water use patterns are recorded in several different ways depending 
on the villages‘ irrigation system specifications.  A surface water manager could 
report water use as: gravity irrigation by area, gravity by volume and, pumped 
irrigation, I each of the irrigation methods in order to get a rate of water use per area 
of irrigated land, for wheat crops. 
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Steps: 
1. Gravity irrigation by volume.  Calculated as: m3/mu/app* # apps/period = 
m
3
/mu/growing period;  
2. Pumped surface water irrigation.  Calculated as 
hour/app/mu*m
3
/hour*#apps/period = m3/mu/growing period; 
3. Gravity irrigation by area. Field area(cm2)*waterdepth (cm)/1000000 * 
1/irrigated area; 
4. Sum water use for season by adding water per application (cubic meters per 
season); 
5. Divide total water applied by irrigated area; 
6. Convert units to be standardized to a cubic unit of water per irrigated area. 
Notes.  The crop water use measures, when comparing them to household level crop 
sales, we can see that the majority of water use goes toward grain that is not sold but 
used for household or to fulfill grain quota.  Therefore the water data collected does 
not cover where a farmers‘ discretionary water use is going, that is what smaller cash 
crop the farmer plants to make a living/profit.  These would be difficult to measure 1) 
because they are often intercropped or shared in with wheat / corn; and 2 because 
both the water amount and precision of measure is low.  Further studies on the highest 
economic use of irrigation water crop water must integrate these smaller scale crops.  
Where we can measure which crop requires the lowest water use for the highest a. 
volume; b. return per volume 
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